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Abstract 
 
Conscious awareness is a fascinating psychological function of the human mind. It 
describes a subjective first-person phenomenon (Damasio, 1998), that consists in 
both the cognitive processes of the self and its interactions with the external world.  
Therefore the construction of the self-awareness includes all the experiences re-
lated to the body (James, 1980), in order to process and to represent the perceptual, 
motor, emotional and cognitive states as own bodily states.  
This function results to be impaired in several neuropsychological and neurologi-
cal disorders (Flashman, 2002), causing interferences with the personal identity or 
the awareness about ourselves (Orfei, et al., 2007). These pathological conditions 
reveal insight to scientifically investigate the cognitive processes and the neuro-
anatomical networks involved in awareness of the bodily self (Fotopoulou, 2012). 
The self-awareness include both the 'sense of agency' as the feelings of the author-
ship and control of our actions and of the following changes on the external world 
and the 'sense of ownership' as the appreciation of the body as belonging to me 
(Gallagher, 2000) and they can be selectively or simultaneously impaired. 
The specific disorder of body agency is the Anosognosia for hemiplegia (Babinski, 
1914), as the apparent unawareness of own sensorimotor deficits or the inability to 
acknowledge and appreciate the severity of the  paralysis and other sensorimotor 
deficits following stroke (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 
2009) 
Indeed the disturbances affecting the body ownership are the inability to recognize 
one's own body ('asomatognosia', Cutting, 1978) and the misattribution of owner-
ship of own arm to another person ('somatoparaphrenia', Gerstmann, 1942). 
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This thesis aims to investigate the possible influences of bodily aspects in self-
awareness, by focusing on the specific role of actions.  
In Chapter 1 and 2, I introduced the disturbances of self-awareness of the Anosog-
nosia for Hemipleia, and Somatoparaphrenia with neuropsychological and neuro-
anatomical accounts. Subsequently I wanted to highlight the importance of plan-
ning an action in these deficits in order to enhance the degree of motor awareness 
through both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms. 
My main projects focused on the investigation of the role of the Action in Anosog-
nosia for Hemiplegia. In details in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 my experiments based on 
evaluating the fluctuations of motor awareness in patients with Anosognosia for 
Hemiplegia during the request to execute an action. I investigated this issue in 
some different tasks: in the attempts to act, in third-perspective view and in auto-
matic bodily activation by measuring skin conductance responses. In addition I 
modulated the affective resonance of these tasks by using dangerous stimuli, so 
that I could evaluate the influences of both bottom-up sensorimotor and top-down 
emotional and cognitive components in awareness' fluctuations. I also integrated 
brain lesion-analyses to understand the neural networks underneath. 
In Chapter 6, I integrated the thesis with a single-case study of a patient with 
Crossed Somatoparaphrenia. This rare disorder gave me the possibility to investi-
gate some aspects related to the body image and the body schema. I studied this 
patient in different situations assessing: multisensory integration and spatial com-
ponents of proprioception and third-perspective view, in order to evaluate both 
sensorial and higher-order possible effects relating to the body representation. 
 
In addition, I also enclosed two single-case studies. The first was a young patient 
with Balint's syndrome, which was evaluated in a cross-modal task, the second a 
man affected by Tactile Agnosia, whit whom I applied a rehabilitation program 
with transcranical direct-current stimulation. These studies are included as extra 
experiemental studies not belonging to the main PhD topic.  
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Chapter 1 
Self-Awareness 
 
 
1.1. Conceptualizing Anosognosia 
 
The term Anosognosia (from the Greek, α = without, νớσος = disease, γνώσις = 
knowledge) defines a disorder of the awareness of one's own disabilities, conse-
quent to a brain lesion. These patients are incapable to recognize or to appreciate 
the severity of a deficit in sensory, motor, affective or cognitive functions (as 
memory or language) (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Prigatano, 1996, 2010).  
Babinsky (1914) coined the term Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP), which indi-
cates the pathological denial of contralesional motor deficits, following a right 
brain damage (but see Cocchini et al., 2009 for left hemisphere cases; Jehkonen, 
Laihosalo, & Kettunene, 2006). Specifically, AHP is a deficiency of awareness of 
the paralysis and of other possible concomitant sensorimotor impairments (Coc-
chini et al., 2009). In this condition, patients declare an unrealistic degree of 
autonomy, since they assume to be capable to act, to use their hand, or to walk 
(Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010). 
 
1.1.1. Epidemiology of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
Empirical studies of AHP after stroke report different frequencies of incidence of 
the disorder. From the classical range of prevalence of about 33-58% (Bisiach, 
Vallar, Perani, Papagno & Berti, 1986; Cutting, 1978), more recent studies have 
reported an occurrence from 10 to 17% (Baier & Karnath, 2005). This variability 
can mainly be attributed to differences in both diagnostic criteria of assessment 
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and time since stroke onset (Jehkonen et al., 2006, Orfei et al., 2007). As a matter 
of fact, a meta-analysis of studies about AHP reported a prevalence range between 
20 and 44% depending upon the time passed from the neurological event (Pia, 
Neppi-Modona, Ricci & Berti, 2004). For instance, it has been documented in 58 
right brain damaged patients that the presence of AHP decreases from 38% in an 
hyperacute stage at 3 days from onset, to 18% in 1 week (subacute stage), and to 
5% in a chronic condition after 6 months (Karnath, Baier and Nӓgele, 2005). Al-
though AHP appears to change and evolve over time and to be often a transient 
dysfunction, it can affect the rehabilitation of all perceptual and cognitive deficits 
(Gialanella, Monguzzi, Santoro & Rocchi, 2005; Jehkonen et al., 2006), and it may 
result in poor general recovery (Jehkonen et al., 2000). 
Finally, only a few studies investigated anosognosic disorders in hemiplegia after a 
left hemispheric stroke. Thus, their incidence might be underestimated due to a de-
pendency on language in awareness' assessments and a consequent restriction of 
diagnostic tools (e.g., VATA-m, Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin & Cameron, 2009).  
 
1.1.2. Characteristics of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
AHP is a specific neurological disorder that cannot be explained by a mere sen-
sorimotor loss, a confusional state or a general cognitive deficit (Coslett, 2005). 
Although an intellectual impairment may be a predisposing condition for major 
severity, it does not appear to be the main causal factor of unawareness (Marcel, 
Tegnér, & Ninno-Smith; 2004, Vuilleumier, 2004).  
Furthermore, AHP manifests in frequent co-presence with other deficits (e.g., per-
sonal and visual spatial neglect, Jenkinson, Preston, & Ellis, 2011), but double dis-
sociations of AHP have been demonstrated with confabulation and deficits of fron-
tal lobe functions (see, Heilman & Harciarek, 2010 for a review), proprioceptive 
(Cocchini et al., 2010) and personal or spatial visuo-motor impairments (Vocat et 
al., 2010). 
These evidences of double dissociations indicate that anosognosia is a definite and 
independent deficit of awareness (Jehkonen et al., 2000), but in clinical practise 
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AHP appears as a heterogeneous phenomenon (Besharati, Crucianelli, & Fotopou-
lou, 2014; Orfei, et al., 2007), that manifests itself in several ways (Heilmann & 
Harciarek, 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004; Vocat et al., 2010). 
In the more general cases, AHP patients are unaware of the presence of their defi-
cits occurred after the stroke and also declare to be able to move their limbs as like 
as healthy individuals. Instead, in some partial clinical manifestations of AHP, 
these patients declare to suffer of some motor impairments and they sometimes 
justify with causes other than hemiplegia (i.e., tiredness, sprained ankle, arthritis, 
etc.) (Orfei, et al., 2007), or someone even claiming bizzare explanations to con-
tradictory evidences (Bisiach, et al., 1986; Bisiach & Germiniani, 1991).  
Furthermore, the affective resonance of the syndrome may reveal itself in various 
expressions. AHP patients can indeed remain optimistic about their prognosis or 
they can minimize and disclose abnormal attitudes towards their limb weakness 
(additionally related 'anosognosia phenomena', Cutting, 1978), up to a form of in-
difference to the problem, namely 'anosodiaphoria' (Babinski, 1914). Instead, other 
patients can express delusional components (Turnbull, Jones, & Reed-Screen, 
2002; Vuilleumier, 2004), with abnormal beliefs or approaches towards their af-
fected limbs, including excessive dislike or hatred ('misoplegia', Critchley, 1955).  
The appearance of awareness can also appear independently in a behavioural or a 
verbal level. Some patients verbally admit the paralysis during a conversation, but 
attempt to move their plegic limb. Vice versa, other patients deny the presence of 
hemiplegia, but request constantly to remain in bed (Jehkonen et al. 2006; Marcel 
et al. 2004; Nimmo-Smith, Marcel, & Tegnér, 2005).  
These features of partiality can also be very persistent and lead to different sub-
types of AHP's manifestations. For instance, the syndrome can be explicitly af-
firmed, or can show some implicit forms of awareness. In these last cases, motor 
impairments are denied, but some degree of awareness about them is unintention-
ally expressed in task performances (Schacter, 1990).  
Finally, other body delusions concerning the sense of body ownership may co-
occur with AHP. In spite of the fact that behavioural and anatomical double disso-
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ciations with other body representation's disordered have been reported (Gandola 
et al., 2012; Invernizzi et al., 2013; Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016, Vallar & Ronchi, 
2009), some AHP patients cannot recognise one’s own body ('asomatognosia'), or 
they attribute its ownership to somebody else ('somatoparaphrenia', Gerstmann, 
1942).  
This clinical variability confirms that AHP is a multifaceted syndrome, which 
manifests itself in several sub-types (Jehkonen et al. 2000; Marcel et al. 2004), and 
suggests that different assessment methods, and likely, of rehabilitation trainings, 
need to be used in clinical and experimental practices (Jehkonen, et al., 2011; 
Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014).  
 
1.1.3 Disorder of the sense of ownership 
Somatoparaphrenia can also independently occur as a specific neuropsychological 
disorder of body representation (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009; Invernizzi et al., 2013), as 
a form of misattribution of the paralyzed limbs to another person in the room, such 
as a doctor or a relative (Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallar, 2002), or even someone 
not physically present (Pugnaghi, Molinari, Panzetti, Nichell, & Zamboni, 2012).  
Since it can manifest in different clinical behavioural and emotional forms and 
with possible co-present symptoms (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009), a broader classifica-
tion includes all abnormal feelings and beliefs related to the hemiplegic limbs as 
the 'disturbed sensation of limb ownership' (DSO) (Baier & Karnath, 2008). This 
term is used in this thesis in order to avoid ambiguity.  
 
 
1. 2. Neuroanatomy of Self-Awareness  
 
1.2.1. Lesions beyond Anosognosia for Hemiplegia  
AHP is frequently associated with a damage in perisylvian area of the right hemi-
sphere. Several studies tried to analyse the specific lesion associated to the syn-
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drome, despite the presence of high variability of manifestations and assessments 
(Jehkonen, et al., 2011). 
In a first meta-analysis, a wide fronto-parietal network was found to play a crucial 
role in AHP, identifying a combination of both cortical (frontal, parietal, but also 
temporal and occipital regions), and subcortical (mainly basal ganglia and thala-
mus) structures. More in detail, the right premotor cortex in Brodmann's areas 
(BA) 6 and 44 and the inferior frontal cortex in BA 46 (Berti et al., 2005; Kortte, et 
al., 2015), joined to somatosensory and primary motor cortex (BA 4) (Berti, et al., 
2005) are specifically associated with AHP, due to their role in motor monitoring.  
In particular the premotor cortex and the surrounding superior longitudinal fascicu-
lus are involved in detecting and monitoring incongruent sensorimotor feedbacks 
(Enriquez-Geppert, Huster, Figge, & Herrmann, 2014; see also for further details 
section '2.1 Theoretical account' in Chapter 2 about the computational model of 
motor control).  
Another crucial area for motor awareness seems to be the right insular cortex 
(Karnath, et al., 2005). Indeed, according to a parallel model of self-awareness 
(Craig, 2009; 2010), the insula is implicated in all subjective feelings as interocep-
tive representations, perceived agency, and in more general aspects of body own-
ership (Karnath et al., 2005; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007).  
It is important to notice that the temporal dynamic of the deficit seems to depend 
upon the lesion site: in more acute phases, subcortical structures seem to be cru-
cially damaged, most of all the insula (Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016; Vocat & 
Vuilleumier, 2010) and the basal ganglia (Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016), but it ap-
pears that only a wider impairment of more cortical frontal-temporal areas is rele-
vant for the persistence of the symptoms, mainly involving the rolandic operculum 
(ventral premotor cortex) and the superior temporal gyrus (Vocat & Vuilleumieri, 
2010, Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016).  
Nevertheless, this wide cortical lesion in chronic AHP patients seems to be an evi-
dence of the important role played by the fronto-temporal-parietal network in mo-
tor awareness. Thus, the specific deficits of the multisensory body representation 
16   
 
in the insula (Karnath et al., 2005) or of the sensorimotor components in premotor 
cortex (Berti et al., 2005) are not sufficient as they need to be associated to other 
broader areas (Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016).  
Given the heterogonous characteristics of AHP, some studies have combined ex-
perimental and lesion analysis to investigate the anatomical networks of the spe-
cific subtypes of AHP. Notwithstanding the small sample size, it has been recently 
reported that the brain region associated with signs of implicit awareness are the 
inferior motor areas, insula, basal ganglia and limbic structures (Fotopoulou, Per-
nigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010) and subcortical with matter connected to 
the basal ganglia (Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, & Aglioti, 2011). This evi-
dence is important to highlight that AHP is a multi-componential disorder. Finally, 
AHP is typically reported after a damage in the right hemisphere rather than after a 
left one, which are often excluded and likely underestimated due to the presence of 
combined language impairments (See Cocchini et al., 2009, Della Sala et. al., 
2009).  
 
1.2.2. Lesions beyond the Disturbed Sensation of limb Ownership 
Right hemispheric stroke can also cause disorders of the sense of ownership, be-
sides the anatomical double dissociation between AHP and DSO.  
In classical studies, the right posterior insular cortex has been considered as a cru-
cial area for subjective feelings and self awareness (Craig, 2009; 2010) and for a 
link between body and action awareness (Baier & Karnath, 2008). However, DSO 
does not selectively correlate to the inferior frontal gyrus (including the insula) as 
like as AHP does, but to more subcortical structures and white matter connections 
(Gandola et al., 2012; Invernizzi et al., 2013, Moro & Pernigo et al., 2016).  
A lesion of DSO is indeed reported to be shifted to more medial and subcortical 
areas than in AHP, in particular with lesion of basal ganglia and thalamus and the 
surrounding white matter (Gangola et al., 2012; Invernizzi et al., 2013; Moro & 
Pernigo et al., 2016). These recent accounts underline the importance of subcorti-
cal structures in body ownership, that may be connected to higher cortical areas for 
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other aspects of bodily awareness, as like as the sense of agency and self-other pe-
culiarities (Blanke, 2012; Tsakiris, Longo & Hagard, 2010).  
Even though DSO has been mainly described as following right brain lesions, in 
those few cases occurring after a left hemispheric damage, the involved areas are 
the ventral and medial frontal cortex with the posterior insula and the subcortical 
nuclei (Perren, Heydrich, Blanke, & Landis, 2015) similarly to some right brain 
damaged patients (Baier & Karnth, 2008; Gandola et al., 2012). 
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Chapter 2  
Action in Self-Awareness 
 
 
2.1. Theoretical accounts 
 
AHP is a peculiar neurological deficit, when the patients present an impaired level 
of awareness referring to their contralesional hemiplegic arm and/or leg and they 
declare to be able to move (Babinsky, 1914; Cocchini et al., 2009), although the 
absence of any real action and of following sensory feedbacks (Bottini et al., 
2010).  
As mentioned above in Chapter 1, this syndrome manifests itself in different sub-
types (Marcel et al., 2004, Orfei et al, 2007), due to the combination of some vari-
ous clinical disorders and some different forms of  spared degree of awareness. But 
despite the multi-componential character of the AHP, this syndrome allows us to 
specifically investigate the characteristics of the functioning of the sensorimotor 
system related to the motor awareness.  
Focusing on the sensory aspects, in a early 'Discovery Theory' the combination of 
the deficit of proprioception and a more general cognitive impairment is assumed 
to cause the loss of personal perception and consequentially the decrease of degree 
of motor awareness (Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 1991). Since double dissociations 
with these deficits (proprioception and general cognition) are documented (Coc-
chini et al. 2010, Marcel et al., 2004), this hypothesis on primary sensory deficits 
could be excluded. 
Instead, a computational model of the motor system (Wolpert, 1997) comes from a 
description of the mechanisms underlying the motor control system in healthy 
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population. Normally, the intention to move is a motor command that produces 
both a prediction about the sensory consequences of movement and the occurring 
sensory feedbacks. In case of errors between the command and the real outcomes, 
a 'comparator' detects the discrepancy between the predicted and the actual action 
so to adjust it accordingly (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Computational model of the motor system. A simple schema of the motor model sys-
tem in healthy population (from Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith 2002). 
 
 
After the first hypothesis about the failure to compute motor intention in AHP 
('Feed-forward hypothesis', Heilman, 1991, Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998), re-
cent assumptions (Firth, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) have focused on the con-
nection between intention and prediction of action.  
AHP patients seem to be able to form proper motor commands and the representa-
tions of their actions (Jenkinson, Edelstyn, & Ellis, 2009),  which are the basic 
steps of motor awareness (Fourneret & Jeannerod 1998). In fact, patients with 
hemplegia (HP) in presence of motor awareness involve the intention to move, in 
order to predict its outcomes, but at the exact moment of execution they are able to 
detect the absence of movements thus preserving a good level of awareness. On 
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the contrary, AHP patients maintain their erroneous beliefs about moving and as-
sume to have acted accordingly to their will (Vuilleumier, 2004).  
This aspect of unawareness can be reinterpreted as a deficit in the cognitive system 
devoted both to the intention and the motor execution, rather than to a general lack 
of acknowledgement about the motor deficit per se (Frith et al., 2000). In specific, 
the mechanism between the construction of a motor intention and the analysis of 
the consequent feedbacks may be the impaired point of the motor computational 
model with AHP ('Forward model') (Blakemore et al., 2001, 2002; Frith et al, 
2000). Thus, the damage results to be at the level of the comparator mechanism, 
that causes poor awareness of discrepancy between the absence (or the impair-
ment) of movements and the absence of a real sensory feedback (Bottini et al., 
2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2008, but see Berti et al., 2007 for discussion).  
Since the heterogonous nature of AHP, in recent hypothesis, it has been underlined 
that the AHP may emerges from a combination of different deficits (Saj, Vocat, & 
Vuilleumier, 2015, Vocat & Vuillemieur, 2010). In the 'ABC model', Vuilleumier 
(2004) proposed three main deficits, respectively, of the Assessing, Belief and 
Control operations, that may contribute in the phenomenon. In fact, in a more gen-
eral model (Fotopoulou, 2014; 2015), some higher-order cognitive, emotional and 
motivation components (e.g. Turnbull, Fotopoulou, & Solms, 2014) are suggested 
to play a role in patient's inability of updating their 'prior belief' about themselves 
to the new 'prediction errors' about their movements, which may lead to a greater 
degree of awareness specifically for the motor domain (see Besharati, et al., 2014 
for experimental results). 
Inherently the importance of the actions in this phenomenon, some studies have 
systematically investigated the relation between the monitoring of intended actions 
and the actual movements with AHP (see, Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010, for re-
view). For example, AHP patients report an intact system of motor intentions 
through the plegic limbs, that interfere with their performance in spatial (Gar-
barini, et al., 2012) and temporal domains (Pia, et al., 2013) and their perception of 
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unrealistic feedbacks (Fotopoulou, et al., 2008; Piedimonte, Garbarini, Pia, Mez-
zanato, & Berti, 2016).  
Furthermore, it is important to stress that a request to act can enhance some resid-
ual forms of awareness, as an implicit unintentional adaptation of the movements 
to the presence of a paralyzed limb (Cocchini et al., 2010) or as an upcoming form 
of declarative awareness during the monitoring of the actual attempts to execute 
(Moro, et al., 2011; Moro, Scandola, Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2015).  
In conclusion, the real attempts to act reveal some aspects of the dysfunctional 
mechanisms beyond AHP and provide some possible insights in rehabilitation (see 
the next section 2.2 'Emergent awareness').  
 
 
2.2. Emergent Awareness 
 
The various manifestations of AHP and the presence of residual forms of aware-
ness are current topics of debate, due to their possible contributions in understand-
ing the mechanism of AHP and its possible clinical and rehabilitative approaches 
(Marcel et al., 2004).   
Hitherto, there is no single model that can encompass all the multi-componential 
and heterogeneous features of AHP and explain its different sub-types. 
In a hierarchical model of AHP (Crosson et al., 1989), three levels of deficit are 
detected: i) Intellectual awareness as a general acknowledgement of the deficit 
without remarkable compensations, ii) Emergent awareness when patients, in addi-
tion to a spontaneous denial of paralysis, may fluctuate to a declarative form of 
awareness during the attempt to perform an action, and iii) Anticipatory aware-
ness, when the patients are able to anticipate the deficits and to search for compen-
satory strategies. It is worth noting that these different type of unawareness can be 
selectively spared.  
Within an experimental paradigm, Emergent Awareness has been firstly described 
by Moro and colleagues (Moro et al., 2011, Moro et al., 2015). When AHP pa-
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tients are required to execute an action and to judge their proficiency during their 
attempts to act, they become to some extent linguistically aware about their own 
deficit.  
According to the 'forward model', these processes seem to influence the 'compara-
tor' mechanism, thanks to a previous spared motor command (Moro 2013). Thus 
the role of action appears to have a relevant role in the mismatches between pa-
tient's intention and prediction to be able to move, without real sensory feedbacks 
(Blakemore et al., 2001; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). In fact, the motor command may 
have a crucial role in the prediction of feedbacks (More et al., 2011), while the 
judgments of their own proficiency during the attempts to act may influence the 
detection of discrepancy of the real outcomes and enhance the level of awareness 
(Moro, et al., 2015). In this way, such a process induces the presence of Emergent 
awareness and the implementation of behavioural strategies that are not usually 
employed in AHP or only at an implicit behavioural level (Cocchini et al., 2009; 
Moro et al., 2011).  
These results can be placed also within other more general models. Firstly, in the 
'ABC model' (Vuilleumier, 2004), AHP is a combination of three components of 
Assessment, Belief and Control operations, where the monitoring of the sensory 
feedbacks may have a crucial role in modifying incorrect beliefs of someone's 
abilities (Vocat, Saj, & Vuilleumier 2013). Secondly, based on a Bayesian 'predic-
tive coding' framework (Friston, 2005; 2010), the lack of motor awareness in AHP 
may be a dysfunctional link between the 'prior beliefs' as acquired internal repre-
sentations about the self, and the 'prediction errors' of actual situations (Fotopou-
lou, 2014; 2015), due to both interoceptive and exteroceptive signals (e.g. Schultz 
& Dickinson, 2000). 
From these models, the required monitoring of movements induces the patients to 
check (control operation) their performance and their simultaneous explicit experi-
ence of failure may lead the patients to rethink about their own beliefs. Despite 
these models try to understand even more complex sensory and cognitive aspects 
of AHP, we may suppose that the direct confrontations of abilities during actions 
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execution may contribute in the process of reaching temporary (Moro et al., 2011) 
or more long-lasting (Moro et al., 2015) declarative awareness, by changing previ-
ous beliefs into the new pathological condition (Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2009).  
In these potential processes, the role of memory seems to be crucial, as reported in 
anosognosia for other cognitive deficits as like as Alzheimer's disease (Morris & 
Mograbi, 2013). In fact, it has been hypothesized (CAM model, Agnew and Mor-
ris, 1998; Morris & Mograbi, 2013) that all long-lasting representations of the self 
are stored in a specialized Persona Database, that need to be updated in case of 
contrasting immediate experiences after the occurrence of a deficit.  
Thus, we can suppose that the request of monitoring the actions' executions might 
contribute to an implicit updating of the autobiographical memory and to a follow-
ing improvement of awareness (Moro et al., 2011; Moro, 2013).  
It is relevant that in the process involve cognitive and metacognitive functions 
(like motor command and monitoring), but also executive functions of action, 
memory and speech, which are needed to integrate both implicit and explicit com-
ponents of awareness and to store them into personal memories (Moro, 2013). As a 
matter of fact, Emergent awareness seems to require the white matter connections 
between parieto-temporal and frontal cortex in a spread neuronatomical network 
influenced by all those cognitive functions (Moro, et al., 2011).  
In addition, Emergent awareness appears to have some rehabilitative evidences 
(Moro, et al. 2014). In fact, the role of attempting actions and the consequent 
analysis of occurring motor errors  might be crucial in restoring this syndrome 
overtime (Moro et al., 2015) in a lack of effective training in the present literature 
(Kortte & Hillis, 2011; Jenkinson et al., 2011). 
In conclusion, the rehabilitation of AHP appears to be insufficient as long as pa-
tients become explicitly aware and implement some strategies (Gialanella & Mat-
tioli, 1992). The possible role of emergent awareness is to link tacit forms of 
awareness to declarative and behavioural improvements (Moro 2013) thus becom-
ing a relevant field of investigation.  
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Anosognosia for hemiplegia is a lack of awareness of motor deficits following a 
right hemisphere lesion. Residual forms of awareness co-occur with and explicit 
denial of hemiplegia. The term emergent awareness refers to a condition in which 
awareness of motor deficits is reported verbally during the actually performance of 
an action involving the affected body parts. In this study, two tasks were used to 
explore the potential role of i) attempting actions which are impossible for suffers 
of hemiplegia and ii) attempting actions which are potentially dangerous. Sixteen 
hemiplegic patients were asked to perform both potentially dangerous and neutral 
actions. Our results confirm an increase in emergent awareness in anosognosic pa-
tients during the execution of both of these types of actions. Morevoer, actions that 
are potentially dangerous improved the degree of awareness. However, lesions in 
the fronto-temporal areas appears to be associated with a reduced effect of action 
execution (emergent awareness), while lesions in the basal ganglia and amygdale 
and the white matter underlying the insula and fronto-temporal areas are associated 
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with a lesser degree of improvement resulting from attempting to perform danger-
ous actions. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The term Anosognosia (from the Greek,α=without,νớσος=disease, γνώσις = 
knowledge) refers to a lack of awareness of sensory, motor or cognitive (i.e. lan-
guage, memory) deficits. Babinski (1914) described a specific form of unaware-
ness, known as Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP), that selectively involves an 
incapacity to admit motor deficits and that mainly occurs as a consequence of right 
hemisphere lesions (Pia et al., 2004; Vocat et al., 2010; but see Cocchini et al., 
2009; Jehkonen et al., 2006). Anosognosic patients fail to acknowledge or recog-
nize their paralysis and they claim that they are able to carry out everyday activi-
ties, which are in reality impossible for them. 
Sensory loss, intellectual impairment or a combination of thee cannot fully explain 
the syndrome (Marcel et al., 2004). Furthermore, double dissociations have been 
demonstrated between AHP and proprioceptive impairment (Cocchini et al., 2010), 
spatial or personal neglect (Vocat et al., 2010),confabulation and deficits in frontal 
lobe functions (Heilman & Harciarek, 2010 for review) and other disorders in 
body representation, in particular somatoparaphrenia and feeling of disownership 
of the affected limbs (Moro, Zampini, & Aglioti, 2004; Moro & Perngio et al., 
2016). 
AHP is indeed an heterogeneous and multi-componential phenomenon which may 
occur in a variety of clinical manifestations (Heilmann & Harciarek, 2010; Orfei et 
al., 2007; Marcel, et al., 2004; Vocat, et al., 2010). 
A crucial role in the syndrome was initially attributed to lesions in the parietal lobe 
(Bisiach et al., 1986; Heilman, 1991) and in the wide networks of fronto-temporo-
parietal integration (Pia et al., 2004). More recently, the premotor cortex (Berti et 
al., 2005) and the insula (Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005) have been identified as 
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the core systems in AHP, with lesions associated with the symptoms in subcortical 
structures (the basal ganglia and the amygdale) and in white matter tracts (Vocat et 
al., 2010; Fotopoulou e al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011; Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016).  
Damages in different parts of these networks has been linked to various expres-
sions of the syndrome, where specific anosognosic symptoms occuring along with 
residual forms of awareness. For example, in case of explicit anosognosia and im-
plicit awareness, patients verbally deny their paralysis but act as if they know 
about their paralyzed body parts (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2010). This may have a significant impact as these implicitly 
aware patients will not try to stand up or to act alone (with the risk of hurt) and 
will ask for help when necessary. In these cases rehabilitation is generally more ef-
ficacious.  
Another dissociation has been reported between deficits in awareness which refer 
to the self and to other patients. Although the majority of people suffering from 
AHP fail to acknowledge paralysis both in themselves and in other people, some 
patients deny the motor deficits only when answering questions which refer to 
themselves. This may indicate that in the former situation the motor awareness 
deficits relate to actions per se, while in the latter they are specific to patients  own 
body actions (Marcel et al., 2004; Ramachandran, 1996; Ramachandran & Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996; Moro et al. 2011). 
A form of Emergent Awareness has been previously described (Moro et al., 2011, 
Moro, 2013; Moro et al., 2015). In this condition, when the anosognosic patient are 
asked to actually perform an action using the affected body parts they are able to 
verbally state that they cannot perform the action due to their otor deficits (Moro et 
al., 2011). This indicates that intention to act (and/or actually acting) may modify 
any explicit, verbal knowledge of deficits. More generally, this suggests that a 
modulation in AHP may be induced by ad-hoc experimental manipulations. 
We investigated this topic by means of an experiment in order to establish whether 
there is a relationship between the top-down processes of requiring to carry out 
specific actions and the effects of the characteristics pertaining to that action, in 
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particular if they are of an emotional as compared to neutral nature. In fact, fluc-
tuations of awareness in AHP are influenced by both sensory-motor and high cog-
nitive functions (Fotopoulou, 2014 for review) and a role of emotional components 
has been previously reported (Besharati et al., 2014; Nardone, Ward, Fotopoulou, 
& Turnbull, 2008). 
In the present study, anosognosic and hemiplegic non-anosognosic patients (HP) 
were asked to execute a number of everyday actions, which were impossible for 
them due to the paralysis. Their judgements regarding their proficiency in carrying 
out the actions were asked at various times: i) in a preliminary interview which fo-
cused on the specific actions to be performed (Semantic awareness); ii) before 
starting to execute the action (Anticipatory awareness); iii) during the execution 
(Emergent awareness) and iv) after the attempt to act (Post-error awareness) (Moro 
et a., 2011). Moreover, the experiment was devised to determine whether the na-
ture of the action had in itself an impact on awareness. To this end, half of the ac-
tions were neutral (i.e. they could be executed in safety, without risks of injury) 
and the other half were dangerous (i.e. patients could potentially hurt themselves). 
We expected that the real attempts to carry out actions would increase awareness 
in AHP patients, with more realistic judgments expressed during the execution 
and/or after the failure. Moreover, we expected that this Emergent Awareness ef-
fect would be stronger in dangerous as compared to neutral actions. A detailed 
analysis of the patients' lesions (Bates, et al., 2003; Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha 
2007) was also carried out in order to integrate behavioural and anatomical data 
associated with AHP and in particular with possible modulations due to emergent 
awareness and the characteristics of the actions they performed. 
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3.2. Materials and Methods 
 
3.2.1. Participants 
Sixteen patients suffering from severe left hemiplegia (absence of movement) as a 
consequence of a right hemisphere stroke were recruited at the Rehabilitation Unit, 
Sacro Cuore Hospital (Negrar, Verona) over a period of one year. They were di-
vided into two groups basing on the presence or absence of AHP. This was as-
sessed by means of the Bisiach scale (Bisiach, et al., 1986) and the Berti interview, 
which investigates symptoms related to upper and lower limbs separately (Berti, 
Làdavas, & Della Corte, 1996). 
In this way eight patients were diagnosed as being affected by AHP (scores ≥1 at 
the Bisiach’s scale and/or at least in one section of the Berti’s Interview). The 
other eight patients did not present any signs of anosognosia (all scores=0) and 
these constituted the control group (HP, Table 1). 
The two groups were matched for age, gender, education and intervals between le-
sion onset and dates of: the assessment, the CT/MRI exams and the experimental 
task (Table 1). The patients did not have a prior history of psychiatric or neuro-
logical diseases. They gave their consent to participate in the study, which was ap-
proved by the local ethics committee (CEP prot. N. 39216) and was carried out in 
accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki (2013). 
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Pt Age G Educ 
Test 
Int 
CT/MRI 
Int 
Exp 
Int 
Lesion Sens Motor 
Berti 
UL
1
 
Berti 
LL
1
 
Bisiach
2
 
DSO 
UL
3 
AHP 1 64 M 18 66 86 99 FP Th + - 1 1 1.5 + 
AHP 2 74 F 5 103 124 123 FP Th - - 1 2 2 - 
AHP 3 47 M 8 34 77 49 TO - - 0 1 0 - 
AHP 4 53 F 8 48 31 52 F - - 1 1.5 3 + 
AHP 5 63 M 13 13 16 17 TP - - 1 2 3 + 
AHP 6 57 F 10 61 61 62 FTP - - 1 2 2 - 
AHP 7 83 M 5 11 11 20 FP Th - - 1 1 1.5 - 
AHP 8 76 M 5 Na Na Na FTP - - 1 2 3 - 
Mean 
(Median) 
64.6 
 
9 48 58 60.3    
 
(1)** 
 
(2)** 
 
(2.5)** 
 
St.dev. 12.3 
 
4.6 32.4 41.2 39     
 
 
  
  
  
          
HP 1 64 M 5 70 Na 85 Na + - 0 0 0 - 
HP 2 
55 F 13 76 71 77 
FTP 
Th 
- - 0 0 0 - 
HP 3 54 M 8 52 85 65 F, Th - - 0 0 0 - 
HP 4 72 F 5 91 100 102 FTP + - 0 0 0 - 
HP 5 66 F 17 103 Na 106 Na - - 0 0 0 - 
HP 6 75 M 5 33 30 55 FP - - 0 0 0 - 
HP 7 70 M 17 45 46 53 Th + - 0 0 0 - 
HP 8 64 M 5 36 30 50 FTP - - 0 0 0 - 
Mean 
(Median) 
65 
 
9.3 63.2 60.3 74.1    
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
St.dev. 7.5 
 
5.4 25.8 29.5 22        
Table 1. Demographic and clinical data of patients with (AHP) and without (HP) 
anosognosia for hemiplegia. Pt= patient, G= gender, Educ= years of education. Test Int= 
interval days between lesion onset and assessment, CT/MRI Int= interval days between 
lesion onset and the CT/MRI scan, Exp Int= interval between lesion onset and experimen-
tal task. Sens= sensory deficits; Motor= motor deficits. 
1Berti’s Interview, 2Bisiach’s 
Scale (The additional score of 1.5 refers to the conditions when patients report impaired 
abilities in moving the arm, but not the presence of hemiplegia), DSO= Disturbed sensa-
tion of limb ownership 
3
(Moro & Pernigo et al., 2016). UL= Upper, Limb LL= Lower 
Limb. Na= not available. T= temporal, O= occipital, F= frontal, P= parietal, Th= thala-
mus. - = deficits present; + = deficits not present. Pathological scores are in bold. For 
each group Mean or (Median for Berti's Interview and Bisiach's Scale) and 
St.dev.(Standard deviation) values are reported. **= Mann-Whitney Tests show signifi-
cant differences (p<0.01) between two groups (no other significant results between the 
two groups). 
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3.2.2. Preliminary neuropsychological examination 
Although some patients had scores under cut-off in the assessment of general cog-
nitive profile (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), this was mainly due 
to visuo-spatial problems (Table 2). Indeed, all patients were well oriented in space 
and time at the time of the experimental task.  
All of the patients (except one in the HP group) failed in tests assessing frontal 
functions (Frontal Assessment Battery - FAB; Apollonio, et al., 2005), while short 
and long verbal memory (Forward digit span and Story recall; Spinnler, & Tog-
noni, 1987) was  spared in the majority of the participants. 
The AHP group showed more symptoms of extrapersonal neglect than HP group 
(Line Bisection, Albert Test and Copy Test; Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987), 
while personal neglect (Comb and Razor Test, McIntosh, Brodie, Beschin, & 
Robertson, 2000) was present in both groups. Finally, only two HP patients were 
over cut-off on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond, & Snaith, 
1983). 
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General and 
Frontal  
 Memory Neglect Mood 
Pt MMSE FAB 
Story 
recall 
ST 
Story 
recall 
LT 
Digit 
Fw 
Bisection Albert Copy VE Comb HADS 
 
AHP 1 
22.2 7.2 7.5 9 8 0 18 1 - -0.42 14 
AHP 2 14.7 3.3 0 0 2 0 10 0 - 0 13 
AHP 3 16.62 11.7 6.5 6.5 8 2 32 1 Imp -0.36 10 
AHP 4 27 11.9 4.8 7.8 9 9 34 2 +/- -0.29 5 
AHP 5 21.27 4 3.3 4.4 4 0 12 0 - -0.125 Na 
AHP 6 27 4.1 5.5 5.5 4 6 24 0 - -0.8 Na 
AHP 7 24.4 8 6.3 5.3 2 4 12 0 - -0.47 Na 
AHP 8 18.7 3.5 6.5 6.4 7 3 18 0 - -0.4 13 
Mean 21.5 6.7 5 5.6 5.5 3 20* 0.5  -0.36 11 
St.dev. 4.6 3.6 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.2 9.2 0.7  0.2 3.7 
   
         
HP 1 24.9 8 0 4.4 4 6 36 3 - -0.6 Na 
HP 2 24 9.3 9 8.5 7 8 36 1 + 0 Na 
HP 3 28.74 10.2 6.5 7.7 6 9 40 0 + 0 8 
HP 4 21 1 3.1 2.3 5 0 12 0 Imp -0.2 11 
HP 5 25.2 18 6.6 7.7 Na 9 36 4 Na Na Na 
HP6 19 7.9 6.4 4.7 Na 1 24 0 - -0.21 Na 
HP 7 25 11.9 5.3 6.4 7 7 36 4 Na -0.5 18 
HP 8 18.9 6.8 3.8 3.8 9 0 22 1 + -0.13 20 
Mean 23.3 9.1 5.1 5.7 6.3 5 30.2* 1.6  -0.23 14.25 
St.dev. 3.4 4.8 2.7 2.2 1.7 4 9.8 1.8  0.2 5.7 
Table 2. Neuropsychological data. Neuropsychological assessment of general functions, 
memory, neglect and emotional state in the patients with (AHP) and without (HP) 
anosognosia for hemiplegia. ST= short term, LT= long term, FW= forward, VE= visual 
extinction, - = deficit present, + = deficit not present. Imp = Impossible to assess, Na= not 
available. All scores are corrected for age and/or education. Pathological scores are in 
bold. Scores at cut-off are in italic. For each group Mean and St.dev.= Standard deviation 
values are reported. * = Significant differences (p<0.05) between the two groups at T-
Test. 
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3.2.3. Lesion mapping 
In order to analyze  the neural correlates of AHP  and compare the two groups, we 
analyzed the patients’ lesions by means of  a voxel-based lesion symptom mapping 
(VLSM) technique. Patients' structural MRI scans were mapped with the MRIcron 
software (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/index.html) (Rorden & Brett, 
2000), by drawing on the standard T1-weighted MRI template (ICBM152) of the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinate system, approximately oriented 
to match the Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). For the procedure, the 
template was oriented on the midsagittal and midcoronal axis to match each origi-
nal MRI scan orientation as closely as possible. Successively, an experienced cli-
nician (SB) traced each lesion manually onto the rotated template, while another 
expert clinician (VM) checked all the drawings in a double-blind procedure. For 
each patient, the outcome was a map of the damaged areas with each voxel la-
belled as 0 (intact) or 1 (lesioned). Finally, all the lesion maps were rotated back to 
the canonical orientation to align them to the standard sterotaxic MNI space (in 
2mm x 2mm x 2mm voxel) and they were filtered with a custom masks based on 
the ICBM152 template, to exclude the voxels of lesions outside the white and gray 
matter brain tissues. 
An analysis of lesions' volumes were computed with Non-Parametric Mapping 
(NPM) software (Rorder, et al., 2007). In order to investigate the neural correlates 
of AHP, we compared the lesions maps of the two groups, by means of a subtrac-
tion technique and a voxel based lesion comparison based on the Libermeister bi-
nomial test (False discovery rate - FDR corrected, Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995).  
In addition, in order to analyzed the neural correlates of the disorder in case of 
emergent awareness and the effects of potentially dangerous actions in AHP we 
carried out a VLSM with t-test statistics, using the performance during the experi-
ment as continuous predictors (Bates, et al., 2003; Rorden, et al., 2007).  
It is to be noted that, while the behavioural results at our tasks inform the reader 
about the improvement in awareness due to experimental manipulations, these 
analyses of lesions provide data regarding the patterns of lesions associated with 
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the lack of such improvement. In fact, all of these statistics were implemented for 
each voxel in the brain (Rorden et al., 2007) and the outcomes indicate the voxels 
damaged in patients with statistically worst performance (at p-value < 0.05 and 
corrected for multiple comparison by using a FDR - False Discovery Rate). 
The outcome of the subtraction and the significant lesion maps of the voxel-based 
lesion techniques were superimposed onto T1 templates to calculate the amount of 
lesioned voxels in various cerebral areas and the centre of the mass of each dam-
aged area. This was then overlapped onto the Automatic Anatomical Labeling 
(AAL) template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) to provide information on the gray 
matter, and onto the Tractography based Atlas of human brain connections Projec-
tion Network (Natbrainlab, Neuroanatomy and Tractography Laboratory) (Catani 
& de Schotten, 2012; de Schotten et al., 2011) for the white matter. 
 
3.2.4. Experimental Task 
In order to  investigate the role of attempting to perform actions in modulating pa-
tients' awareness (Emergent awareness) and the effects of actions which were po-
tentially dangerous, an ad-hoc task was devised. 
The patients were asked to judge their proficiency in the execution of specific ac-
tions (neutral or dangerous) in four different situations: i) during an interview,  ii) 
before the attempt to act, iii) during and iv) after the actual attempt to act.  
As this main task was executed in the first-person perspective, another task (Judg-
ment of Others’ actions) was administered in which the patients had to judge the 
abilities of another hemiplegic patients with regard to the same actions (for 
Method and Results, see as supplementary materials in the Chapter 4). This control 
task allowed us to evaluate any potential dissociation in AHP patients in their 
judgments relating to themselves and to other people.  
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3.2.4.1 Stimuli   
20 bimanual or full body actions which were impossible for hemiplegic patients 
were selected. Another 4 unimanual actions involving the healthy hand were used 
as a control to check the consistency of patients’ responses and their attention to 
the task. 
The 20 experimental actions were divided into two blocks. The first block con-
sisted of 10 actions that involved the full-body (FB e.g. going downstairs, using a 
wheelchair). The second block was consisted of 10 upper-body actions (UB e.g. 
cutting nails with scissors, using a ruler to draw a line). The realistic nature of the 
setting was guaranteed by the choice of everyday actions.  
In order to test the impact of actions which were potentially dangerous, in each 
block there were 5 neutral (N) and 5 potentially dangerous (D) actions. In the FB 
block, actions were dangerous because the patients were at risk of falling or getting 
hurt (e.g. moving from a wheelchair to a bed). Actions in the UB block were po-
tentially dangerous for everybody regardless of paralysis (e.g., cutting one’s own 
nails with scissors). The actions were selected so that each D action corresponded 
to a N action in terms of similarity of execution (e.g. moving a full pot from a gas 
ring - Lifting up a tray with glasses) or purpose (e.g. walking – using the wheel-
chair) (see Table 3). 
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Control actions  Full-body  (FB) Upper-body (UB) 
Looking at the 
side 
 Walking 
Putting a nail in a wooden 
block 
Blowing the 
nose 
 
Moving from the wheelchair 
 to the bed 
Lighting up a candle 
Drinking from a 
glass 
D Going down the stairs Cutting his nails with scissors 
Tilting the bust  Lifting up a heavy box 
Washing a big knife at the 
sink 
  Standing up from sitting 
Moving a full big pot from a 
gas ring 
  
 
 
  Using the wheelchair Using a ruler to draw a line 
  Snuggling on the bed Sharpening a pencil 
 N 
Going into the elevator  
to use it 
Opening a big tube of cream 
  Scratching both knees 
Washing a big spoon at the 
sink 
  Holding the sitting position Lifting up a tray with glasses 
Table 3. Experimental actions. The 24 actions are shown. Left column, the 4 control ac-
tions; Central column: the 10 Full-body actions; Right column: the 10 Upper-body ac-
tions. The 20 experimental actions are  divided into two blocks of dangerous (D) and neu-
tral (N) actions. D actions are listed in order to link to its corresponding N action (e.g. 
Walk - Use the wheelchair). 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Procedure 
The order of the two blocks (FB and UB) was counterbalanced between the par-
ticipants with breaks of 20-30 minutes between the two blocks.  
The task was executed in four steps. The participants were first asked Yes/No an-
swer questions to judge whether they could perform the actions ("Can you do it?", 
for the answer "No" the score was 0). In the case of a positive answer, they had to 
rate their ability on a 10-point Likert scale ("How well can you do it?" - with 
scores ranging from 1 = "I cannot  do it" to 10  = "I can do it without any prob-
lems"). This score represented the measure of Semantic awareness.  
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Next, the patients were put in a real situation, they were given the necessary told 
and were then request to perform each of the action. Before starting to move, the 
same general question ("Can you do it?") was asked. Again, in case of positive an-
swer, participants were requested to predict their proficiency in that specific action 
on the10-point Likert scale ("How well can you do it?"). This was considered a 
measure of Anticipatory awareness. 
In the third step, the patients were asked to carry out the action and the same two 
questions were asked during the attempt. This provide a measure of Emergent 
awareness.  
Finally, after the failure in the attempt, the questions were asked again. This was a 
measure of Post-Error awareness.  
The attempts to act were realized in absolute safety and the patients were stopped 
before any eventual risks of injury might occur . The FB actions were executed in 
the gym of the rehabilitation department, where patients could try to act under the 
supervision of the physiotherapist. The UB actions were executed in a room, at 
desk (or sink) under the supervision of the experimenter. Any potential disturbance 
or distraction (e.g. the presence of other people or environmental noises) were re-
moved.  
 
3.2.4.3. Comparison with the judgment of the physiotherapists 
In order to measure patients’ unawareness regarding their ability to execute the 
specific experimental actions, their judgments (Semantic awareness) were com-
pared to those expressed by their physiotherapists (Pht judgement) with references 
to the same actions and with the same criteria of response (Yes/No question  and in 
the case of positive answer giving a score from 1 to 10 on a Likert scale). 
 
3.2.4.4. Modulation of AHP 
Finally, in order to investigate potential general fluctuations in AHP due to the ex-
perimental manipulations, a general measure of awareness (General awareness) 
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was recorded at the beginning and at the end of each of the two blocks (4 measures 
in total).  
This scale was developed from a previously validated assessment (Marcel et al.’s 
modified interview; Marcel, et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011) with the participants 
being asked: one standard question on general awareness ("Do you feel something 
unusual on your body?", scores 0= completely aware, 5= slightly aware and 10= 
completely unaware), two questions on general sensory-motor abilities of their up-
per and lower body parts (e.g. "Do you feel something unusual on your left arm?", 
scores 0= completely aware, 5= slightly aware and 10= completely unaware) and 7 
questions regarding their  proficiency in bimanual or bipedal everyday actions dif-
ferent from those used in the experimental task (e.g. "Can you clap your hand?" 
requiring a Yes/No question and in the case of a positive response allocating a 
score on a 10-point Likert scale). In this way the score ranged from 0 to 100.  
The same procedure was repeated for the second block (see timeline in Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental task. The general timeline of the First person-perspective task. 
The two blocks were counterbalanced between subjects. The measure of General aware-
ness was recorded before and after each block. For each action, the questions about profi-
ciency assessed semantic anticipatory, emergent and post-error awareness. 
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3.2.4.5. Statistical Analyses 
According to the Likert scale, the score range was from 0 to 10, with 0 when the 
action was judged impossible and 10 when the patient or the physiotherapist (Pht) 
declared that the action was possible without any difficulties. Given the ordinal na-
ture of the data, these were analysed by means of a cumulative logit model 
(Agresti, 2002) in R (R Development Core Team, 2015 with cumulative link 
mixed model - clmm function of the ordinal package, Christensen, 2015). The cu-
mulative logit model allows us to compare several factors in an ANOVA-like way 
using the ANalysis Of DEviance Test (ANODE, McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). For 
all analyses, the random intercept of the model was the subject due to the small 
sample (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015). 
In order to evaluate patients’ degree of awareness, the judgment of the Phts were 
compared to those expressed by the patients in the first step of the task (Semantic 
awareness), by means of a 2 (Evaluator: Pht vs. Patient) x 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) 
ANODE Test. 
The modulation of awareness induced by the experimental task was computed in a 
2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 4 (Time: Semantic, Anticipatory, Emergent, Post-Error) 
x 2 (Action: Dangerous vs. Neutral) x 2 (Block: FB vs. UB) ANODE Test.   
Finally, to investigate any potential generalization of the experimental effects on 
actions other than those executed, the partecipants' scores in the General Aware-
ness Assessment were analyzed across time in a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Inter-
val: Before vs. After block) x 2 (Block: FB vs. UB) ANODE Test.   
All the post-hoc analyses were computed by means of Least-Square Means 
(lsmeans) Test (Lenth, 2016), a specific analysis for ordinal data, with Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni, 1936). 
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3.3. Results  
 
In the trial involving the control unimanual actions, all of the patients (AHP and 
HP) declared to be able to perform the actions and showed a good level of atten-
tion to the task giving consistent responses.  
 
3.3.1. Behavioural data  
The results of the comparison between the judgments given by Patients and Phts 
indicate a main effect of Evaluator (LRχ2(1)= 43.62, p<0.01) and the Evalua-
tor*Group interaction (LRχ2(1)= 64.73, p<0.01). Post-hoc analyses show that only 
in the AHP group there is a difference between Pht and patient's judgments 
(p<0.01) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Patient's Semantic Awareness of their proficiency in experimental actions 
and Phts' Judgments. The judgments of Pt (Patients) and PhT (Physiotherapists) are re-
ported for the two groups (AHP and HP). The Judgment's range on the y-axis is between 
0 to 10 as recorded during the task. The box represents the first and the third quartile of 
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data, and the darker line inside is the median. The bottom and the top whiskers are respec-
tively 1.5* Interquartile range lower and 1.5* Interquartile range higher.  
 
 
The analysis of the modulation in awareness induced by the task shows that the 
main factors of Group (LRχ2(1)=9.01, p<0.01), Time (LR χ
2
(3)= 31.29, p<0.01) and 
Action (LRχ2(1)= 19.24, p<0.001) and the Group*Time (LRχ
2
(3)==10.08, p=0.02), 
Group*Block (LRχ2(2)=13.77, p<0.01) and Action*Block (LRχ
2
(2)=49.62, p<0.01) 
interactions are significant. 
Post-hoc tests of the Group*Time interaction indicate that in AHP group aware-
ness improved in Emergent versus Semantic (p<0.01) and versus Anticipatory 
Awareness (p=0.05), and in Post-Error versus Semantic (p<0.01) and Anticipatory 
Awareness (p<0.001). In contrast, there are no statistical differences for the HP 
group (Figure 3a).  
In the Group*Block interaction only the AHP group shows a significant difference 
between FB and UB (p<0.01) with greater awareness in actions involving the full 
body with respect to those of upper body (Figure 3b).  
Finally, in the Action*Block interaction, post-hoc analyses indicate significant dif-
ferences between dangerous and neutral for each of the FB and UB blocks (both 
p<0.01) with a greater awareness for dangerous as compared to neutral actions in 
both groups (Figure 3c).  
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Figure 3. Results at the experimental task. The judgments of patients in the range be-
tween 0 to 10 as recorded during the task are reported.Lower judgments refer to higher 
awareness and vice versa higher judgments refer to lower awareness. The box represents 
the first and the third quartile of data, and the darker line inside is the median. The bottom 
and the top whiskers are respectively 1.5*Interquartile range lower and 1.5*Interquartile 
range higher. a) Judgments of the two Groups are reported according to Time, b) Judg-
ments of the two Groups are reported according to Block, c) Judgments of the Blocks are 
reported according to type of Actions (not separated for Group), d) scores at General 
Awareness Interview. *= Significant result, *
$
=Significant results, not Bonferroni cor-
rected. 
 
The results regarding the modulation of General Awareness show the main effects 
of Group (LRχ2(1)= 7.91, p<0.01) and Interval (LRχ
2
(1)= 5.49, p=0.02), without 
significant interactions. With the aim of conducting a limited exploration, we 
computed a post-hoc analyses between Group and Interval. Only in the AHP group 
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there is a difference (p=0.04) in awareness between the Before and After blocks 
(regardless of the order of the blocks). However, the difference does not resist to 
Bonferroni correction (p=0.07) (Figure 3d). 
 
3.3.2.Voxel Lesion Symptoms Mapping  
3.3.2.1. Comparison between groups 
There were no significant differences between the AHP and the HP groups in the 
extent of lesions (AHP mean= 241.49cc, SD= ±122.88cc; HP mean= 123.00cc, 
SD= ±123.31cc; t(12)= 1.78, p=0.09) (see Figure 4). The statistical comparison be-
tween the two groups (Figure 4D) showed that the cortical areas which were 
mainly compromised in AHP are the right supramarginal gyrus, the inferior parie-
tal cortex the superior temporal pole, the insula, the rolandic operculum and the 
prefrontal gyrus. In addition, the basal ganglia (in particular the putamen and the 
amygdale) proved to be damaged in the AHP group. The lesion extended into the 
white matter, involving in particular the long segment and anterior segments of the 
right arcuate and the cortical spinal tract. 
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Figure 4. Lesion mapping between groups. Mapped lesions displayed in axial view and 
in a central sagittal slice for: Overlay images of A) AHP patients (center of mass= x 30, y 
-10, z 20), with bar of index of number of total patients overlaid and B) HP patients (cen-
ter of mass= x 34, y -10, z 24), with bar of index of number of total patients overlaid. 
Comparison between the two groups: C) subtraction of the HP groups from the AHP 
group (center of mass= x 29, y -9, z 19), with bar of index indicating the number of AHP 
patients who survive to subtraction; and D) results from comparison between two groups 
at the Liebermeister (L) binomial analysis (center of mass= x 39, y -16, z 17), with bar of 
L value (FDR corrected) of significant areas (p-value<0.05). Statistical results from L 
comparison for E) gray and F) white matter, with number, percentage (%) of voxels for 
each area and MNI coordinates (only areas with impaired percentage of voxel bigger than 
5%). All lesions are in the right hemisphere. The same axial sections are shown in A-D.  
 
 
3.3.2.2. Lesions associated with lack in Emergent awareness 
In order to identify the networks specifically involved where there was no modula-
tion in awareness, we calculated an index of Emergent awareness [(Anticipatory 
awareness /Emergent awareness)/Anticipatory awareness]*100. This was com-
puted on the sum of the Likert-scale scores for each subject in order to detect the 
fluctuation between the different kinds of awareness (the ratio between Anticipa-
45   
 
tory and Emergent awareness), which had been modulated with respect to the ini-
tial level of awareness. 
Lesion mapping results indicated which damaged area was related to a lower index 
value, i.e., a lesser degree of Emergent awareness. This index was used as an inde-
pendent predictor in a VLSM involving all the of the patients (t-test statistics). 
It was evident that a lack of Emergent awareness can be associated  with lesions 
involving a wide fronto-temporo-parietal network, in particular with the insula, the 
ventral inferior frontal area and the temporal lobe. In addition, the basal ganglia, 
amygdale and white matter around them are damaged (Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Lesion mapping with behavioural data in Emergent awareness. A) Lesions 
associated with lack in Emergent awareness are displayed in axial view and in a central 
sagittal slice. t value (FDR corrected) of significant areas (p>0.01) are reported (center of 
mass= x 36, y 14, z 6). Table of significant lesions with number and percentage of voxels 
for each area for B) grey and C) white matter (only areas with impaired percentage of 
voxel bigger than 3%).  
 
 
 
 
46   
 
3.3.2.3. Lesions associated with reduced effects resulting from attempts to per-
form actions of a dangerous nature 
To evaluate damaged areas were involved when the partecipant's level of aware-
ness did not increase as a result of attempting a potentially dangerous action, the 
index was computed as: [(Neutral /Dangerous )/Neutral]*100. Again, we consid-
ered the fluctuations between different kinds of actions (the ratio between Neutral 
and Dangerous actions), modulated with respect to the initial level of awareness in 
Neutral actions.  
The index was calculated firstly on the sum of each parent's scores for Anticipa-
tory awareness and then on the sum of the scores for Emergent awareness. We 
computed two different VLSM (t-test statistics) in order to identify the damaged 
area (lower index) related of  a reduced influence of Dangerous on, respectively, 
Anticipatory and Emergent awareness. 
The results regarding the reduced influence of Dangerous on Anticipatory aware-
ness indicated that this lack of effect is associated with cortical and subcortical le-
sions in frontal areas,  the insula, the rolandic operculum and  the basal ganglia 
(Figure 6a-c).  
The reduced influence of Dangerous on Emergent awareness is associated with 
damage to the insula, the basal ganglia and amygdale, and the white matter around 
these structures (Figure 6d-f).  
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Figure 6. Lesion mapping with behavioural data in emotional/dangerous nature of 
actions. Two different VSLM s separate analyses of lack of Dangerous effect in Anticipa-
tory and Emergent actions showed similar results: A) Lesions of lack of Dangerous effect 
in Anticipatory awareness (center of mass= x 37, y 0, z 11). B) Table of significant le-
sions with number and percentage of voxels for each area for B) grey and C) white mat-
ter. D) Lesions of lack of Dangerous effect in Emergent awareness (center of mass= x 30, 
y 16, z 5). Table of significant lesions with number and percentage of voxels for each area 
for E) grey and F)white matter. For both VLSM analysis: The statistical lesions are 
shown in axial view and in the middle sagital slice, t-value (FDR corrected) are reported 
only for significant areas (p>0.01) and only areas with impaired percentage of voxel big-
ger than 3%. 
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3.4. Discussion 
 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that AHP is a multifarious syndrome (Orfei 2007; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2004; Fotopoulou, 2014) and that residual forms of awareness 
may be spared in anosognosic patients (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). 
Very recent studies also suggest that modulation of the symptoms is possible by 
means of specific manipulation, for example changing the patient’s perspective of 
self- observation (Fotopoulou, Holmes, & Kopelman, 2009; Besharati, Kopelman, 
Avesani, Moro, & Fotopoulou, 2015), activating the intention to act (Moro et al., 
2015) or inducing specific emotions (Besharati et al., 2014). 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the possibility of activating residual 
forms of awareness by asking the patients to execute everyday actions in specific 
conditions. 
In particular, we focused on: i) the potentially positive influence of attempts to act 
on patients' awareness of their deficits (Emergent awareness) and ii) the potential 
impact on anosognosia of attempting to perform actions with dangerous character-
istics (Actions of a dangerous nature). Our results support and expand previous 
data (Moro et al., 2011) indicating that AHP patients may show signs of a form of 
emergent awareness. In fact,  the patients' degree of awareness  increases during 
the actual attempts to act, in comparison to the Anticipatory awareness (before 
execution). In addition, the attempt to perform potentially dangerous actions posi-
tively influences these effects, inducing an improvement in awareness in both the 
AHP and control groups.  
Finally, an improvement (although not statistically significant)  in the degree of 
General Awareness (which does not directly relate to the experimental action) is 
recorded after the execution of the task. This may be important in terms of  devis-
ing rehabilitation strategies. 
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3.4.1 The assessment of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia   
The categorization of our patients as anosognosics or non-anosognosics was ini-
tially done based on their scores on the Bisiach scale  and Berti interview, which 
are two well known and widely used instruments in the AHP diagnosis.  
This first assessment was also confirmed by the results of the two groups in the 
experimental task. In fact, the comparison between the judgments of the patients 
and that of their Physiotherapists judgments regarding their proficiency confirmed 
the preliminary classification. It is worth to note that an assessment based on this 
kind of comparison is particularly sensitive in term of identifying the presence of 
anosognosia (e.g. the VATAm, Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, 2009).  
Finally, we administered a further ad-hoc questionnaire where specific items re-
garding self-reported proficiency in bimanual and bipedal actions (different from 
those of the task) were used as a measure of General Awareness (Marcel et al.’s 
modified interview, Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011). As the scores in this 
interview ranged from 0 to 100, it offered us the possibility to detect any fluctua-
tion in participants’ awareness occurring before and after the experimental task. 
We can thus assume that the two groups of patients really differed in terms of 
awareness. A comparison of their lesion confirmed this, as in AHP patients it was 
possile to detect  the involvement of a wide right fronto-temporo-parietal network 
in AHP (Pia et al., 2004), with a main role of ventral frontal areas (Berti et al., 
2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Kortte et al., 2015), the insula (Fotopoulou et al., 
2010, Karnath, Baier, &Naegele, 2005; Vocat et al., 2010, Moro & Pernigo et al., 
2016), but also of subcortical structures, such  as the basal ganglia and amygdale 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat et al., 2010) and the white mat-
ter around them (Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016). 
We also found lesions in the supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal cortex. This 
indicates that in this AHP group the damage was spread in a more posterior and 
cortical direction with respect to previous studies (Karnath et al., 2005; Berti et al., 
2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; , Moro et al., 2011; Moro & Pernigo et al., 2016). 
50   
 
The cortical parietal damage also explains the presence of visual spatial neglect, 
which was recorded in all of the patients in the AHP group (Bartolomeo, de Schot-
ten, & Chica, 2012; Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016  supplementary materials in 
Chapter 4). 
The hypothesis of more general disorders in the ability to evaluate has been ad-
vanced in AHP (Saj, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2016). As the comparison between the 
AHP group’s judgements referring to themselves as compared to others (Chapter 
4) did not show significant differences, we cannot totally exclude this interpreta-
tion.  
Nevertheless, observing the performance of each individual patients provided con-
firmation of the results of a previous concerning the existence of a dissociation 
(Moro et al., 2011). In fact, although four out of seven patients in this study (one of 
them did not perform the ther-reffered task) showed symptoms of AHP both in the 
self- and other-referred conditions, two patients displayed a significantly greater 
degree of anosognosia in the self-referred condition and one in other-referred con-
dition.  
Finally, the FB actions were judged to be more difficult than the actions involving 
only the upper limbs (UB). This may be at least in part explained by the fact that 
the motor deficit in lower limbs was more evident at the patients, who were in a 
wheelchair. In addition, the patients were given daily training in FB actions during 
the rehabilitation sessions, while most of the bimanual actions were not performed 
by the patients during their stay in hospital. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that some learning mechanisms relating to their difficulty in performing those 
actions might contribute to an implicit updating in autobiographical memory (the 
Personal Data Base in Morris & Mograbi, 2012).  
However, these everyday experience in rehabilitation training were not enough to 
make AHP patients aware of their paralysis, as they were anosognosic with regard 
to both upper and full body actions.  
Hence it is important not to consider AHP as an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but as 
a multifaceted complex syndrome that needs to be assessed in a variety of con-
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texts, at different times and with several different methods (Nurmi & Jehkonen, 
2014 for review). When well investigated, the issue of fluctuations in symptoms 
may be addressed in order to help patients to increase awareness (Besharati et al., 
2015; Moro et al., 2015). 
 
3.4.2. Emergent Awareness   
Emergent Awareness in AHP has been described (Moro et al., 2011, Moro et al., 
2015) as the explicit awareness that emerges during an attempt to act. It may be 
detected when AHP patients become more aware of their own deficits when they 
are asked to actually perform actions or to explain the reasons why they fail. 
The concept originates from the hierarchical model of awareness devised by Cros-
son and colleagues (Crosson et al., 1989; Orfei, et al., 2007; Moro et al., 2011). 
This describes three levels of awareness: (1) intellectual awareness, i.e. the generic 
ability to recognize a deficit (e.g. “I suffered a stroke”); (2) emergent awareness, in 
which a patient becomes declaratively aware of his/her deficits only when asked to 
perform an action with the affected body part (i.e. by means of “confrontation”; 
e.g. “I thought I was able to do this action, but now I’m realizing it is impossible 
for me”); and (3) anticipatory awareness, i.e. the ability to anticipate the effects of 
a deficit, i.e. admitting the inability to perform an action before it becomes evident 
in a real situation (e.g. stating beforehand “I cannot jump because of my paraly-
sis”). This model posits a hierarchical relation between the three levels so that an-
ticipatory awareness is thought of as the highest level (and thus the first one to be 
affected in AHP), which is followed by emergent and then intellectual awareness. 
However, in cases of AHP it is possible that individual patients may show varying 
degrees of deficit in these three forms of awareness (Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et 
al., 2011). 
The first study which tested this theory in AHP demonstrated empirically that 
when patients were asked to perform movements with their affected body parts, 
emergent awareness was manifested in a group of patients who were more gener-
ally unaware of their deficits (Moro et al., 2011). This finding suggests that intel-
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lectual and perhaps even anticipatory awareness may increase as a result of failed 
attempts to perform an action. 
The efficacy of this approach has also been confirmed in a study of rehabilitation 
where a specific error-based program was administered to four AHP patients 
(Moro et al., 2015). Unfortunately, the number of patients involved in both of 
these previous studies was small and in addition only bimanual actions were em-
ployed. Thus, further data were necessary in order to confirm and expand the first 
evidence.  
In line with the data resulting from these two studies, the AHP patients in the pre-
sent study judged their ability to perform actions as being worse they when they 
were actually placed in the real condition to act in comparison to the judgement 
that they gave during an preliminary out-of-context interview (Semantic Aware-
ness) or before being placed in the situation where they were required to act (An-
ticipatory Awareness). This improvement in awareness was also present after the 
execution of the action, when patients compared their previous judgements with 
their failures to perform (Post-Error awareness). 
The Forward Dynamic model helps to explain our results. According to this model, 
motor awareness is based on the congruence between action planning and the pre-
diction of the sensory consequences of the same action. When a given movement 
does not occur as intended and planned, a mismatch between predicted and actual 
sensory feedback is detected by a brain comparator that brings about conscious 
awareness of an error (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Fotopoulou et al., 
2009). In AHP, the symptoms derive from a defective functioning of the compara-
tor which for some reasons is incapable to detect this mismatch (Bottini et al., 
2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). In this framework, we consider that intention to act 
combined with the request to evaluate performance may have an important role in 
the activity of monitoring any discordance between the original intention and the 
sensory feedback and contribute towards an improving in Emergent awareness 
(Moro et al., 2011). The process induces the use of cognitive and metacognitive 
strategies and executive processes (necessary for the intention, the monitoring and 
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the evaluation of performance), which are not spontaneously activated in AHP pa-
tients and can be very important resource for recovery. 
 
3.4.3. Effect of potentially dangerous actions 
It is well known that the characteristics of a stimuli and the emotions these charac-
teristics arouse have an impact to individual’s responses. For example, the emo-
tional content of facial expressions strongly influences the process of face percep-
tion for both healthy subjects and neurological patients (de Gelder, Frissen, Barton 
& Hadijikhani, 2003; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001; Vuilleumier, 2004; Moro et 
al., 2011). The presence of dangerous objects interferes also with movements by 
evoking a specific aversive affordance (Anelli, Borghi, & Nicoletti, 2012; Anelli, 
Nicoletti, Bolzani, R., & Borghi 2013), which probably has the main purpose of 
preparing the motor networks to act in order to protect the self (Bradley, Codispoti, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Dangerous stimuli may also be efficacious as they im-
prove the impaired motor control of involuntary movements, as shown in a patient 
suffering from anarchic hand and magnetic apraxia, where involuntary grasping 
and groping significantly reduced in the presence of dangerous (e.g. a piece of 
broken glass) but not neutral (e.g. a glass) objects (Moro & Pernigo, at al., 2015).  
This modulation of the emotions is thought to be based on the direct modulatory 
effects of subcortical structures (in particular the amygdale), that promote the 
processing of emotionally salient events (Amaral & Price, 1984; Sah, Faber, Lopez 
de Armentia, & Power, 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2004). 
The role of emotional and motivational components in AHP has been investigated 
a number of times (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Ramachandran 1996; Vuilleumier, 
2004) and the difficulty which AHP patients have in accepting and tolerating an 
aversive emotional status has been interpreted as a problem concerning the emo-
tional-regulation system of negative feelings relating to the self (Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2002; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen 2005). 
According to the 'defense' theory (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955), the misattribution of 
negative emotions would be related to a refusal to explicit acknowledge own defi-
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cits. However, when spared, a certain degree of implicit knowledge of deficits 
could induce a process of repression (Anderson & Green, 2001). This latter hy-
pothesis has been confirmed in recent studies showing that AHP patients can 
evoke implicit negative emotional reactions when given information regarding 
their hemiplegia and this interferes with their performance in attentional (Nardone 
et al., 2007) or verbal-inhibition tasks (Fotopoulou, et al., 2010). 
Our results confirm these data and expand them by providing evidence of the posi-
tive effect of the potentially dangerous actions resulting in a greater temporary de-
gree of explicit awareness of hemiplegia. Interestingly, the effect of potentially 
dangerous actions was seen in both groups in the present study, suggesting that the 
processes underlying protective activation or alerting may be spared in AHP pa-
tients. Emotional negative stimuli has been found to have an activating role in a 
recent study (Besharati et al., 2014), that investigated the influence of emotions on 
explicit awareness. In this outstanding paradigm, negative or positive self-
referential emotions were induced by giving, respectively disapproving or approv-
ing social feedbacks to the patients about their performance. Although the AHP 
patients were capable of experiencing both negative and positive feelings, only the 
former induced a temporary improvements in explicit self-awareness (Besharati, et 
al., 2014). 
Another interesting result is that actions with dangerous attributes have an effect 
on all kinds of awareness, not only when the action is in progress (Emergent 
awareness) but also before the action starts (Semantic and Anticipatory aware-
ness). It is thus possible that, in addition to the subcortical emotional processes 
linked to the action planning, more top-down, semantic factors (i.e. the knowledge 
about the danger involved in a action) influences the effect.  
In a similar way, neuro-anatomical studies have shown that he representation of 
actions involving dangerous stimuli is associated with a cortical activation in a 
general network (Baumgartner, Willi, & Jäncke, 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Oliveri 
et al., 2003), that integrates emotional information with behavioral and cognitive 
motor responses (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). Both subcortical areas, such  as the 
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basal ganglia (Butler et al., 2007, Phelps et al., 2001), amygdale and putamen 
(Romano, Gandola, Bottini, & Maravita, 2014), and cortical regions probably con-
tribute in a fronto-insula/limbic inhibitory regulation (Phelps et al., 2001). Our 
analyses of the lesions are mainly explorative, due to the small number of patients, 
but they support this hypothesis. In fact, the lack of an improving effect resulting 
from a request to perform a potentially dangerous action, (in particular with refer-
ence to the responses relating to Emergent awareness), is significantly linked to a 
damage to the basal ganglia and amygdale (Hornigo, Vega-Flores, & Castro-
Alamancos, 2016) and in the white matter underlying insula and fronto-temporal 
areas.  
In the present study, the awareness of the AHP patients increased to a greater de-
gree with FB as compared to UB actions. This is particularly interesting since FB 
actions (e.g. standing up or walking) are in fact potentially dangerous only for pa-
tients suffering from  paralysis, while UB actions may be dangerous for everybody 
(i.e. putting a nail in a wooden block or lighting up a candle). This might represent 
an index of some residual forms of implicit awareness (see also Nardone et al., 
2007; Fotopoulou et al., 2010). 
An implicit bodily response to potentially dangerous stimuli has been found in a 
recent study (Romano et al., 2014), where the anticipatory reaction of skin conduc-
tance to threatening stimuli was recorded in hemiplegic and somatoparaphrenic pa-
tients, subjects with hemiplegia and anosognosia for hemianesthesia and hemiple-
gic patients without deficits in body representations. Crucially, the authors found a 
reduced conductance response in somatoparaphrenic patients, specifically relating 
to the contralesional arm, which they considered as not belonging to their body. In 
contrast, anosognosic patients showed implicit responses which were analogues to 
those of patients who only suffered from paralysis.  
 
3.4.4. Limitation and conclusions 
This study has some limitations. As with most studies on AHP, the number of pa-
tients is small. This is mainly due to the rarity of the syndrome and the difficulty of 
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finding patients with a sufficient degree of attention, which was necessary to com-
plete the task. Unfortunately we could not examine in depth the level of anxiety 
and depression in the patients and the data from the HADS were not available for 
all of them. Nevertheless, clinicians did not identify specific problems relating to 
mood or anxiety in the patients recruited for the study. 
Taking everything into consideration, our results confirm the existence of various 
different forms of awareness and the possibility of activaing residual emergent 
awareness in order to restore an explicit recognition of his/her motor deficits. At-
tempting actions and the consequent analysis of the patient's motor deficits (with 
adequate emotional support) might be crucial in the recovery from anosognosia 
(Moro et al., 2015), especially in contexts which do not offer effective training 
programs (Kortte & Hillis, 2011; Jenkinson, Preston, & Ellis,  2011, but see 
Besharati et al., 2015).   
Our experiment brings some new evidences regarding the influence of emotional 
and motivational components of action on AHP (as in Besharati, et al., 2014), and 
it is thus potentially useful in rehabilitation. 
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Chapter 4 
Modulating Anosognosia for Hemiplegia: the 
Judgment of Other's actions  
(Supplementary materials) 
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4.1. Control task: The Judgment of Others’ actions: a third-person perspec-
tive 
 
In order to collect data regarding the dissociation in motor awareness deficits, 
which may refer exclusively to the self or also to other people, a second task was 
administered. The patients were asked to judge the ability of another hemiplegic 
patient to carry out the same actions as those used in the main experimental task.  
This chapter is in integration to the previous experiment (in Chapter 3), thus the 
theoretical framework  and the information related to the patients are present in the 
introduction and the discussion of Chapter 3. 
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4.1.1. Stimuli 
The patients were asked to view a series of very short video-clips (ca. 3-4 seconds 
long), showing a young man suffering for left hemiplegia. The list of 24 actions he 
had to perform were the same as those used in the main experiment in Chapter 3. 
Crucially, the video never showed the whole action, but stopped before the action 
started, so only the situation in which the patient was asked to do the actions, but 
not his attempts to act were seen. This allowed us to investigate other-referred 
awareness only in the Anticipatory (and not the Emergent) condition. The patient 
was shown from a frontal perspective and his hemiplegia was always clearly visi-
ble.  
 
4.1.2. Procedure 
The participants sat at a table and a computer was placed in front of them (at 
around 40 cm) or in a right position (in case of neglect), in which it was easily 
visible. The examiner sat close to the patient and the video-clips were shown. Af-
ter each video, the subjects were asked (by means of Yes/No questions) to judge 
the capacity of the patient in the video to realize the action seen ("Can he do it?” 
the score for No was 0). In case of positive answer, they then had to judge the 
other’s proficiency ("How well can he do it?") using the 10-point Likert scale 
(from 1 = "He cannot do it" to 10 "He is very good at it"). FB and UB blocks were 
presented in a counterbalanced order between participants. 
To prevent that this other-referred perspective task influences the self-referred 
awareness (Besharati, et al., 2014; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009), this task was always 
administered after the main experimental task.  
In addition, the potential general effect of the videos in the General Awareness In-
terview (Moro et al., 2011) was measured at the beginning and at the end of the 
whole task.  
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4.1.3.  Statistical analyses 
In order to assess any fluctuations of Awareness from a self-referring or other-
referring perspective, these analysis were carried out only for the AHP group. The 
data from seven subjects were available, since 1 patient did not execute this task 
for practical reasons. The differences between judgments of self or another pa-
tient’s action were analysed by means of a 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Ac-
tion: Dangerous vs. Neutral) ANODE Test. All post-hoc analyses were executed 
with lsmeans Tests (Bonferroni corrected). 
To investigate the potential effects on awareness, the scores at the General Aware-
ness were analysed across time in a 2 (Interval: Before vs. After task) lsmeans 
Test.  
 
 
4.2. Results 
 
In the judgment of others’ actions, the results showed significant statistical differ-
ences in AHP in the main factor Action (LRχ2(1)=35.30, p<0.01), but not in Per-
spective (LRχ2(1)= 1.68, p=0.19) and in the interaction Action*Perspective (LR 
χ2(1)= 1.20, p=0.27) (Figure 1Sa). Thus, analysing the whole group, the dissocia-
tion self-other does not emerge (but see below for individual results). 
In the General Awareness assessment the AHP group showed a difference between 
the assessments pre and post task (p<0.01) (Figure 1Sb). 
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Figure 1S. Results for AHP group at The Judgment of Other person’s actions task. 
The judgments of patients are expressed in the range between 0 to 10 as recorded during 
the task; lower judgments indicate that the action are judged as more difficult (i.e. better 
awareness), and vice versa higher judgments refer to actions perceived as easier (i.e. 
worse awareness). The box represents the first and the third quartile of data, and the 
darker line inside is the median. The bottom and the top whiskers are respectively 1.5* 
Interquartile range lower and 1.5* Interquartile range higher.  
a) Judgments are reported according to the Perspective (Self and Other) and the type of 
Actions (Dangerous and Neutral), b) Judgments at the measure of General awareness pre 
and post the other-referred experimental task. 
 
 
4.2.1. Individual performance 
As in the previous literature on the subjects, the dissociation between self- and 
other-referred anosognosia is reported only in some of AHP patients, we analysed 
the individual performance (Figure 2S), in order to calculate the number of pa-
tients really manifested this dissociation. For each subject we computed a repeated 
2-way (Perspective: Self vs. Other) Wilcoxon Test.  
Statistical differences are detected for participant n. 2 (Z=-2.07, p=0.04) and sub-
ject n. 4 (Z=-3.34, p<0.01), who showed greater awareness in other-referred condi-
tion as they judged the other patient’s proficiency as being worse than their 
own(Self).. 
61   
 
In contrast, the subject n. 3 showed a contrary effect (Z=-2.87, p<0.01) with more 
severe judgments for the Self than for the Other patient’s actions.  
All of the other patients did not show differences in judgment, confirming that the 
dissociation between Self and Other is present only in some AHP patients. 
 
 
 
Figure 2S. Individual results of the AHP patients in The Judgment of Other person’s 
actions task. The judgments of patients are expressed in the range between 0 to 10 as re-
corded during the task; lower judgments indicate that the action are judged as more diffi-
cult, and vice versa higher judgments refer to actions perceived as easier. The box repre-
sents the first and the third quartile of data, and the darker line inside is the median. The 
bottom and the top whiskers are respectively 1.5* Interquartile range lower and 1.5* In-
terquartile range higher.  
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Anosognosia for hemiplegia is a deficit of motor awareness that is characterized 
from heterogeneous and multi-componential factors. From previous evidence, it 
has been suggested that a real attempt to perform an action might enhance some 
residual form of awareness.  
In this experiment, we investigate whether some residual forms of awareness 
might be detected in measurements of automatic bodily responses of skin conduc-
tance during actions with or without the affective resonance of danger. From the 
results the skin conductance responses of patients with Anosognosia for hemiple-
gia appear to be enhanced by vicarious actions, but not specifically from danger-
ous objects used during these actions. We suppose that some more specific type of 
stimuli and processes might be needed to induce sensorymotor and top-down 
modulations of awareness, but further investigations are suggested. 
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5.1. Introduction  
 
The neurological disorder of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia manifests itself as a lack 
of awareness of  motor impairments in patients affected by a right brain damage 
(Babinski, 1914). Namely, these patients fail to acknowledge or recognize the mo-
tor deficit of their upper and/or lower limbs and report being able to move them. 
AHP has heterogeneous and multi-componential manifestations (Heilmann & Har-
ciarek, 2010; Orfei et al., 2007; Marcel, et al., 2004; Vocat et al., 2010), that con-
sist of both sensory-motor and high cognitive functions (Fotopoulou, 2012; 2014). 
Several studies have systematically investigated the relation between monitoring 
of intended actions and actual movements with AHP (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 
2010 for review). For instance, it has been demonstrated that AHP patients have an 
intact intention to move, which influences their performance during bimanual ac-
tions. Despite only one of their hands is actually moving, the intention and the plan 
of bimanual actions incide to the performance of the spared hand(Garbarini, et al., 
2012; Pia, et al., 2013) and to the perception of the incoming feedbacks 
(Piedimonte et al., 2016). Furthermore the presence of AHP affect the automatic 
bodily responses, as the electrodermal and muscle responses are observed during 
mental imagery of movements of the hemiplegic limb (Hildebrandt & Zieger, 
1995). Similarly, when AHP patients are instructed and trained to program a reach-
ing action as it would be really performed, they show muscles activation through 
electromyography of their paralyzed arm (Berti et al, 2007). These results demon-
strate that these patients preserved intentions to move and that they can produce 
the motor commands of the affected hemiplegic limb. 
In a recent study (Romano et al., 2014), the automatic electrodermal activity was 
investigated in right-brain damaged patients affected by hemiplegia. These patients 
were divided into different groups: subjects with somatoparaphrenia (deficit of the 
sense of ownership of their own arm), subjects with anosognosia for hemianestesia 
(lack of awareness of the controlateral sensory impairments) and subjects without 
deficits in their body representation. Crucially, the authors found that the anticipa-
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tory skin conductance reaction after the threatening stimuli was reduced specifi-
caly in the somatoparaphrenic group referring to the affected arm which they felt 
as not belonging to their body. In other words, a deep detachment of the arm from 
the body representation influences the implicit response to potential dangerous 
stimuli. Vice versa, there are no significant differences in the other groups of 
hemiplegic patients. Even the presence of anosognosia for the hemianestesia does 
not appear to implicitly modulate the perception of sensory stimuli. These results 
suggest that the body representation can be implicitly influenced in different ways 
by the sense of ownership or the degree of awareness (Romano et al., 2014). We 
may hypothesize that some somatoparaphrenic patients might show some spared 
electrodermal reaction as an implicit form of ownership of their arm and that the 
automatic reaction of skin conductance might be a useful method to detect the 
fluctuations in awareness.  
Instead the AHP patients show a deficit in sense of agency, meant as the feeling of 
authorship and control of their own actions (Gallagher, 2000). Despite the absence 
of actual limbs' movements due to hemiplegia, these patients do not appear to be 
aware about such a lack or at most they show it only in some tacit forms of aware-
ness. For example, some patients can implicitly adapt their movements to compen-
sate for the paralyzed limb without claiming the presence of hemiplegia, namely a 
form of Implicit awareness (Cocchini et al., 2010). Other patients reach instead an 
upcoming form of declarative awareness during the actual attempt to execute the 
movement, which is known as Emergent awareness (Moro, et al., 2011; Moro et 
al., 2015).   
In this framework, we suppose that these residual forms of awareness might be de-
tected in measurements of automatic bodily responses both in relation to actions 
(Berti et al., 2007; Hildebrandt & Zieger, 1995) and to their emotional resonance. 
Since dangerous stimuli appear to improve the level of awareness in AHP during 
the request to act (D'Imperio, Bulgarelli, Bertagnoli, Avesani, & Moro - Chapter 3 
of this thesis), the skin conductance responses (SCR) might provide an implicit 
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automatic measure of awareness during actions with threatening and neutral stim-
uli (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2014). 
In this new experiment, right-brain damage patients with and without AHP are re-
quest to perform a 'go-like' task, while the skin conductance responses (SCR) are 
constantly recorded. In the task some images of an arm during actions' executions 
are displayed in a first-perspective view so to make the patients feel as if their own 
arm is moving. After a few seconds, these images are covered by a big coloured 
square that is the 'go-signal' to answer. Patients are instructed to state its colour and 
the accuracy of responses is recorded. In order to detect possible fluctuations of 
awareness, these images are divided in accordance to the left or right hand and to 
the active action of reaching or the passive situation of being threatened by an ap-
proaching stimulus. In this way, we measure the behavioural and electrodermal 
bodily responses in relation to both the presence of the hemiplegia and the type of 
action. Furthermore, the stimuli are also differentiated by means of their affective 
resonance, since half of them have implied dangerous meaning while the other half 
are neutral. In particular, the dangerous actions feature objects implying the risk of 
being hurt and may trigger protective reaction.  
Finally, we also request the patients to declaratively judge their proficiency to real-
ize the same actions, with the aim to evaluate a possible dissociation between im-
plicit and explicit forms of awareness.  
In this study, we evaluate both the sensory-motormechanisms associated to differ-
ent types of stimuli and the possible higher cognitive modulation of awareness as-
sociated to changes in emotional state after a potential threat (Besharati et al., 
2014; Nardone et al., 2007).  
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5.2. Materials and Methods 
  
5.2.1. Participants 
Ten neurological patients following a right-brain damaged and suffering from se-
vere contralateral hemiplegia were recruited among 1 year. The deficits of lan-
guage comprehension and production and an history of brain injuries or psychiatric 
disease were considered as exclusion criteria. The two groups were matched for 
age, gender, education and the interval from the lesion onset and the experimental 
task (Table 1). 
 
Pt Age G Educ Exp Int Sens TE Motor 
AHP 1 75 M 5 < 1 + + - 
AHP 2 72 F 5 1 - 3 - Imp - 
AHP 3 49 F 5 < 1 - Imp - 
AHP 4 41 F Na 3 - 6  + Na - 
AHP 5 46 M 8 3 - 6  + - - 
Mean 56.6 
 
5.8     
St.dev. 15.7 
 
1.5     
  
  
    
HP 1 83 F 5 < 1 + - - 
HP 2 47 M 9 > 6  - Imp - 
HP 3 37 M 8 > 6  - Imp - 
HP 4 53 M 13 1 - 3  + Na - 
HP 5 Na F Na 3 - 6  - Imp - 
Mean 55 
 
8.8     
St.dev. 19.8 
 
3.3     
Table 1. Demographic and clinical data of patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(AHP) and without anosognosia for hemiplegia (HP). Pt= patient, G= gender, Educ= 
years of education. Exp Int= interval between lesion onset and experimental task classi-
fied in periods of: < 1 Month, form 1 to 3 Months, from 3 to 6 Months, > 6 Months. 
Sens= sensory deficits, TE= tactile extinction, Motor= motor deficits. -= deficits present; 
+= deficits not present. Imp= impossible to assess, Na= Not available. For each group 
Mean and St.dev.= Standard deviation values are reported 
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All the patients were divided into two different groups basing on the presence of 
AHP. For the categorization, AHP was assessed in upper and lower limbs by 
means of the Bisiach scale (Bisiach et al., 1986) and the Berti interview (Berti et 
al., 1996). For the diagnosis of AHP, the scores were  ≥ 1 at both the Bisiach scale 
and the Berti interview (Table 2).  
In order to verify the normal reactions of SCR to the task, we compared their per-
formances to a control group of group of 10 healthy people, which matched for 
age, gender and education. All the participants gave their consent to participate in 
the study (approved from the local ethics committee -CEP prot. N. 39216- and car-
ried out in accordance with the guidelines in the Declaration of Helsinki, 2013). 
All patients were well oriented in space and time at the time of the experimental 
task. Although some patients had scores under cut-off in the assessment of general 
cognitive profile (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), this was mainly 
due to visuo-spatial problems (Table 3). Half of the patient from each group failed 
in tests assessing frontal functions (Frontal Assessment Battery - FAB; Apollonio, 
et al., 2005).  
Finally both groups showed more symptoms of extrapersonal (Line Bisection, Al-
bert Test and Copy Test; Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987), and personal ne-
glect (Comb and Razor Test, McImtosh, Brodie, Beschin, & Robertson, 2000). 
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Pt Berti UL
1
 Berti LL
1
 Bisiach
2
 MMSE (30) FAB (18) Bisection (9) COMB 
AHP 1 1 2 3 11 5 Na -0.3 
AHP 2 1 2 1.5 17 1 0 -0.2 
AHP 3 1 2 1.5 23 12 9 0 
AHP 4 2 2 1.5 20 15 0 Na 
AHP 5 1 1 1 24 15 6 -0.4 
Mean  
  
19 9.6 3.75 -0.22 
St.dev.  
  
5.24 6.31 4.5 0.17 
  
  
    
HP 1 0 0 0 25 14 6 -0.06 
HP 2 0 0 0 16 11 2 -0.29 
HP 3 0 0 0 16 11 2 -0.36 
HP 4 0 0 0 26 12 4 -0,31 
HP 5 0 0 0 29 14 0 -0.33 
Mean  
  
22.4 12.4 2.8 -0.32 
St.dev.  
  
6.02 1.52 2.28 0.01 
Table 1. Neuropsychological data of patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) 
and without anosognosia for hemiplegia with Right damage (HP DX) and after left dam-
age (HP SX). Pt= patient. UL= Upper Limb LL= Lower Limb. Na= not available-= defi-
cits present; += deficits not present. Pathological scores are in bold. Scores at cut-off are 
in Italic. For each group Mean and St.dev.= Standard deviation values are reported.   
 
 
5.2.2. Stimuli   
The stimuli consisted of single images in which two arms were displayed while in-
teracting. In these images, the two arms were placed in front of each other, so that 
whomever was watching the screen saw an arm at the front, in a first-perspective 
view, as if it was making the movement and reaching out for the other arm, 
pointed in the opposite direction in an interactive situation. 
The other arm in the opposite view was always holding an object. Thus, to create 
the stimuli, 16 different objects were chosen that were easy to handle with one 
hand and common in everyday life activities. 
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Three different types of images were designed for the experiment to characterize 
different features of the first-perspective movements: i) the moment before the in-
teraction in an undetermined pre-action moment (Pre-action Block), ii) the arm in 
first-perspective actively reaching the opposite objects (Active Block) and iii) the 
other arm with the object approaching the arm in first-perspective, which is meant 
to move away or escape (Passive Block). It is relevant to notice that these actions 
were never completed. Indeed, in the Active Block, the arm in first-perspective 
was in a middle frame while reaching the other arm with the object. While in the 
Passive Block the opposite arm was in the middle of approaching the closer arm in 
first-perspective.  
Each object was used to realize a stimulus image for each Block, so that there were 
16 different kind of stimuli for every block.  
Furthermore, these stimuli were divided according to their affective resonance: 
half of the images were dangerous and half neutral (see section Validation of affec-
tive resonance of stimuli). This subdivision was based on the type of object hold 
from the opposite hand, which characterized the action. For the Dangerous Actions 
(D), we used some threatening objects that normally elicit the risk of getting hurt 
(i.e. a shard of glass or a knife). Dangerous objects in Active Block were then 
placed in a manner that would cause an injury if it is reached (e.g., ending on the 
sharp point of the knife pointing towards the reaching hand). Instead in the Passive 
Block the dangerous objects were used to approach the arm in a first-perspective in 
a threatening way (i.e. trying to hit the arm with the sharp end of the knife) (see 
Figure 1). Vice versa, the objects used for Neutral Actions (N) were harmless (i.e., 
a whole glass or a plastic comb). In addition, the objects were selected so that each 
dangerous object corresponded to a neutral object for similarity of shape and size 
(e.g., the knife and the comb) (see Figure 2).  
All the images were repeated during the task and presented once for each hand, so 
that in total we presented 96 stimuli for hand (divided in 32 stimuli for each block: 
Pre-action, Active and Passive) and repeated for the other hand. 
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Figure 1. Example of Dangerous Action. Experimental stimuli of a dangerous action is 
displayed separately for the movements in the a) Pre-action, b) Active and c) Passive 
Block. They are displayed only for the right hand. But they are repeated for the left hand. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a Neutral Action. Experimental stimuli of a Neutral action is dis-
played separately for the movements in the a) Pre-action, b) Active and c) Passive Block. 
They are displayed only for the right hand. But they are repeated for the left hand. 
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5.2.2.1 Validation of affective resonance of stimuli  
In order to ensure the affective resonance of the stimuli, 12 health subjects (6 
males and 6 females, mean of the age = 52.58 ±18.36, that were not involved in the 
experimental task) were recruited to judge their saliency.  
These subjects sat at the table and the computer was placed in front of them (ca. at 
40 cm). All the 96 images of the the experiment were individually shown in the 
middle of the computer screen, exactly as in the experimental procedure. The sub-
jects were asked to judge the dangerousness of each image by means of a visual 
analogue scale (VAS) displayed below the image with the mouse (with the right 
button). The VAS gave a value in a range from 0 ("Not dangerous at all") to 100 
("Very dangerous").  
For the experimental images the medians under the first quartile were qualified as 
neutral and over the third quartile as dangerous. Across all patients, the medians 
for the selected images were respectively 8.5 for Neutral and 87 for Dangerous Ac-
tions and they were considered as suitable for the experiment.  
 
5.2.3. Procedure 
In the experimental task, the subjects sat on their wheelchairs at a table and a com-
puter was placed in front of them (ca. at 50 cm). The images were shown in the 
middle of the screen, so that they were well visible for all patients (also in cases of 
neglect).  
Before the beginning of the experimental procedure, the subjects were left quite 
for a few minutes so that they could relax and feel comfortable. Subsequently, they 
were gently introduced to the experimental setting.  
The experiment consisted of a go-like task, while SCR was recorded. In each trial, 
after a fixation cross (2000 ms), a stimulus was shown on the screen randomly for 
4.5 or 5 seconds so that subjects could not get used to stimulus timing. Then, a big 
coloured square appeared on the screen and completely covered the stimulus. This 
was the "go signal" to which subjects were instructed to answer by saying its col-
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our ("Yellow" or "Green") as soon as they could. The images disappeared after the 
answer and another trial started. Accuracy at the task was recorded.  
In order to familiarize with the task before the start, an instruction block was ad-
ministered. For which, 8 images of a single hand (without objects) were shown 
randomly for 4.5 or 5 seconds and then the yellow or green square form appeared. 
The subject was instructed to pay attention to the hand and trained to answer only 
at the appearance of the square form by saying its colour. In this introductive part 
the subject was also asked to recognize which hand was displayed ("Which hand is 
it?" -  Left/Right answer). This question was asked randomlly a couple of times 
during the task, to ensure that the subjects were aware about it. 
As abovementioned, the experiment was composed of three different Blocks (of 32 
stimuli each) associated to the different moments of actions (Pre-action, Active 
and Passive Blocks) and they were run in counterbalanced order between subjects. 
In each block, stimuli were presented randomly so that half were Neutral and half 
were Dangerous Actions (as suggested for SCR measurements, e.g. Romano et al., 
2014) (see timeline in Figure 3). 
The task was administered in two separate days, respectively one day for all the 
blocks referring to an hand, in order not to tire the subjects out. For all the patients, 
we always started the experiment with the Blocks referring to the impaired hand, 
to avoid the possibility that the level of AHP might be influenced by the experi-
ment routine.  
E-prime 2.1 Software (Psychology Software Tool Inc., Pittsburgh, A) was used to 
control timing and randomisation of the task and the measurement of SCR was 
constantly recorded for the entire duration of the experiment by means of a Biopac.  
In addition at the beginning and at the end of the task, the level of explicit aware-
ness of the same actions were measured by a self-reported judgment of proficiency 
on a 10 Likert-points scale ("How well can you use your hand with this object?" - 
from 0 "I am not able to do it" to 10 "I can do it without any problems", namely 
the Explicit Awareness)  
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Figura 3. Timeline of the 'go-like' task. a) General timeline of the task for each hand. b) 
Specific timing for each trial of the task (the object is not displayed for space issue). 
 
 
5.2.3.1. Skin conductance responses' measurement 
Skin conductance responses (SCR) were recorded using a specific acquisition am-
plifier for skin conductance activity EDA100C (Biopac System Inc.). The ampli-
fier was connected to the computer through a serial port. The gain parameter was 
set at 5 µmho/V and the signal sampled at 100 Hz.  
Two snap electrodes (EL507: 2.7 cm x 3.6 cm, 1.5 mm thick) were used to acquire 
the signal. They were placed on subject's shoulder (as in Cacioppo, Tassinary, & 
Berntson, 2007), after that the skin was carefully cleaned with spirit. In case of pa-
tients the electrodes were placed on the ipsilateral shoulder. The electrodes were 
self-adhesive and pre-gelled with isotonic cream, that ensures a good signal-to-
noise ratio. At the beginning of each stimuli a trigger was digitally send from the 
E-prime Software to the signal  to sign the stimulus timing.  
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The analysis of SCR was computed using Acqknowledge 4.0 Software (provided 
by Biopac System). At first we filtered the signal at a cut-off of 40Hz, then an 
automatic continuous decomposition analysis (CDA; Benedek & Kaernbach, 
2010) permitted to separate the phasic components form the tonic activity, by 
means of a high pass digital filter at 0.05 Hz. 
The SCR was analyses on a peak-to-base measurements (similar to Romano, et al., 
2014), by computing the difference between the maximum (peak) value in the in-
terval between 0.3 s to 5 s post-stimulus (limit of the trials' time presentation) and 
the average value in the 0.3 s pre-stimulus.  
To overcome the intersubject variability (Lykken & Venables, 1971), the SCR re-
sponses were normalized within subjects into z-scores before being analysed. 
 
 
5.3. Results 
 
5.3.1. Accuracy  
The performance of all patients at the go-like task was extremely high in the accu-
racy (mean=91.72%). It confirmed both that the task was easy to perform and that 
all patients paid attention at it.  
The analyses were computed by means of a 2 (Group: AHP v. HP) x 2 (Hand: 
Hemiplegic v. Healthy hand) Chi
2
 Test, and post-hoc analysis with pairwise com-
parison tests for proportions with False discovery rate (FDR) correction (Benja-
mini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Despite the high level of accuracy, the result indicates a statistical difference of re-
sponses (χ2(1)=8.50, p<0.01), with a specific lower frequency of correct answers for 
the AHP group about the Hemiplegic hand than the Healthy hand (p<0.01). Instead 
the HP group do not present any differentiations in performance according to the 
hand (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Accuracy at the 'go-like' Task. Percentage of Correct Answers are shown in 
accordance to the Group and to the Hand. 
 
 
5.3.2. Skin Conductance Reponses  
The z-scores of peak-to-base measure of the SCR were analyzed separately for the 
control group of healthy subjects and for brain-damaged patients.  
For the SCR of the healthy control group, the analyses were computed by means of 
Linear Mixed Models. The fixed factors were the Block (Pre-action v. Active v. 
Passive) x Type (Dangerous v. Neutral actions), while the random intercept of all 
the model was the subject due to the small sample (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & 
Baayen, 2015).  
For the analysis reffering only to the brain-damaged patients, we added to the 
model two fixed factors of Group (AHP vs. HP) and Hand (Hemiplegic v. 
Healthy) and the covariate factor of Anosognosia (the value of the External aware-
ness before the experiment). Post-doc analysis are computed by means of t-test 
with FDR correction (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
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For the control group of healthy subjects, the results indicate a statistical difference 
of the Interaction Type*Block (F(1,1)=5.72, p=0.01), but not statistical effects of 
Type (F(1,9)=0.08, p=0.78) and Block (F(1,9)=0.63, p=0.49). In direct t-tests, there is 
only a statistical difference of Type in Pre-action Block (t(1,9)=1.90, p=0.05), with 
higher SCR for Dangerous (mean=0.16) than Neutral (mean= -0.02) actions (Fig-
ure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. SCR of healthy control group. Z-scores of SCR measurements of the control 
group of healthy subjects. The results indicate that the task elicits an affective automatic 
responses for Dangerous Actions. In case of possible movements to avoid the danger, the 
enhancement is not present. * for p≤0.05. 
 
 
For the two groups of patients, the results indicate a statistical difference of the co-
variate Anosognosia (F(1,1)=4.77, p=0.03) and the main factors Type (F(1,1)=4.31, 
p=0.04) and Hand (F(1,1)=15.21, p<0.01), but not other main factors Group 
(F(1,1)=4.13, p=0.07) or Block (F(1,2)=2.57, p=0.08). There is a significant Interac-
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tion of Group*Hand*Anosognosia (F(1,1)=6.97, p=0.01) and a tendency to signifi-
cant of Group*Type*Hand (F(1,1)=3.55, p=0.06). There are no other effects (Figure 
6 and 7). 
 
 
Figura 6. SCR of the brain-damaged groups. The means of the Z-scores of the peark-
to-base SCR for both AHP and HP group are shown, in order to show the average re-
sponses for the brain-damaged patients 
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Figura 7 Covariate Anosognosia. Trend of the Z-scores of SCR for the covariate 
Anosognosia according to the Group and the Hand. 
 
 
In order to investigate the role of the Hemiplegic hand, we provided divided the 
analysis according to the hand. We included all factors mainly for a descriptive 
reason. For instance only the results on the Hemiplegic hand show statistical dif-
ferences of the main of Block (F(1,2)=9.40, p<0.01, FDR corrected), but not of the 
other main effects of Group (F(1,1)=1.22, p=0.33), or Type (F(1,1)=0.12, p=0.72). 
There is a significant Interaction of Group*Block (F(1,2)=3.98, p=0.03, a tendecy 
with FDR correction).  
There are no significant results for the Healthy hand. 
 
Finally, for more descriptive aims, a separate analysis was performed for each 
group only for the Hemiplegic hand.  
For the AHP group, the results indicate only the main effect of Block (F(1,2)=6.47, 
p<0.01, FDR corrected), but not of Type (F(1,1)=0.06, p=0.79), or of Interactions. In 
post-hoc t-tests, higher SCR values appear for the Active Block (mean=0.35) than 
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the Passive (mean= -0.15) (T(1)=-3.97, p<0.01, FDR corrected) and lower Passive  
to the Pre-action (mean=0.11) Blocks (T(1)=-2.22, p=0.4, FDR corrected). 
For the HP group, the results indicate the main effect of Type (F(1,1)=7.05, p=0.02, 
FDR corrected), but not of Block (F(1,2)=3.33, p=0.04), or for Interactions. Higher 
SCR values appear for the Dangerous Type (mean=0.01) than the Neutral Type 
(mean= -0.03) (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figura 8. SCR for the Heiplegic hand. The means of the Z-scores of the peark-to-base 
SCR for both AHP and HP group are shown. * for p≤0.05. T* = Significance of factor 
Type.  
 
 
5.3.3. External awareness 
Given the ordinal nature of the data from the Likert scales, these data were ana-
lysed  by means of a cumulative logit model (Agresti, 2002) by the ANalysis Of 
DEviance Test (ANODE, McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). For all analyses the ran-
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dom intercept of the model was the subject, for the theoretical reason that the sam-
ple was small (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015).  
The modulation of External awareness for the Hemiplegic hand was computed in a 
2 (Group: AHP v. HP) x 2 (Interval: Before v. After task) ANODE Test. All the 
post-hoc analyses were computed by means of Least-Square Means (lsmeans) Test 
(Lenth, 2016), that it is a specific analysis for ordinal data, with the Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni, 1936). 
 
Results indicate a main effect of Interval (LRχ2(1)= 12.96, p<0.01) and the interac-
tion Interval*Group (LRχ2(1)= 15.15, p<0.01). Post-hoc analyses show that only in 
the AHP group there was a difference between the higher measurement before than 
after the task (p<0.01, Bonferroni Corrected) (Figure 9). No other post-hoc com-
parisons are significant. 
 
 
Figure 9. External awareness. The judgments of self-reported proficiency are reported 
for the two Groups and the two Intervals before and after the task. The Judgment's range 
82   
 
on the y-axis is between 0 to 10 as recorded during the task. The box represents the first 
and the third quartile of data, and the darker line inside is the median. The bottom and the 
top whiskers are respectively 1.5* Interquartile range lower and 1.5* Interquartile range 
higher. 
 
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
In clinical and experimental practices, AHP is considered as a multi-componential 
syndrome (Orfei et al., 2007) and is a relevant source of insight in the investigation 
of residual forms of awareness (Nurni & Jehkonen, 2014). For instance, some 
AHP patients reported implicit aspects of awareness during bimanual actions 
(Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011) or temporal (or long-term) explicit 
awareness by asking them about their motor proficiency during the actual attempt 
to execute (Moro et al., 2011, Moro, et al., 2015).  
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the potential relation between 
implicit forms of awareness by means of SCR and the vicarious action excution. 
The SCR was measured during the vision of in-time actions in a first-perspective 
view. In particular, SCR to dangerous stimuli in Active actions of reaching and 
Passive actions of escaping were evaluated in right brain damaged patients with 
hemiplegia or with hemiplegia and AHP.   
 
5.4.1. Implicit forms of awareness during actions 
AHP reveals some latent processing of motor information that may lead to an ex-
plicit insight of the deficit (Cocchini, et al., 2010). It has been long acknowledged 
that some patients with AHP declaratively deny any motor impairments, but report 
some apparent implicit knowledge of the paresis during movements' attempts 
(Cocchini, Beschin & Della Sala, 2002; 2009, Moro et al., 2011). 
Recent evidence has shown the dissociation between explicit and implicit aspects 
of AHP. Indeed, although some patients fail to recognize the motor deficit only in 
first-perspective, yet they are still able to verbally assess the performance of other 
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paralyzed patients (Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Marcel, et al., 2004) orn to admit their 
own deficits while whatching themselves in a third-perspective view in a mirror or 
in a video-clip (Besharati, et al., 2015; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009).  
Other possible dissociations between implicit and explicit types of awareness have 
been reported in relations to actions' executions. For instance, some patients, who 
verbally deny their paralysis, are able to adjust their actions to compensate for the 
impossibility to move the hemiplegic arm, as they would know about their im-
pairments (Cocchini et al., 2009).  
Taken together, in our experiment we aim to detect implicit awareness through the 
observation of some acions, by means of the automatic bodily activations. Infact 
SCR were already used to prove disturbances of body representation (Romato et 
al., 2014) and it might be an implicit measure of motor awareness. SCR seemed to 
be similar between our AHP andHP groups, adnd they may be considered as a con-
flict between the visual perceived actions (on the screen) and the absence of real 
movements which could be plan (Berti et al., 2005). 
This conflict might be similar for both the AHP and the HP groups, but only the 
former presented an inability to explicitly acknowledge their motor deficits in the 
same actions (Explicit awareness) and showed a reaction similar to an avoidance 
of attention to left-hand's movements (Accuracy). Although in our experiment this 
dissociation was not clearly shown (see below for some differences between 
groups of patients), these outcomes suggested that the automatic responses of skin 
conductance could provide information about an implicit form of awareness during 
ations that may be otherwise hard to detect. 
 
5.4.2. Modulation of awareness during actions 
The explicit awareness that emerges in AHP during an attempt to act is known as 
Emergent Awareness (Moro et al., 2011, Moro et al., 2015). Based on the hierar-
chical model of awareness by Crosson and colleagues (Crosson et al., 1989; Orfei, 
et al., 2007), the Emergent awareness appears to be in a middle position between 
the Intellectual awareness of the presence of a global deficit (i.e. 'I know I had a 
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stroke') and the Anticipatory awareness of the specific motor deficit and the ability 
to anticipate its effects by adjusting the performance before to act.    
Since AHP can be selectively impaired in these three forms, only some AHP pa-
tients show to improve their motor awareness when they are requested to attempt 
to act (Moro et al., 2011) and to explain the reasons of their failures in those 
movements (Moro et al., 2015).  
In fact, the first study about this theory has empirically demonstrated that when 
some AHP patients are asked to perform some actions with their affected limbs, 
the Emergent awareness may manifest as an improvement of verbal degree of 
awareness of their paralysis (Moro et al., 2011), with a possible restoring effect 
(Moro et al., 2015). These results have been confirmed in a similar study where the 
degree of awareness was influenced by both the attempts to act and the general 
emotional features of the actions (D'Imperio et al., Chapter 3), suggesting the pres-
ence of top-down processes in recovery from AHP (Fotopoulou et al., 2010). 
In this study, we aimed to investigate the possible relation between these three lev-
els of AHP by analysing an automatic aspect of actions related to the body and the 
level of explicit awareness during vicarious actions' execution (Moro, 2015).  
In our experiment, what it is worth to notice that the activation from the SCR for 
both AHP and HP groups seemed to be specifically associated to the actions in 
which a movement is displayed in first-perspective view (Active Block), in com-
parison to the situation in which the action of escaping might be the natural reac-
tion but it is not yet present in the stimuli (Passive Block). Furthermore, in all pa-
tients the automatic responses were mediated from the level of explicit awareness 
of the same actions, as a confirmation of the heterogeneous attribute of the syn-
drome (Marcel at al., 2004), and its different levels of awareness.    
Interestingly, the control group of health subjects presented an activation for the 
Dangerous stimuli, but only when the actions was not shown. This outcome might 
suggest that they might plan and monitor adequate actions in the Active and Pas-
sive Blocks in order to not get hurt, so thus the affective responses about them 
might be suppressed. 
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5.4.3. Affective resonance of actions 
The possible modulation of awareness through dangerous stimuli has been re-
ported in Chapter 3, where it has been suggested that the motivational/emotional 
aspects of actions may modulate the degree of AHP before and during actions.  
In fact, the dangerous graspable objects interfere with the movements, by evoking 
some specific aversive affordances and bodily motor responses to escape or to 
avoid the danger (Anelli, et al., 2012; 2013) in order to protect the self (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Therefore, the dangerous objects can play a 
role in modulating the sense of agency and of its awareness. For instance, this kind 
of stimuli can effectively increase an impaired motor control of movements, as in a 
patient suffering from anarchic hand, who improved her performances in presence 
of dangerous objects by showing a decrease of involuntary grasping (Moro & Per-
nigo, at al., 2015). 
In AHP patients the bottom-up aspects of bimanual actions' requests may elicit 
some residual implicit levels of awareness (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 
2011), which may then be combined with higher order processes of action process-
ing (D'Imperio et al., Chapter 3; Fotopoulou, 2015), as in an attentional study in 
which the reaction to motor related words is influenced by the presence of motor 
awareness (Nardone, et al., 2007). This evidence suggested the possible influences 
of action and dangerous situation in AHP. 
In our experiment, indeed, AHP patients presented an enhancement of the SCR 
during the movements of reaching (Active Block) in comparison to Passive 
movements, but for both Dangerous and Neutral Actions.  
We might consider this result as an automatic affective implicit reaction during the 
execution of actions, but with a tendency of over-activation, which is not related to 
actions' features. We cannot complitely exclude that it may relates to a more gen-
eral deficit of awareness in monitoring the actions (Vuilleumier, 2004; Saj, Vocat, 
Vuilleumier, 2014). 
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In the HP group the SCR appeared to increase progressively as the level of 
Anosognosia, which was instead not explicitly expressed during the neuropsy-
chological assessment. Furthermore the level of SCR of the HP patients reached a 
similar activation to the AHP patients. But later on, when the evaluation of 
Anosognosia in the AHP group was even higher, the SCR decreased, as a possible 
sign that the implicit awareness was not more present.  
Despite the differenciation in groups' SCR values, it is important to stress that the 
two groups do not show any clear distinction, but the results might be driven from 
the level of Explicit awareness of the same experimental actions. Thus, we can 
confirm the multi-componential heterogeneous aspect of AHP (Orfei et al., 2007), 
that implies possible fluctuations of the syndrome and some peculiar manifesta-
tions of residual forms of awareness, which can be selectively impaired (Moro et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, we might suppose that a potential residual form of aware-
ness, which might be detected in skin conductance measurements during the at-
tempt to act, can be described only in a sub-group of patients as already reported 
about Emergent and Implicit motor awareness (Moro et al., 2011).  
The HP patients without anosognosia have a similar tendency of enhancement of 
SCR specifically for the Active Block, that supports the hyphotesis of importance 
of the attempts of actions in better realize paralysis' consequences and recovery 
(Moro et al., 2015). But in the HP group the increasing of SCR appeared to be spe-
cific for Dangerous actions as a selective arousal with Dangerous Actions for a 
more protective reaction to these stimuli.  
These outcomes might put emphasis on the theoretical hypothesis, that the spared 
motor command is not sufficient to explain the lack of acknowledge the absence of 
sensory feedback in AHP (Berti et al., 2007 for discussion; Fotopoulou et al., 
2008; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). Therefore, the sense of agency might com-
bine both a good level of awareness during the motor command and the integration 
of the predicted consequences during the execution (Desmurget et al., 2009).  
Considering all these theoretical accounts, these results might be a first experimen-
tal insight, that the HP patients with preserved explicit awareness are able to com-
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bine their conscious intention to the absence of movement and thus of feedbacks, 
so they might generate a protective alerting reaction to danger. Instead, the AHP 
patients do not show a complete different activation according the affective reso-
nance of the stimuli during the movement, but a general enhancement of arousal. 
So this result might indicate a spared ability or a probable dominance of motor 
command (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010), although they do not completely adjust 
their motor representations to feedbacks.  
Nevertheless, our results seem to be in accordance with the tendency of AHP pa-
tients to report self-generated movements, but they fail to integrate adequately the 
consequential feedbacks in order to become (Jenkinson et al., 2009, Fotopoulou et 
al., 2008), and consequently they do not reach explicitly awareness about their 
deficits. 
 
5.4.4. Limitation and conclusions 
The sample was quite small, as like as many studies about AHP, but more patients 
might be needed to understand the results better and to overcome the high variabil-
ity of the measurement of skin conductance. The difficulty was to find patients 
with a sufficient degree of attention, which was necessary to complete the task. 
Furthermore the task appeared to be complex to administrate and the results might 
be interpreted as not very strong. For example there were not huge responses for 
the HP group, which were not very influenced by the stimuli. But, despite we did 
not control for the perception of dangerousness for the experimental subjects, the 
validation of the stimuli reported a clear division of actions according to their af-
fective meanings. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results confirmed the existence of heteroge-
neous forms of awareness and the important role of attempting actions in modulat-
ing the degree of motor awareness (Moro et al., 2011). We showed some small 
signs of improvements of External awareness after the task, but we underlined the 
import role of specific and consistent feedbacks in possible restoring processes of 
AHP (Moro et al., 2015). In conclusion, with this study we supported the evidence 
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about the attempting actions in eliciting the Emergent Awareness (Moro et al., 
2011) and the consequent analysis of occurring motor errors as a crucial method in 
recovery from anosognosia (Moro et al., 2015). 
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Somatoparaphrenic symptoms after left hemisphere damage are rare. To verify the 
potential role of body-related sensory (proprioceptive, visual and somatosensory) 
manipulation in patients experiencing sensations of hand disownership, the symp-
toms of a patient suffering from crossed somatoparaphrenia were monitored and 
clinical and neuropsychological variables were controlled. Four types of manipula-
tion were administered: changes in spatial position of the hand, multisensory 
stimulation and self-observation (using video and mirrors). Multisensory visuo-
tactile stimulation was effective in reducing somatoparaphrenia and changes in the 
position of the hand produced some positive effects.  Third person perspective 
self-observation, however, did not result in any changes.  
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6.1. Introduction  
 
Disorders in body representations following brain damage have been reported 
since the first half of the twentieth century (Head & Holmes, 1911). Gerstmann 
(1942) described body ownership disturbances citing patients who were unable to 
recognize contralesional body parts as belonging to their own body. Later, various 
classifications were suggested (e.g. Critchley, 1953; Hécaen, 1972) and a distinc-
tion was made between patients showing a lack of recognition of the existence or 
ownership of their limbs (asomatognosia/disownership) and the condition where 
this is accompanied by delusions regarding the affected limbs, such as the belief 
that the affected limb belongs to another person (somatoparaphrenia). 
Somatoparaphrenia may in fact take several clinical forms (Vallar & Ronchi, 
2009) and in order to classify all abnormal feelings and beliefs regarding paralyzed 
limbs, a definition entitled ‘the disturbed sensation of limb ownership’ (DSO) was 
proposed (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Moro & Pernigo, et al., 2016). 
The specificity of the syndrome and the contribution of other functions in its onset 
(in particular, somato-sensory information and neglect) is still being debated (Val-
lar & Ronchi, 2009). Furthermore, DSO is usually associated with Anosognosia 
for Hemiplegia (AHP), although clinical and anatomic dissociations have been 
found. While AHP occurs after damage to the right insula, rolandic operculum and 
superior temporal gyrus, a shift in the latero-medial direction (involving the basal 
ganglia) emerges when DSO co-occurs with AHP (Moro & Pernigo et al., 2016). 
Only a few cases of DSO after left hemisphere lesions have been reported (Perren, 
Heydrich, Blanke, & Landis, 2015) but even though the incidence of this pathol-
ogy is rare, these cases may help us to understand the theories underlying neuro-
cognitive mechanisms of body-ownership better. 
It has been proposed that crossed somatoparaphrenia is less strongly associated 
with AHP and personal neglect than somatoparaphrenia after right brain damage. 
In contrast, it seems rather to depend upon a combination of extra-personal neglect 
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and sensory-motor deficits, with concomitant verbal capacities which allow the pa-
tient to express delusional ideas (Perren et al., 2015). 
In this context, if by means of experimental procedures a change in symptoms can 
be effected, this would constitute a contribution towards a better understanding of 
the syndrome. To date experimental results are not exhaustive and almost exclu-
sively refer to DSO after right hemisphere lesion (but see Spitoni et al., 2015). 
With the aim of investigating the potential role of body-related sensory informa-
tion in modulating DSO after left hemisphere damage, we compared the effects of 
four different types of manipulation in one individual patient (AS). Changes to the 
spatial position of the contralesional upper limb were made in order to evaluate 
proprioceptive and spatial components. Multisensory visuo-tactile stimulation 
served to investigate the role of sensory integration in the syndrome, while self-
observation of the hand in a video clip or a mirror allowed us to assess the effects 
on the patient of changes in perspective. 
These procedures have been recently demonstrated to be efficacious in reducing 
DSO following right-hemisphere lesion. In particular, it has been suggested that 
there is a visuo-spatial component of the syndrome as changes in the observation 
perspective (Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & Kopelman, 2009) or in the position of 
the examiner (Salvato et al., 2015) induce a modulation. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that multisensory visuo-tactile stimulation produces an effect (Bo-
lognini, Ronchi, Casati, Fortis, & Vallar, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, 
these manipulations have not been applied in crossed DSO and there have been no 
comparisons of their effects on an individual patient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92   
 
6.2. Methods  
 
6.2.1. Case report  
AS is a 78 year-old, right-handed woman with 13 years of education. She suffered 
a hemorrhagic left hemisphere stroke involving the fronto-temporal-insular cortex, 
the underlying white matter and basal ganglia (Figure 1). She was examined 3 days 
after the lesion onset and then daily for three months. During this period, she re-
mained unable to move her right limbs. She showed disorders in tactile perception 
and her sense of position. There were signs of right side personal and extra-
personal neglect and deficits in calculation, praxic abilities and frontal functions, 
while language and memory were preserved (Table 1). AS was unaware of her 
hemiplegia (AHP) and showed signs of somatoparaphrenia (DSO): in a number of 
clinical interviews she repeatedly denied that her right side was paralyzed and 
when she looked at her right upper limb (UL), she declared it was not hers and that 
it belonged to the doctor or examiner.  
Due to the unusual side of the lesion, an extensive assessment of body representa-
tion was carried out one month after the onset of the lesion (Moro, Pernigo, 
Urgesi, Zapparoli, & Aglioti, 2009). This showed disorders in left-right orienta-
tion, the denomination of body parts and finger agnosia (Table 1). While the DSO 
resolved itself in 6 weeks, AHP was still present six months after the lesion onset.  
AS gave written, informed consent to her participation in the study  (CEP prot. N. 
39216). 
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3 days 1 month 2 months 
Motricity Right Left Right Left Right Left 
MRC
1 
0 5 0 5 0 5 
Tactile Perception (9) 0 9 0 9 3 9 
Proprioception (9) 0 9 0 9 3 9 
Handedness 
  
   
 
Handedness Questionnaire
2 
19 2 19 2 19 2 
Edinburgh Inventory
3 
19 0 19 0 19 0 
Right Spatial Neglect 
  
   
 
Line Crossing
4 
0 18 0 18 0 18 
Star Cancellation
5 
Np 8 6 
Line Bisection
5 
9 9 9 
Figure and shape copying
5
 0 0 0 
Representational drawing
5
 0 0 0 
Comb and Razor test
6 
0.78  0.28 
Double stimulus Extinction %
7 
0 100 0 100 0 100 
 
Body Representation   
   
 
Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (UL)
8 
2 2 2 
Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (LL)
8 
2 2 2 
Somatoparaphrenia
9
 - - - 
Left-right disorientation (10)
10         
6 n.a. 6 
Indication of body part s (verbal command)
11  
  
   
 
   One's own body with closed eyes(18) 17 
   Examiner's Body open eyes (18) 17 
   On a manikin (21) 16 
Spatial localization of body parts (13) 10 
Spatial localization of bicycle parts (13) 12 
Semantic Knowledge
11   
 
Denomination of body parts (18) 9 
Definition of body part functions (10) 10 
Finger agnosia
11 
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  Indication of her fingers (30) 
 
 18 np   
   Indication on a drawing of a hand (30) 
 
 25 25   
Denomination of fingers (30) 
 
 18 18   
Definition of finger functions (10) 2 
General Functions (MMSE)
12 
24 Na na 
Language  + + + 
Memory
13 
np + + 
Praxic functions
14 
- - - 
Calculation
15 
np - - 
Frontal Functions
16 
np 7.5 na 
Table 1. Neuropsychological assessment. The scores at the neuropsychological assess-
ment at intervals of 3 days, 1 and 3 months from lesion onset are shown. Assessments in: 
Motricity (
1
Florence, et al., 1992), Handedness (
2
Briggs & Nebes, 1975; 
3
Oldfield, 1971) 
and Neglect (
4
Albert, 1973;  
5
Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987; 
6
Beschin & Robert-
son, 1997; 
7
Karnath, Baier, Nägele, 2005). Assessment of Body representation: Anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia (
8
Berti, Làdavas, & Della Corte, 1996);
 
Somatoparaphrenia (
9
Moro 
et al., 2004); Left/Right Disorientation (
10
Benton, 1959); Identification of body parts, se-
mantic knowledge of body and finger agnosia (
11
Moro et al., 2009). General functions 
(
12
Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975); Language, Memory (
13
Spinnler & Tognoni, 
1987); Praxic functions (
14
De Renzi, Motti, Nichelli, 1980); Calculation abilities 
(
15
Miceli, & Capasso, 1991); Frontal Functions (
16
Apollonio, et al., 2005). UL= Upper 
Limb, LL= Lower Limb. na= not available. np= not possible. += not impaired, -= im-
paired. The number of total stimuli assessed is in parenthesis. Scores at cut-off are in 
italic. Pathological scores are in bold. 
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Figure 1. Lesion analysis. AS's lesion was traced on a standard MRI template from the 
Montreal Neurology Institute (MNI) using MRIcron software (Rorden & Brett, 2000). 
The final drawing was superimposed on an Automatic Anatomical Label (AAL) template 
and the JHU (Johns Hopkins University) DTI-based white matter atlas in order to analyze 
the damage to grey and white matter, respectively. a) A representation of the traced lesion 
on a 3D brain, b) Real neurological CT in Axial view, c) Percentage and number of vox-
els damaged for grey and d) white matter areas. 
 
 
 
6.2.2. Procedure 
To verify the role of visual and sensory components in the modulation of disown-
ership, four experimental manipulations were repeatedly administered during the 
first 6 weeks. These included: i) changes in the spatial position of the patient’s 
right hand; ii) multisensory stimulation; and changes in the patient’s visual per-
spective of her hand by means of self-observation in iii) a video-clip or iv) a mir-
ror. 
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In each session, at least two different manipulations were carried out (Table 2), in 
random order and with intervals of  45 minutes. The number of manipulations and 
the duration of each session depended on AS’s conditions, in particular on her at-
tention and fatigue. In fact, AS’s cognitive functions fluctuated and were influ-
enced by clinical variables (e.g. pain, quality of sleep) and manipulations were 
only administered when she felt well enough. A daily diary of symptoms poten-
tially related to DSO was kept (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2. Timetable of the experimental sessions and the evolution of the symptoms. 
All the experimental and clinical sessions are reported. In the upper section, x= admini-
stration of the experimental task; NT= not testable. In the lower section, the evolution of 
clinical symptoms over time. AHP= Anosognosia for hemiplegia; b/a= assessment done 
before and after the experimental manipulations;. -= presence of deficit. Scores for clini-
cal symptoms: Attention= scores from 1 (no attention) to 5 (normal attention), Fluency= 
scores from 1 (mute) to 5 (loquacious), Confabulation= scores from 1 (inconsistent lan-
guage) to 5 (consistent language), Avoidance= scores from 1 (very frequent) to 5 (not 
present at all), Referred Pain= scores from 1 (excessive complains) to 5 (not reported 
pain); Fatigability= scores from 1 (high degree) to 5 (absent). L= Presence of gaze devia-
tion towards the left side.  
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AS was tested in a quiet room with the examiner standing on her right. She sat  at a 
table,  The position of her hands and the direction of her gaze were controlled. To 
assess any potential modulation in DSO due to experimental procedures, we re-
corded the patient’s responses to two questions regarding DSO before and after 
each manipulation: “Is this hand your hand?” (Response: Yes/No); and if the re-
sponse was “No”,  “Whose is this hand? ”. All of the patient’s responses were 
manually recorded. In the multisensory and mirror manipulations (see below), the 
questions were also asked during stimulation. The same questions were asked 
again 5 minutes later to check how long the modulation lasted and to avoid any 
carry-over effects.  
Whenever it was possible, any potential modulation in AHP and neglect was as-
sessed before and after the experimental task (Table 2). Finally the same experi-
mental procedures were repeated once on the left hand as a control.  
 
6.2.2.1. Changes in spatial position.  
While she was being distracted by general questions, AS’s right hand was placed 
palm down, in one of four positions (counterbalanced order, Figure 2B): a) raised 
in front of her eyes; resting on the table to her b) left, c) in the middle and d) to her 
right. When her hand was still, questions regarding its ownership were asked (25 
assessments for each position).  
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Figure 2. Experimental Procedure: A) The timeline for the experimental procedure for 
all tasks. B) The positions of AS’s right hand in Spatial Position manipulations. a: 
Raised; b: to the Left; c: in the Middle; d: to the Right. A graph with the percentage of 
correct responses is shown with *= significant direct post-hocs (χ2, FDR corrected, Ben-
jamini & Hochberg, 1995: Raised vs. Middle: χ2(1)=4.083, p=0.053; Raised vs. Right: 
χ2(1)=8.912, p=0.008; Left vs. Right: χ
2
(1)=3.742, p=0.053). C) AS's position in the Mul-
tisensory Stimulation experiment and the percentage of correct responses. D) AS's posi-
tion in the Mirror (similar to Video-clip) stimulation and the percentage of correct re-
sponses for the mirror and video-clip manipulations. 
 
 
6.2.2.2. Multisensory stimulation 
AS’s hands lay on the table in front of her, elbow bent, palm down and in a sym-
metrical position (Figure 2C). Following Bolognini and colleagues’ procedure 
(2014), we simultaneously stroked the dorsum of AS’s right hand (which she could 
see) and left hand (hidden from view) with a soft cosmetic brush for 2 minutes. 
Throughout the stimulation, we made sure that AS was looking at her right hand, 
recalling her attention whenever necessary, and we asked  questions relating to 
DSO (5 measures). 
 
6.2.2.3. Video-clip  
A video (recorded during the first assessment of AHP and DSO) showed the pa-
tient while she was answering DSO-related questions (Besharati, Kopelman, Ave-
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sani, Moro, & Fotopoulou, 2015). In the video, a frontal view of the upper part of 
the patient’s body was visible. and the examiner was shown standing to the right of 
the patient holding her right arm. Over 5  sessions, the video-clip was shown to AS 
and the DSO questions were asked. 
 
6.2.2.4. Mirror 
The procedure was similar to that used in the video-clip experiment with the only 
difference being that AS responded to the DSO questions while she was sitting at a 
table looking at her right hand reflected in a mirror (on-line measure, 5 meas-
ures).The mirror was placed in front of AS and it showed her right hand from a 3rd 
person visual perceptive (Fotopoulou et al., 2009). 
 
 
6.3. Results  
 
AS always recognized the left hand as her own during the control tasks. 
In contrast, the sense of ownership of right hand was modulated to different de-
grees by the experimental manipulations. There were immediate strong effects re-
sulting from the multisensory stimulation, minor benefits from the changes in the 
hand position and no improvement from the changes in visual perspective. Since 
whenever the patient denied the ownership of her hand she was very consistent in 
attributing it to the doctor, we exclusively analyzed the Yes/No responses to the 
first question (“Is this hand your hand?”).  
 
6.3.1. Spatial position 
Changing the position of AS’s hand modulated her sense of disownership 
(χ2(3)=12.438, p=0.006), with the central/raised position resulting in the worst per-
formance. A progressive increase in accuracy was present in the positions with the 
hand lying on the table to the left, in the centre and to the right (Figure 2B). 
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6.3.2. Multisensory stimulation  
There was an immediate and ameliorating effect on DSO during the multisensory 
stimulation sessions with the patient referring to the hand as her own in all five 
sessions (Figure 2C). Unfortunately, 5 minutes after manipulation, AS went back 
to denying ownership. 
 
6.3.3.Video-clip and Mirror sessions  
No effects were found. When AS was asked to look at her hand from a different 
perspective, she merely became confused. 
No change in AHP and neglect was recorded either before or after experimental 
sessions.  
 
 
6.4. Discussion  
 
Somatoparaphrenia is a rare syndrome after right brain damage and it is almost 
unknown in left-side lesions. Only a few patients have been described (Perren et 
al., 2015) and for this reason our patient is particularly interesting. The neuropsy-
chological assessment excluded the possibility that AS presented with reversed 
hemispheric lateralization and thus her case is even rarer. Indeed, she showed 
symptoms typically associated with both left (calculation disorders, left/right con-
fusion, finger agnosia, apraxia) and right hemisphere lesions (neglect, AHP, DSO). 
For this reason, we consider that her case involves a co-occurrence of Gerstmann’s 
syndrome (Mayer et al., 1999). A similar combination of symptoms was previ-
ously reported in a patient suffering from Gerstmann’s Syndrome following right 
lesion (Moro et al., 2009). Although rare, these cases lead us to consider that a de-
finitive version of the distinction between body schema and body image, normally 
connected with right or left hemispheric lesions respectively, is not totally ade-
quate in terms of describing the neural correlates of body representation. 
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AS was in the acute phase of the illness and her attention fluctuated. This pre-
cluded the possibility of devising complex experimental paradigms, which are 
generally very demanding in terms of attention. Nevertheless, the continuous, daily 
monitoring of her clinical and neuropsychological symptoms (in particular, neglect 
and AHP) enabled us to exclude the possibility that the modulation of DSO was 
mediated by factors other than those relating to our experimental procedure. In-
deed, we noted a progressive increase in attention over time, but this did not corre-
spond to any change in DSO. In contrast, this increase in her attention capacity ap-
peared to be associated with a temporary aggravation of other symptoms such as 
fatigue and avoidance (Fotopoulou, Pfaff, & Conway, 2012). Confabulations did 
not change over time. Our results confirm that it is in fact  possible to modulate 
DSO symptoms by means of simple manipulation (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Bo-
lognini et al., 2014; Spitoni et al., 2015).  
A comparison between the four types of intervention indicates that for this patient 
the most efficacious was multisensory stimulation. This procedure had immediate 
effects, although only temporary, on the patient’s self-attribution of the disowned 
hand. As expected due to her sensory deficit, AS did not report any sensation of 
being touched when her hand was stroked. Thus, we consider that the combination 
of contralateral (left hand) tactile stimulation and visual input from the affected 
right hand provided an integration of the sensations from the unimpaired hand onto 
the disowned hand, with resulting increase in the sense of ownership (Bolognini et 
al., 2014). 
Changes in spatial position also had some positive effects. That there is a spatial 
component to DSO is supported by the observation that vestibular stimulation 
ameliorates neglect and DSO (Rode et al., 1994). However, our result is in this re-
spect counterintuitive. In fact, one might expect that the sense of ownership would 
increase when the hand is placed in the non-neglected hemi-space. In contrast, AS 
identified the hand as her own more frequently when it was on her right, neglected 
side. This suggests that neglect and DSO are largely independent. A similar disso-
ciation between DSO and neglect has been documented in other two somatopara-
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phrenic patients (Moro, Zampini, & Aglioti, 2004). In that study, moving the spa-
tial position of the hand towards the non-neglected hemi-space induced a recovery 
in tactile extinction (symptom of neglect) but did not affect DSO.  
We consider that in AS it was the congruency between visual information and the 
position of the hand in the canonical representation of the body, rather than the 
spatial position itself, that facilitated the integration of her hand in her body, 
thereby increasing the sense of ownership. This is also consistent with the frequent 
clinical observation that somatoparaphrenic patients often look for “their” super-
numerary hand in the canonical position (precisely on the neglected side of the 
space), where the hand is expected to be.  
A limited impact of vision is confirmed by the absence of modulation found in 
visual perspective manipulation, both in the on-line (mirror) and off-line (video-
clip) conditions. This contrasts with previous results involving DSO and AHP after 
right lesion where these manipulations were efficacious in terms of reducing 
symptoms (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Besharati et al., 2015; Moro, Scandola, Bulga-
relli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2015).  
Thus, in the case of AS, stimulation of multisensory integration and top-down (ca-
nonical) representations of the body have ameliorative effects on DSO. In contrast, 
visuo-spatial components do not impact directly on the sense of ownership. We 
can thus conclude that, although all these multiple factors probably co-occur at the 
onset of the syndrome, the possibility of modulating them differs.  
Finally, we do not know whether our experimental manipulations impacted on 
AHP. Unfortunately, awareness was only checked before and after the sessions 
and we never asked specific questions regarding this issue during the manipula-
tions, meaning that any potential changes went unrecorded. 
All things considered, it is clear that these factors and the difference in sensitivity 
to experimental manipulations after right and left hemisphere lesions deserve fur-
ther investigation.    
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Chapter 7: 
General Discussion 
 
AHP is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but as a multifaceted and complex syn-
drome. Our studies confirmed the heterogeneous and multi-componential features 
of AHP (Orfei 2007; Vuilleumier et al., 2004; Fotopoulou, 2014), that may occur 
in a variety of clinical manifestations (Heilmann &Harciarek, 2010; Orfei et al., 
2007; Marcel, et al., 2004; Vocat, et al., 2010) and some residual forms of aware-
ness may be shown (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). Furthermore these 
possible fluctuations in AHP can support patients' rehabilitation (Besharati et al., 
2015; Moro et al., 2015), and thus they are worth to be investigated. 
In recent studies about AHP, it has been suggested that specific tasks could con-
tribute in influencing its symptoms, such as the evaluation of own motor profi-
ciency during the real attempts to act (Moro et al., 2015), the presentation of visual 
feedbacks of own abilities in third-perspective (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Besharati 
et al., 2015) or inducing specific emotions (Besharati et al., 2014). 
In the first study in Chapter 3, we investigated the possible fluctuations of AHP in 
the attempts to act in relation to some potentially dangerous actions. Changes of 
awareness in AHP are influenced by both sensory-motor and high cognitive func-
tions (Fotopoulou, 2014 for review) and a role of emotional components has been 
previously reported (Besharati et al., 2014; Nardone, Ward, Fotopoulou, & 
Turnbull, 2008). Therefore we investigated the possible relation between the ef-
fects of actions' characteristics, in particular its emotional valance (neutral and 
dangerous nature of stimuli) and the top-down processes of requiring to carry out 
specific actions, in order to integrate both sensory aspects of an action and its pos-
sible cognitive, motivational and emotional components (Fotopoulou, 2015).  
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In this study, we devised a task where AHP and HP patients were asked to execute 
some everyday actions, that had a dangerous or a neutral meaning and we assessed 
their level of awareness in different timing: before, during and after the action and 
in an extra out-of-context moment.  
Our results showed that the explicit level of awareness of our patients changed in a 
on-line moment of executing the actions and recognizing some motor problems. 
Thus we confirmed the presence of Emergent awareness in our group of AHP pa-
tients, as a residual form of awareness during the actually perform of an action 
with the affected body parts when patients become linguistically awareness. In fact 
the Emergent awareness was already previously described (Moro et al., 2011, 
Moro, 2013; Moro et al., 2015) as a possible modulation in AHP induced by ad-
hoc experimental manipulations and based on the presence of intention command 
and a possible modulation of the successive motor execution by verbally declaring 
self proficiency during the performance.   
According to the Forward Dynamic model, when there is mismatch between  in-
tended and planned actions and actual sensory feedback, a cognitive 'comparator' 
should detect the error and construct conscious awareness about it (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). This process  may be defective with AHP and they do not 
update their belief about actions' outcomes according to the real discrepancies. 
Thus, we suppose that intention to act combined with the request to evaluate per-
formance may have an important monitoring role and support the enhancement of 
Emergent awareness (Moro et al., 2011; 2013).  
In addition we explored the potential role of dangerous actions in this process. The 
emotional feature of stimuli seemed to improve the degree of awareness of hemi-
plegia in both the groups of hemiplegic patients with and without Anosognosia. 
But if in HP patients the improvements appeared mainly before to start the action, 
in AHP patients continued to contribute in improving the level of awareness during 
the attempt to act.  
In fact it has been long known, that dangerous objects interfere also with move-
ments, for example by evoking a specific aversive affordance (Anelli, Borghi, & 
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Nicoletti, 2012; Anelli, Nicoletti, Bolzani, R., & Borghi 2013), that probably has 
the main purpose of preparing the motor networks to act in order to protect the self 
(Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001).  
In addition AHP shows some emotional and motivational components (Bisiach & 
Geminiani, 1991; Ramachandran 1996; Vuilleumier, 2004), while these patients 
show difficulty in accepting and tolerating aversive emotional status as a problem 
in the emotional-regulation system of negative feelings referred to the self (Kap-
lan-Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2002; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen 2005). Some ex-
perimental evidences suggest that AHP patients can evoke implicit negative emo-
tional reactions in relation to their hemiplegia, that could interfere with their per-
formance in cognitive tasks (Fotopoulou, et al., 2010; Nardone et al., 2007) and 
even play a role in temporary restoring the degree of motor awareness (Besharati, 
et al., 2014). We suggested that the dangerous resonance of actions may enhance 
explicit awareness probably due to bottom-up processes of protective activation or 
alerting and top-down emotional and semantic aspects, as both components in the 
complex phenomenon of motor awareness (Vuilleumier, 2004; Fotopoulou, 
2014;2015).  
From the brain lesions analysis, a broad front-temporal network and subcortical 
structures may be important in these processes. At first we confirmed a similar as-
sociation between Emergent awareness, temporal lobe and white matter connec-
tions. In addition in processing potentially dangerous actions the related areas are 
basal ganglia, amygdale and in white matter underlying insula and fronto-temporal 
areas, as in the general cortical activation with dangerous action (Baumgartner, 
Willi, & Jäncke, 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Oliveri et al., 2003) and in the fronto-
insula/limbic inhibitory regulation (Phelps et al., 2001).  
In Chapter 4 we investigated the same actions in third-perspective view, while ask-
ing the patients to judge the abilities of another hemiplegic patients. This control 
task allowed to evaluate the possible dissociation in AHP patients in judgments re-
ferred to the self and to other people. But we saw that our group of patients did not 
improve their abilities to detect the motor impairments in third-perspective view 
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(only two patients out of seven). These performances could indicate that in the 
previous task of attempting the actions, the motor awareness deficits relate to spe-
cific for one's own body actions, while in the latter it would consider the actions 
per se (Marcel et al., 2004; Ramachandran, 1996; Ramachandran & Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996; Moro et al. 2011). Furthermore only some AHP patients 
take advantages from the third-person perspective and deny the motor deficits only 
when answering to self-referred questions. Indeed, our result is an evidence that 
different forms of residual awareness can be selectively spared (Moro et al., 2011).  
Successively in Chapter 5 we tried to evaluate different aspects of the actions' exe-
cutions. Therefore we analyzed whether an active action of reaching or a passive 
reaction of escaping may contribute in AHP in relation to their affective resonance 
and we tried to detect some residual forms of awareness measurements of auto-
matic bodily responses. In fact skin conductance responses were already reported 
as a sign of spared motor intention in AHP (Hildebrandt & Zieger, 1995), and we 
hypnotized they may provide an implicit automatic measure of awareness during 
actions. In addition since dangerous stimuli appear to improve the level of aware-
ness in AHP during the request to act (Chapter 3), we expected to find some auto-
matic modulation according to affective features of actions with threatening and 
neutral stimuli (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam et al., 2011; Romano et 
al., 2014). From our results the experience of a vicarious active action in first-
perspective view enhanced in AHP the automatic responses of skin conductance. 
In addition our AHP patients showed a similar SCR activation to those of the other 
HP group, despite their deficit of explicit declarative awareness and even some 
possible avoidance reaction to the experimental actions (in accuracy). This disso-
ciation may suggest an implicit form of awareness of these AHP patients and that 
skin conductance may be a useful method to detect them. 
In our experiment, however, active actions of reaching enhance automatic skin re-
sponses in AHP patients, but for both Dangerous and Neutral Actions. It may be 
considered, that the automatic affective implicit reaction of AHP patients during 
the actions is linked to a general enhancement of arousal. This result may indicate 
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a spared ability or a probable dominance of motor command (Jenkinson & 
Fotopoulou, 2010), although they do not completely adjust their motor representa-
tions to feedbacks. Finally, so we supposed that the residual forms of awareness 
probably need to be integrated with some higher-cognitive processes, in order to 
fill the discrepancies between the visual and the experiences actions (in this study) 
and to enhance an explicit level of awareness (Moro et al., 2015).  
The last Chapter finally gave some evidences of fluctuations in Crossed 
Somatoparaphrenia by means of different experimental approaches with the aim of 
investigating the potential role of body-related sensory information in modulating 
body ownership's deficit. In this study we compared the effects of different types 
of manipulation: i) Changes to the spatial position of the contralesional upper limb 
were made in order to evaluate proprioceptive and spatial components, ii) Mul-
tisensory visuo-tactile stimulation served to investigate the role of sensory integra-
tion in the syndrome, while ii) self-observation of the hand in a video clip or a mir-
ror allowed us to assess the effects on the patient of changes in perspective. 
Our patient seemed to improve her sense of ownership thanks to a multisensory 
stimulation, and to possible influences of changes of body position, but not to task 
of third-perspective view. These results highlights that even the disturbances of 
body ownership present some various clinical manifestations and they might be in-
fluenced from different types of bottom-up and top-down stimulations. 
In conclusion the general construction of self-awareness appears to be a very com-
plex phenomenon and both its aspects of sense of agency and sense of ownership 
(besides their peculiarities) appear to be influenced by different levels of compo-
nents in a consistent and adequate updating of the Self (Fotopoulou, 2015). Final-
ly, in case of deficit, Self-awareness requires to be extensively evaluated to under-
line both preserved and impaired mechanisms, in order to lead to possible rehabili-
tation programs.  
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Abstract  
Introduction: Cross-modal interactions improve the processing of external stimuli, 
particularly when an isolated sensory modality is impaired. When information 
from different modalities is integrated, object recognition is facilitated. This cross-
modal facilitation probably bases on bottom-up and top-down processes. Aim of 
this study is the investigation of  potential effects of cross-modal facilitation in 
simultanagnosia. 
Methods: We report a detailed analysis of clinical symptoms and a 18F-FDG Brain 
PET/CTs study of a patient affected by Balint's Syndrome, a rare and pervasive 
visual-spatial disorder following bilateral parieto-occipital lesions. In addition, we 
experimentally investigated the effects of visual and non-visual cues in the facilita-
tion of overlapping pictures. Four modalities of sensory cues were used: visual, 
tactile, olfactory and auditory. 
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Results: Data from neuropsychology showed the presence of Ocular Apraxia, Op-
tic Ataxia and Simultanagnosia. The experimental results indicate a positive effect 
of the cues in the discrimination of overlapping pictures, not only in the identifica-
tion of the congruent cued stimulus (target) but also in the identification of the oth-
er, non-cued stimulus. All the sensory modalities analysed (except the auditory 
stimulus) were efficacious in increasing visual recognition. 
Conclusions: We consider that in this patient cross-modal facilitation induced the 
activation of both top-down (attentional and short-term memory) and bottom up 
(sensory systems) processes able to improve the recognition of complex overlap-
ping images. This is potentially useful in the devising of rehabilitation training for 
attentional and visual-perceptual deficits. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Experimental evidence indicates that objects characterised by redundant multisen-
sory cues are identified more rapidly than the same objects presented in a 
unimodal condition. This suggests that object identification in one modality is in-
fluenced by input from other modalities.  
To date, this effect of cross-modal integration has been mainly investigated in 
visuo-acoustic modalities (Chen & Spence, 2011; Fort, Delpuech, Pernier, & 
Giard, 2002; Pascucci, Megna, Panichi, & Baldassi, 2011; Schneider, Engel, & 
Debener, 2008). However, cross-modal facilitation has also been demonstrated for 
synchronous auditory-tactile (Gillmeister & Eimer, 2007), visuo-tactile (Helbig & 
Ernst, 2007) and visuo-olfactory (Gottfried & Dolan, 2003) integration. In addi-
tion, an effect of cross-modal facilitation in the detection of emotional stimuli has 
been described (Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001; Seubert et al., 2010).  
Cross-modal interactions are modulated by both the nature of the perceptual task 
and the sensory skills of individuals (Fort et al., 2002). This type of interaction is 
particularly efficient in terms of improving perceptual performance when an iso-
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lated modality is deficient (Caclin et al., 2011). For this reason, the study of cross-
modal facilitation in patients affected by perceptual and attentional diseases may 
offer important information for clinical assessment, rehabilitation and compensato-
ry strategies. 
Balint’s syndrome (BS) is a specific disorder affecting visuo-spatial attention 
(Hécaen & de Ajuriaguerra, 1954). It is usually the result of lesions in the bilateral 
parieto-occipital area, but has also been reported after damage involving frontal ar-
eas (Hausser, Robert, & Giard, 1980) and pulvinar areas (Ogren, Mateer, & Wyler, 
1984). BS was initially described in a patient suffering from “progressive cerebro-
vascular complications” (Balint, 1909; Rizzo & Vecera, 2002) and later reported 
after traumatic brain injury, posterior cortical atrophy, tumours and prion disorders 
(e.g.  Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) and viral infections such as HIV (for a review, see 
Rizzo & Vecera, 2002). 
Three deficits (not always associated) represent the core of BS symptoms: ocular 
apraxia, optic ataxia and simultanagnosia (Rizzo & Vecera, 2002).  
The term Ocular Apraxia indicates a lack of organisation in voluntary eye move-
ments, with prolonged static fixations and dysfunctional gaze shifting (Rossetti, 
Pisella, & Vighetto, 2003). When Optic Ataxia occurs, oculo-motor coordination is 
impaired, in the absence of motor, sensory or visual acuity or visual field disorders 
(Karnath & Perenin, 2005). This makes it very difficult or impossible to execute 
visually goal-directed movements of the hands, such as reaching and grasping ob-
jects in the peri-personal space. Finally, Simultanagnosia (Wolpert, 1924) refers to 
an inability to explore complex visual images and to perceive multiple objects and 
the relationship between them. The processing of individual items and local fea-
tures is however spared. 
Literature on BS mainly refers to single-case reports. This is due both to the low 
frequency of the syndrome and to the fact that typically there are bilateral large le-
sions, usually responsible for extensive sensory and cognitive symptoms, all of 
which hinder specific assessments.  
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We had the opportunity of carrying out extensive research on a young man af-
fected by BS (stable over time) as a consequence of anoxic cerebral damage. He 
was keen to participate in our study. In addition to an in-depth neuropsychological 
assessment and an (18)F-FDG PET/CT study, we devised an experimental proce-
dure in order to investigate the potential effects of cross-modal facilitation in the 
identification and denomination of two objects shown in overlapping images.  
Previous studies have investigated the role of visuo-tactile facilitation in spatial 
representation (Valenza, Murray, Ptak, & Vuilleumier, 2004). Nevertheless, to the 
best of our knowledge, the effects of cross-modal processing in simultanagnosia 
have never before been investigated. Starting from the data indicating that the per-
ception of external stimuli is supported (through bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing) by cross-modal integration, when isolated sensory modalities are impaired 
(Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005), we hypothesized that cross-
modal facilitation enhances MR's ability in detecting and recognizing overlapping 
visual images. 
In order to test the effects of facilitation induced by various different sensory stim-
uli, we devised an experimental paradigm very similar to a matching-to-sample 
task. A single stimulus (cue) was first presented in one of four sensory modalities 
(visual, tactile, olfactory and auditory). Then, an image showing two overlapping 
objects was presented in the visual modality and the subject was asked to identify 
and denominate both objects. In this way, we were able to measure not only the di-
rect effect of congruent facilitation on the cued stimulus, but also whether the 
recognition of one of the two overlapping elements helped the visual system to 
identify the other object.  
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2. Methods 
 
2.1. Case report  
MR was a 40 year old, right-handed man who worked as a manual worker (8 years 
of education). As consequence of cardiac arrest (30-40 seconds) which occurred 5 
days after a surgical operation, he suffered an anoxic brain injury. A CT scan (3 
days from onset) revealed hypodensity in the cortical and subcortical bilateral 
parieto-occipital transition, in the right fronto-parietal and left rolandic areas.  
A month after the onset of the lesion, MR appeared to be not totally oriented in 
time and space and not fully aware of his condition. The left side of his body was 
weak but there were no paralysis or sensory deficits. There were massive disorders 
in ocular motricity and when he reached for objects using his hands, in addition to 
non-testable difficulties in exploring the left visual field and minimal deficits in 
object recognition. During conversation he showed anomies and phonemic 
paraphasias, with alexia and agraphia.    
The procedure of the study was approved by the local ethics committee (CEP, Ve-
rona) and informed written consent concerning the participation in the experiments 
was obtained by the patient.  
 
2.2. General Neuropsychological Assessment  
Two months after the stroke, a computerized campimetric examination indicated 
only a few small patches of reduced sensitivity in the visual field. Horizontal and 
vertical ocular movements were normal. General cognitive functions and temporal 
orientation appeared to have been spared, although a global slowness in verbal and 
motor responses was evident. Initial signs of spatial neglect and apraxia had recov-
ered. He complained of difficulties in object discrimination. As a result of this, a 
first assessment of visual agnosia was carried out (Table 1, second column). 
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Table 2. Neuropsychological assessment of Visual Agnosia. 
1
Battery Test for Agnosia 
(It. Vers. Barletta-Rodolfi, 1996) at 2 and 4 months (
2
Additional clinical test of denomi-
nation of real objects). 
3
BORB (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993) at 4 months; imp = impos-
sible. Pathological scores are in bold; in Italic the score at cut-off or where the time of 
execution is slower than normative data.  
  2 months 4 months Cut-Off 
Agnosia Battery
1
 
   
   Efron Test (20)
 20 18 16.51 
   Figure-ground discrimination (33) 16 24 29.03 
   Overlapping images test (Ghent) (40) 4 24 36.51 
   Incomplete images test: short (Gollin) 
(75) 
imp 38 58.56 
   Matching objects (40) 23 30 30.79 
   Chimeric images  (48) 32 41 41.99 
   Colour naming (40) 35 36 36.16 
   Associative match task (20) 12 19 17.92 
   Semantic Test: short (240) 236 235 234.09 
   Picture naming (40) 35 37 37.67 
   Object denomination (33)
2 30 - - 
BORB
3
    
   Length match (30)
 
 
24 24 
   Size match (30)  
23 23 
   Orientation match (30)  
21 20 
   Position of gap (40)  
34 27 
   Letters (36) (sec.)  
36 (1.58) (0.4) 
        Paired non-overlapping (36) (sec.)  
35 (1.42) (0.4) 
        Paired overlapping (36)(sec.)  
35 (0.97) (0.4) 
        Triples non-overlapping (36) (sec.)  
32 (2.5) (0.4) 
        Triples overlapping (36) (sec.)  
28 (3.47) (0.4) 
   Geometrical shape (36) (sec.)  
32 (5.05) (1.0) 
        Paired non-overlapping (36) (sec.)  
35 (3.08) (1.1) 
        Paired overlapping (36)(sec.)  
33 (2.75) (1.1) 
        Triples non-overlapping (36) (sec.)  
30 (4.05) (1.2) 
        Triples overlapping (36) (sec.)  
34 (3.97) (1.3) 
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Four months after onset, at the time of the experimental procedure, MR underwent 
a further assessment for visual agnosia, neglect, language, memory and executive 
functions (Tables 1 and 2). His deficits in visual discrimination were confirmed, in 
particular in a subtest involving the discrimination of multiple and overlapping im-
ages (Table 1) and in the examination of visual extinction of double stimuli. In ad-
dition, MR showed deficits in executive functions in tasks involving short-term 
memory, phonemic fluency (FAB, subtest score = 1) and task planning (Table 2).  
 
  
 
Cut-Off/ES 
Neglect 
     Reading + 
    Writing + 
    Barrage + 
    Coping with drawing  + 
    Clock Test
1
 (13) 13 7.57 
   Visual extinction - 
 Language 
     Denomination of pictured compound nouns (30) (AAT
2
) 30 
    Denomination of pictured sentences (30) (AAT
2
) 27 
 Memory 
     Short-term spatial memory (9) (Corsi
3
) 2.5 3.75 
   Long-term spatial memory (29.16) (Corsi
3
) 17.2 10.25 
   Short-term verbal memory (16) (Word Span
3
) 2.5 3 
   Story Recall
3
 (16)
 11.1 4.75 
Executive Functions 
     FAB
4
 (18) 16.85 12.03 
   BADS
5
 (24) 11 18.6 
        Rule shift cards (ES 0-4) 3 3 
        Action program (ES 0-4) 3 3 
        Key search (ES 0-4)  2 3 
        Temporal judgement (ES 0-4) 1 3 
        Zoo map (ES 0-4) 0 3 
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        Modified six elements (ES 0-4) 2 3 
   Verbal Judgement
3
 (60) 42.5 33 
   Tower of London
6
 (36)  24 26.54 
Table 2. General  Neuropsychological Assessment. MR’s scores  in batteries that assess 
Neglect (
1
= Caraffa et. al, 2011), Language (
2
= Luzzatti, Willmes, & De Bleser, 1991), 
Memory (
3 
=Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987)  and Executive Functions (
4 
=Frontal Assessment 
Battery, FAB test – Apollonio et al., 2005; 5 =Behavioural Assessment of the Disesecu-
tive Syndrome – BADS, it. version Spitoni, Antonucci, Orsini, D'Olimpio & Cantagallo, 
2002; 
6 
=Tower of London, ToL - Shallice, 1982)  are reported. ES= Equivalent Score, += 
normal performance, - = pathological performance, pathological scores are in bold; in 
Italic the scores at cut-off. 
 
 
2.3. Balint’s Syndrome  
Following the seminal case report by Balint (Balint, 1909, reported in Vallar & 
Papagno, 2007), three main symptoms were investigated separately: ocular aprax-
ia, simultanagnosia and visuo-motor processing.  
Ocular Apraxia: In the acute phase, ocular apraxia was manifested in MR’s inabil-
ity to read, write and visually follow lines. These disorders recovered during the 
first few months. At the time of our second evaluation (four months from the on-
set), MR was able to follow specific directions with his eyes on verbal command, 
though with some minimal hesitation on the left side. Nevertheless, MR was not 
able to voluntarily gaze the surrounding space. In addition, he failed to pursuit eye 
movements and he could not move his eyes properly in order to identify small dif-
ferences in the length of two or more objects (e.g. the length discrimination of two 
sticks task, Table 3) or to single out one object among others (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129   
 
                                                                         % correct responses 
Ocular Apraxia 
   Sorting the length of multiple objects (sticks) (10) 50 
  Length discrimination of two sticks (19) 31.58 
Simultanagnosia 
   Identification of the numerosity of objects (5) 0 
  Discrimination of the reciprocal position of two objects (47) 57.48 
Visuo-motor processing 
    Optic ataxia R (8)          100 
   Optic ataxia L (13) 84.61 
   Pointing at objects RH (45) 73.33 
   Pointing at objects LH (45) 48.89 
   Pointing with a tool RH (15) 33.33 
   Pointing with a tool LH (15) 26.67 
   Pointing at overlapping objects RH (15) 66.67 
   Pointing at overlapping objects LH (15) 73.33 
   Grasping with RH (15) 80 
   Grasping with LH (15) 60 
Table 3. Clinical assessment of Balint's Syndrome. MR’s scores in tasks assessing Op-
tic Apraxia, Simultanagnosia and Visuo-motor processing are reported. Pathological 
scores are in bold. 
 
Simultanagnosia: The patient complained that he found it difficult to explore space 
and complex, multipart objects, in comparison to normal abilities to recognize and 
name simple, single objects, real or represented in pictures. At the first assessment, 
MR failed in the task of visual extinction of double stimuli, where he always 
missed one of the two stimuli presented simultaneously. In contrast, he detected 
the single stimulus (the right or left one), indicating that he perceived only one 
stimulus at once. At two months from lesion onset, he still failed in a task of iden-
tification and counting objects closely placed (i.e. identification of the numerosity 
of objects, Table 3). Moreover, MR could not discriminate the reciprocal position 
of two real objects superimposed (e.g. identifying whether a spoon was in front of 
or behind a fork). He also failed in discrimination of the two parts of  chimeric im-
ages. Finally, he could not describe a complex scene as a whole, stating that he 
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saw some separate sets of images without being able to integrate them into one im-
age (see video in Supplementary Materials).  
Visuo-motor processing: MR could grasp moving objects that were placed in his 
right or left hemifield (Optic Ataxia - Karnath, 2005) without problems. In con-
trast, he failed to point at and grasp static objects (e.g. a pen or a fork) with either 
his right or left hand, and his performance worsened when he pointed at objects us-
ing an instrument of some sort (e.g. a pencil).  
 
2.4. Neuroimaging data from (18)F-FDG  Brain PET/CT  
The examination was carried out by a highly experienced physician of nuclear 
medicine (MaS) two months after the lesion onset (for technical details, see Figure 
1). Results indicated reduced metabolism in the parietal areas and at the parieto-
occipital transition bilaterally, while occipital lobes appeared spared. In addition, 
hypo-metabolism involving the dorsal frontal areas were present bilaterally, but 
more extended in the right hemisphere. Note that the Lateral Occipital Complex 
(LOC) turned out to be spared from lesion (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. (18)F-FDG Brain PET/CT. The patient was asked to fast for at least 6 hours 
before the examination. The blood glucose level of  the patient was determined before the 
examination. Scanning was not performed until the blood glucose level was less than 140 
mg/dL. The test was  performed using a hybrid PET/CT scanner (Siemens mCT Bi-
ograph, Germany). The Brain CT scanning was performed using a continuous spiral tech-
nique on a 64-slice helical CT, and the PET scanner had three detector rings. No contrast 
medium was administered during CT scanning. After the CT scan, an emission scan was 
performed from the head to the thigh after the intravenous injection of 0.08 mC/kg (2.96 
MBq/kg) FDG.CT and PET scan data were co-registered. The standardised uptake value 
(SUV) was acquired using the attenuation-corrected images, the amount of injected FDG, 
the body weight of the patient, and the cross-calibration factors between PET and the 
dose calibrator. The images are displayed following the neurological standard (left to 
right side) and are based on an SUV scale (from red = activation to blue = no activation). 
Reduced metabolism is evident in: a) temporo-parietal areas, b) left and c) right parietal-
occipital junctions; d) left and e) right frontal areas. 
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3. Experimental design: Cross-modal matching in the discrimination of overlap-
ping figures 
 
A new experimental task was devised to investigate the potential influence of mul-
tisensory facilitation on the identification of multiple overlapped visual stimuli. 
First, a preliminary  stimulus (cue) was presented in one of four sensory modali-
ties: visual, tactile, auditory or olfactory. Next, a stimulus consisting of two over-
lapping images was shown in visual modality and MR was requested to identify 
and denominate both the objects shown in the overlapping images. Only in half of 
the overlapping images the cue corresponded to one of the two images (target), 
while in the other half there were no objects corresponding to the cue (two non-
target stimuli).  
 
3.1. Stimuli 
In order to ensure that the degree of difficulty was comparable in each of the con-
ditions, all the stimuli were selected from the BORB subtests (Riddoch & Hum-
phreys, 1993), with the exclusion of those that had been used during the neuropsy-
chological assessment. 
The visual cues were outlines of objects drawn in black (10.6cm x 10.6cm) and 
they were identical to the target stimulus showing overlapping figures in all but the 
rotation (see below). For the other non-visual cues, realistic stimuli were used. Re-
al objects served as tactile stimuli (e.g. a comb, a balloon). Naturalistic sounds 
were played in the headphones as auditory cues (e.g. a bell, a match being struck). 
Real odours were used for the olfactory stimuli (e.g. an onion, a cigarette).  
Each cue was followed by the stimulus showing two overlapping images, 45 de-
gree rotated in opposite directions, (the cued and the distractor images or the two 
non-target images). Each overlapping stimulus was presented twice for each of the 
two rotation positions (see Fig 2).  
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Figure 2.The experimental task. a) Timeline regarding the procedure for each individu-
al item. b) Examples of sensory primes used in the four conditions. c) The general time-
line of the experiment. 
 
 
4 separated lists of stimuli were created for the various sensory modalities used in 
the cued stimuli (visual= n.36, tactile= n.24, auditory= n.12, olfactory= n.12, the 
number of trials for each modality depended on how difficult it was to match  the 
stimuli of the BORB with real objects which were useful for the auditory and ol-
factory modalities). 
An additional list of 24 different overlapping images without any cues (baseline 
and follow-up lists) was presented before and after the experimental procedure as a 
general measure of the ability to recognise overlapping images.  
3 healthy subjects (mean age= 39.66, DS= ±7.50, education and gender matched to 
MR) were recruited to verify whether the lists compared in terms of the degree of 
difficulty. Their accuracy  and response time for denominating the two objects in 
the overlapping images were recorded and analysed. 
 
3.2. Procedure 
MR sat approximately 55 cm away from a 15-inch LCD monitor (resolution 1024 
x 768 pixels; refresh frequency 60Hz). After observing a central fixation point 
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(1000 ms), a cue (visual or non-visual: auditory, tactile or olfactory) appeared for 
3000ms. A black and white random-dot-mask (10.6cm x 10.6cm in size, duration 
500ms) was then shown followed by the overlapping image stimulus, which re-
mained until the subject responded (Figure 2a). Crucially, in half of the trials, the 
cues (n. 84) were consistent with one of the objects (target) shown in the overlap-
ping images, while the other image represented a different (non-target) object. In 
the other half of the trials (the non-cued stimuli), both the objects in the overlap-
ping images were non-target, namely different from the cue. MR was requested 
first of all to click the computer mouse in order to indicate whether or not the over-
lapping images included the previous shown cue (Identification task, response: 
Yes/No). He was then asked to denominate both of the objects represented in the 
overlapping images stimulus (Denomination task). 
In the baseline list, there were not any cues and the central fixation point (1000ms) 
was followed by an overlapping image showing two objects which remained until 
MR had denominated them. 
Accuracy in the Identification task was automatically recorded by the software, 
while in the Denomination task an examiner manually annotated MR’s answers.  
The 4 experimental lists were randomly repeated in two consecutive sessions, with 
an interval of a week between the sessions (total= 168 items). The additional base-
line list was presented before (baseline) and after (follow-up) the whole experi-
mental procedure. 
 E-prime 2.1 Software (Psychology Software Tool Inc., Pittsburgh, A) was used to 
control timing and randomisation. 
 
3.3. Statistical analyses  
The trials where MR failed to recognise the cue were excluded from the analyses 
(7 out of 168). For the Identification task, in order to test whether there were dif-
ferences in accuracy between the various conditions, a 4x2 log-linear model was 
computed with sensory Modality (visual, tactile, olfactory, auditory) and Answer 
(correct/error) as factors.  
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In the Denomination task, three scores were possible (correct denomination: both 
objects= 2; one object= 1; neither of the objects= 0). Responses were initially ana-
lysed separately for each sensory modality by comparing the frequency of cued 
and non-cued items with a 2 (Cue: present/absent) x 3 (Response: 0,1,2) log-linear 
model. Then, in order to specifically assess the effects of the cue in each modality, 
the frequency of correct responses in the cued and not cued trials, post-hoc anal-
yses were computed with χ2 tests, all False Discovery Rate (FDR) corrected 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). In all of these comparisons, Cramer’s V effect 
size was adopted (V<0.1= negligible effect, 0.1≤V<0.2= weak effect, 0.2≤V<0.4= 
moderate effect, 0.4≤V<0.6= relatively strong effect, 0.6≤V<0.8 = strong effect 
and 0.8≤V≤ 1= very strong effect; Rea & Parker,1992). 
We also tested the efficacy of the cues by computing a log-linear model for each 
modality on the frequencies of the cued items versus the frequencies in the base-
line with 2 (Condition: baseline vs. cued items) x 3 (Response: 0, 1, 2) factors. 
Analogous 2x3 log-linear models were executed for non-cued stimuli. 
In conclusion, to verify any potential effects of general improvement, the baseline 
and follow-up lists were compared in a 2 (Time: baseline vs. follow-up) x 3 (Re-
sponse: 0,1,2) log-linear model.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
The performance of the controls confirmed that the stimuli lists were balanced for 
difficulty. No differences between the lists in terms of accuracy (χ2(2)=3.831, 
p>0.05) or response times (F(1,4)=0.919, p>0.05) were found (general accuracy in 
denomination of overlapping figures = 94.59% , range=200-209/216). 
 
4.1. Identification task  
In this task MR’s rate of accuracy was 93.17% overall (with a mean of 92.62, 
±5.52 across lists). He failed to identify 7 cues in the overlapping images and there 
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were only 3 false alarms (i.e. when he indicated a cue which was not shown in the 
target). An accuracy analysis showed no significant effects for Modality 
(χ2(3)=4.262, p=0.234), Answer (χ
2
(1)=2.972, p=0.085) or  Modalities*Answer in-
teraction (χ2(3)=2.344, p=0.504). 
 
4.2. Denomination task 
Results indicated that the cue enhanced MR’s performance although to different 
degrees depending on the sensory modality (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. MR's results in the experimental task. For each cue modality (as 
shown on the right) the frequency of responses in the cued condition (second col-
umn) is compared with the baseline (left column) and the non-cued condition 
(third column). The follow-up condition (right column) is compared with the base-
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line condition. (Baseline and follow-up on the additional list, see text). *:<0.05, 
**:<0.01 
 
 
The Visual cue significantly improved MR’s performance. We found significant 
effects of Cue (χ2(1)=12.395, p<0.001), Response (χ
2
(2)=18.418, p<0.001) and the 
Cue*Response interaction  (χ2(2)=16.305, p<0.001).  Direct χ
2
 analyses showed that 
there were more type 2 responses  (χ2(1)= 4.556, p=0.049, V= 0.251) and fewer 
type 0 responses  (χ2(1)= 12.518, p=0.001, V= 0.417) in cued as compared to non-
cued trials. The efficacy of cued stimuli was also confirmed in the Condi-
tion*Response interaction (χ2(2)=10.264, p=0.006) in the comparison between cued 
stimuli and baseline (no effects of Condition χ2(1)= 2.093, p=0.148 or Response 
χ2(2)= 4.471, p= 0.107). Direct χ
2
 analyses  showed that there were more type 2 re-
sponses in the case of visual cued stimuli than in the baseline (χ2(2)= 6.790, 
p=0.027, V= 0.336). 
Finally, in the comparison between non-cued visual stimuli and the baseline there 
was a main effect of Condition (χ2(1)= 4.7166, p=0.030), but not other effects (Re-
sponse: χ2(2)=4.471, p=0.107 or Condition*Response interaction (χ
2
(2)= 5.338, 
p=0.069).  
 
The Tactile cue also significantly improved MR’s performance. A comparison 
showed significant effects of Cue (χ2(1)= 10.971, p<0.001) and Response 
(χ2(2)=12.293, p=0.002) and the Cue*Response interaction (χ
2
(2)= 14.509, p<0.001). 
In a  direct comparison between cued and non-cued stimuli, type 0 responses were 
significantly fewer for cued stimuli  (χ2(1)= 10.206, p=0.004, V=0.476). Although 
there were no other direct differences, the sum of type 1 and 2 responses was  
higher for cued than for non-cued trials (χ2(1)= 10.206, p=0.001, Cramer's 
V=0.476).  
The comparison between cued stimuli and the baseline showed a main effect of 
Condition (χ2(1)= 3.9624, p=0.046) but no effects of Response ( χ
2
(2)=4.4710, 
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p=0.107) or of the Condition*Response interaction (χ2(2)= 4.501, p=0.105). Finally 
a comparison between non-cued tactile stimuli and the baseline did not reveal any 
differences (Condition χ2(1)= 2.039, p=0.153, Response χ
2
(2)=4.471, p=0.107, Con-
dition*Response interaction χ2(2)= 3.725, p=0.155).  
 
The Olfactory cue significantly improved denomination in cued trials. We found  
main effects of Cue (χ2(1)=5.545, p=0.018), Response (χ
2
(2)=8.512, p=0.014) and 
the Cue*Response interaction (χ2(2)=6.268, p=0.043). No differences between cued 
and non-cued stimuli were found in direct χ2 contrasts. 
Nevertheless, denomination after olfactory cues was significantly better than at 
baseline as indicated by the main effect of Condition (χ2(1)=8.317, p=0.004) and 
the Condition*Responses interaction (χ2(2)=7.486, p=0.024) but with no effect of 
Response (χ2(2)=4.471, p=0.107). Direct χ
2
 did not show any significant effects. 
Finally a comparison between non-cued stimuli and baseline indicated that there 
were no differences (Condition χ2(1)= 0.403, p=0.526, Response χ
2
(2)=4.4710, 
p=0.107, Condition*Response interaction χ2(2)= 4.471, p=0.107). 
 
In the denomination task no specific advantage of Auditory cue was found (Cue: 
χ2(1)=0.505, p=0.477, Responses: χ
2
(1)=0.188, p=0.910, Cue*Responses interaction: 
χ2(2)=1.253, p=0.534). Furthermore, there were no differences either between cued 
stimuli and the baseline (Conditionχ2(1)=1.019, p=0.313, Response χ
2
(1)=4.471, 
p=0.107, Condition*Response interaction χ2(2)=1201, p=0.548) or between non-
cued stimuli versus the baseline (χ2(1)= 0.0910, p=0.762, Response χ
2
(2)=4.471, 
p=0.107, Condition*Response interaction χ2(2)= 1.025, p=0.599). 
 
4.3. Baseline and follow-up lists 
A comparison between the baseline and follow-up lists did not show any signifi-
cant differences (Time: χ2(1)=0.0001, p~1.00, Response: χ
2
(2)=4.471, p=0.107, 
Time*Responses: χ2(2)=4.134, p=0.127) . 
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Discussion  
 
In this study the potential effects of different types of sensory cues in reducing 
simultanagnosia were investigated in a patient with Balint's syndrome. The diag-
nosis was formulated based on the results from a detailed neuropsychological as-
sessment and supported by an accurate analysis of underlying lesions by means of 
a (18)F-FDG Brain PET/CT. We found that the ability to recognise overlapping 
pictures may be improved by presenting a congruent stimulus (cue) prior to the 
task. This stimulus was presented using a visual modality and also other sensory 
modalities. Crucially, the sensory cue improved not only the target object, but also 
the non-target object. This suggests that the facilitation effect produced by the 
presentation of a cue acts on the visual system, allowing the patient to disambigu-
ate the two overlapping images and thus separate them. In fact, although MR’s 
discrimination of the (cued) target was obviously influenced by the fact that he 
recognised it from the previous equivalent cue, his  improvement in terms of 
recognition of non-target objects can only be due to the visual identification of the 
overlapping objects in the image. In addition, the fact that there were very few 
false alarms (i.e. the trials with an incongruent cue where the patient incorrectly 
indicated the cue as an object present in the stimulus) rules out the possibility that 
MR was basing his discrimination of objects in the overlapping images exclusively 
on his previous recognition of the cue.  
 
Balint’s Syndrome 
The patient here described showed certain specific signs of BS. The initial symp-
toms of neglect had totally disappeared at the time of the experimental study and 
MR did not suffer from visual acuity or serious visual field deficits. Ocular apraxia 
had been present exclusively in the acute phase, when MR was totally unable to 
voluntarily move his gaze which appeared fixed and vacuous (the “psychic paraly-
sis of gaze” originally described by Balint, 1909). At the time of our assessment, 
his inability to compare object size or lengths remained, probably at least in part 
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due to simultanagnosia. MR was able to grasp moving  objects but failed to point 
at or grasp unmoving objects or pick out one object from among others (Optic 
Ataxia).  
As previously described in other cases (Chechlacz & Humphreys, 2014; 
Dalrymple, Barton, & Kingstone, 2013), the most evident symptom was certainly 
MR’s simultanagnosia, (i.e. his inability to interpret complex visual displays due to 
a difficulty in processing multiple items and the relations between them) (Wolpert, 
1924). MR complained that he saw a chaotic and incoherent picture of the sur-
rounding world and this was confirmed by the assessment which showed that he 
was unable to see more than one object, or even a piece of an object, at a time. He 
appeared to be totally unaware that what he was looking at was only part of a larg-
er image and he was unable to synthesise the elements of a scene in order to pro-
duce the overall scene (Rafal, 2001). Two forms of simultanagnosia have been de-
scribed (Farah, 1990). In “dorsal simultanagnosia” attentional limitations preclude 
the detection of multiple objects, while in the “ventral” form the main symptom is 
a slowdown in visual processing that causes disorders in recognising the individual 
parts of a multipart object (Rizzo & Vecera, 2002). The dorsal subtype is associat-
ed with bilateral lesions in parieto-occipital areas, including the cuneus, the 
intraparietal sulcus and visuospatial white matter pathways (Chechlacz & 
Humphreys, 2014). The ventral subtype, less frequent, results from left inferior oc-
cipital-temporal damage (Farah, 1990). 
Damage resulting from anoxic etiology generally causes multi-focal lesions and 
areas of hypodensity which are not easy to identify with traditional neuroimaging 
techniques. The double imaging method (PET/CT) here employed provided a valid 
support in the identification of the functional damage of MR. Areas of hypo-
metabolism were found in bilateral parietal areas across both the parieto-occipital 
and temporo-parietal transitions. These areas have been previously described in 
patients suffering from BS (Phan, Schendel, Recanzone, & Robertson, 2000; Rizzo 
& Vecera, 2002). A specific investigation on the site of the lateral occipital com-
plex (which is specialised in recognition of  single objects), confirmed that this ar-
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ea was spared. In fact, MR did not show any disorders in his perception of individ-
ual objects. Finally, the damage to the right dorsolateral frontal cortex explains 
MR’s impairment in planning tasks (FAB, London Tower, BADS).  
Although this is compatible with both the dorsal and ventral forms of 
simultanagnosia, we consider that MR mainly suffered from object-based disor-
ders. Indeed, he could identify multiple objects in space (although slowly) and he 
did not present with spatial or topographic deficits. In contrast he failed to identify 
multipart, complex, overlapping objects, even when these occupied the same spa-
tial coordinates as an object that he could see (Rafal, 2001). Actually, MR mani-
fested two apparently opposite deficits: he was unable to integrate individual pic-
ture-parts to make them into a whole but he was also unable to identify the indi-
vidual elements of a complex image. For example, he was at the same time unable 
to realise that a complex image showed a coffee-bar (with typical furniture and ob-
jects, a waiter and a customer) and unable to identify in a chimeric image the pres-
ence of two elements (e.g. a dunk and a key). Rather than an isolated inability to 
focus his attention across a wider area (the Restriction of Visual Attention hypoth-
esis, Rizzo & Vecera, 2002; Rafal, 2003), we suggest that MR’s disorders involve 
an interaction mechanism between spatial attention and processes of perceptive 
grouping (Shalev et al., 2004; Chica, Bartolomeo, & Valero-Cabré, 2011).   
It has been shown that the features of a stimulus can modify the expression of 
simultanagnosia, for example the distance between local elements in compound 
forms (Dalrymple, Kingstone, & Barton, 2007; Huberle & Karnath, 2006; 
Montoro, Luna, & Humphreys, 2011) as can the significance of a stimulus or its 
familiarity (Coslett & Saffran, 1991; Shalev, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2007). In 
addition, the salience of a stimulus may influence the symptoms (Dalrymple et al., 
2007; Montoro et al., 2011). Mevorach and colleagues (2014) found that manipu-
lating local and global shapes so that either the former or the latter were salient 
changed the patient’s performance, showing an effect of local or global “capture” 
which was simply dependant on the relative salience of the shape. This capture ef-
fect may be also associated with the inability to disengage attention from a stimu-
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lus (Farah 1990). MR’s symptoms only in part support the Integrated Competition 
Hypothesis (Duncan et al., 1997) which explains simultanagnosia as the result of 
an all or nothing competition between objects (Jackson, Swainson, Mort, Husain, 
& Jackson, 2009). In fact, he recognised only one element at a time in complex 
scenes and omitted (or neglected) the others. Nevertheless, following this theory, 
the patient would be expected to systematically recognise one of the two overlap-
ping images, while in the baseline and the non-facilitated condition MR failed to 
identify either of the two objects represented in the stimuli.  
In effect, it is probably impossible to identify one single disorder underlying 
simultanagnosia due to variability in the symptoms as a result of different aetiolo-
gies and the co-occurrence of other deficits. Discordant findings probably reflect 
the existence of distinct subtypes (Coslett & Lie, 2008) associated with at least 
partially different lesions. 
Disorders in recognizing a whole object is reported even in the integrative visual 
agnosia (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987). This is a particular type of apperceptive 
visual agnosia involving deficits in recognition of single objects, but preserved 
abilities in the analysis of their single parts. We exclude this possibility as MR 
showed spared abilities in processing single drawings and real objects. Further-
more, integrative agnosia is reported after lesions in bilateral posterior and ventro-
medial occipital-temporal areas, including inferior temporal, fusiform and lingual 
gyri (Riddoch, et al. 2008). These ventral areas were spared in MR.  
 
Facilitation effects induced by a visual cue 
Our results indicate that a visual cue helped MR to discriminate the elements in 
two overlapping figures. Crucially, when the stimuli were cued this facilitated the 
recognition not only of the target but also of the not-target stimuli. In other words, 
when the patient was able to match the cue with the target in the overlapping fig-
ure (Identification task) and to identify one object in the double stimulus (Denomi-
nation task), he was then also able to separate this object perceptively from the 
other object and to distinguish each of these as one single object. In terms of visual 
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attentional processes, we can hypothesise that the cue induced a generic increase in 
brightness contrast in the limited space depicted in the images. This might enhance 
both bottom-up and top-down attentional processes. With regard to the potential 
bottom-up mechanisms, we suggest that the cue facilitated a disengagement of at-
tention from the global stimulus (global “capture”), allowing the identification of 
the two separate objects of the overlapping figures. In other words, the cue would 
potentially represent an instrument that allow the patient to overcome the global 
capture effect. To at least partially support this hypothesis , at the denomination 
task, in the trials with a false cue (i.e., when the cue was not present in the follow-
ing overlapped images) the performance decreased significantly in comparison to 
the baseline.  
As the significance of stimuli influences in the attention to the same stimuli in 
simultanagnosia, we suggest that top-down, semantic memory processes were also 
involved in our experimental results. Previous results support this hypothesis. In a 
single-case study, Coslett and Saffran (1991) found that their patient was better at 
identifying two simultaneously presented words when these were components of 
compound words (e.g. BASE and BALL) or were semantically related (e.g. HOT 
and COLD) than when they were unrelated. Better recognition was also found for 
pairs of line drawings that were semantically related (e.g. both animals) than those 
that were unrelated (e.g. an animal and a tool) (Coslett and Saffran,1991). 
Recognising the object used as a cue may also have induced an effect of  “familiar-
ity" for the stimulus which was subsequently presented. In an interesting study, 
Shalev et al. (2007) demonstrated that their simultanagnosic patient perceived only 
the global shape of a compound letter as long as its local elements were unfamiliar; 
however, after that the patient was trained to identify the local (previously unfa-
miliar) elements, it became difficult to perceive global forms containing the now-
familiar local elements. Thus, familiarity changed the stimulus saliency. 
That said, we suggest that the facilitation in our experiment did not act separately 
on the visuo-spatial attentional or semantic systems, but rather enhanced the inte-
grative processes of spatial attention and visual discrimination.  
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Cross-modal facilitation in the perception of overlapping images.  
In everyday situations, people perceive the surrounding complex environment as a 
unique, coherent whole thanks to the integration of multiple sensory systems such 
as the olfactory, auditory, visual, gustatory and tactile systems. The likelihood and 
speed of detection and identification of events is certainly higher when inputs 
come from two or more sensory channels as compared to only one (Demattè, 
Sanabria, & Spence, 2006, 2009; Gottfried & Dolan, 2003).  
Cross-modal integration is certainly supported by neuronal networks at multiple 
levels. A first level acts relatively early in subcortical brain structures (e.g. the 
colliculus) and in the primary sensory cortices. Here, there are bimodal neurons 
that at the same moment respond to stimuli presented in two different modalities, 
in particular when those two stimuli occur in close spatial and temporal proximity 
(Diaconescu, Hasher, & McIntosh, 2013; Fort et al., 2002; Gottfried & Dolan, 
2003). A second step involves the associative cortices. For example, synchronous 
auditory-tactile stimulation induces cross-modal facilitation effects and increases 
the auditory intensity rating thanks to the auditory-tactile multisensory neurons in 
the auditory associative cortex (Gillmeister & Eimer, 2007). In addition to these 
sensory areas, multisensory integration in humans is supported by a complex, 
widespread network. This involves the superior temporal sulcus which is associat-
ed with the integration and labelling of objects and the intraparietal sulcus, in-
volved in spatial information processing (Calvert, 2001; Stein & Stanford, 2008). 
In these areas an overlapping activation related to three different senses (tactile, 
auditory and visual) has been recorded (Beauchamp, Yasar, Frye, & Ro, 2008; 
Bremmer et al., 2001; Langner et al., 2012). Furthermore, the retro-medial orbito-
frontal cortex and hippocampal areas have been identified as neuronal correlates of 
multisensory integration involving the olfactory and gustatory domains (Gottfried 
& Dolan, 2003; Price, 2008). Finally, the amygdala and the insula have also been 
found to be involved in the integration of cross- or multisensory information relat-
ed to emotional perception (Dolan et al., 2001; Freiherr, Lundström, Habel, & 
Reetz, 2013). 
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This suggests that, in multisensory integration, high cognitive functions such as 
attentional and memory processes are also involved (Rizzo & Vecera, 2002). The 
improvement that our patient showed in his ability to discriminate the two objects 
in the overlapping images after non-visual cues probably made use of these wide-
spread networks. Certainly, these interacted with and enhanced the more specific 
spatial-attentional processes (as mentioned earlier for visual unimodal facilitation). 
In addition, research on multisensory interaction has demonstrated that this is more 
efficient at improving perceptual performance when an isolated modality is defi-
cient (the principle of “inverse effectiveness”; Caclin et al., 2011; Hairston, 
Laurienti, Mishra, Burdette, & Wallace, 2003). 
Nevertheless, in the case of MR cross-modal integration was not as efficacious as 
visual facilitation in terms of reducing simultanagnosia and neither did the audito-
ry modality have any notable effects. The delay between the cue and the presenta-
tion of stimuli showing overlapping objects may have contributed to this reduction 
in efficacy. There may also be other factors. The visual cue was perceptively iden-
tical (although not rotated through 45° like the target stimuli) and for this reason 
represented the most salient cue, thanks to the possible integration of bottom-up 
and top-down processes. In contrast, non-visual cues only matched the target stim-
uli semantically, probably inducing top-down attentional and short-term memory 
processing (Shinn-Cunningham, 2008). In addition, while the temporal proximity 
between cue and target was identical for all of the modalities, spatial congruency 
was only respected in the visual modality (Frassinetti, Bolognini, & Làdavas, 
2002; Valenza et al., 2004).  
The tactile and olfactory cues were efficacious in improving MR’s recognition and 
denomination of overlapping objects, but the auditory cues did not have any influ-
ence. A possible explanation is that the acustic cue was too difficult to identify and 
thus did not provide useful information. In fact, MR made many mistakes in rec-
ognizing acoustic cues (33.33% errors: 1 excluded and 3 missed in the Identifica-
tion task). 
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Nevertheless, this result was unexpected, considering the importance that auditory 
inputs have in the context of daily life and in terms of object recognition. One 
could speculate that auditory stimuli are more connected to linguistic than visual 
information about objects. Thus, these stimuli might facilitate verbal recall more 
than visual recognition. Unfortunately, we did not investigated this possibility in 
MR.  
A hypothesis regarding the enlargement of the attentional window by means of a 
priming task (with a procedure similar to ours and a delay between the stimuli) has 
been suggested in a single-case study involving a patient affected by BS (Shavel, 
et al., 2004). The patient showed an improvement in the visual recognition of 
compound letters following a preliminary task in which he  had been asked to 
identify one of same letters. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if this effect was sup-
ported by implicit processes or short-term memory.  
Another possible interpretation of our results refers to the effects of expectation of  
imminent stimuli. When sensory stimuli occur close together in time and space 
they are likely expected by individuals to be associated signals coming from a 
common source (top-down expectation; Gau & Noppeney, 2016; Körding, et al. 
2007; Magnotti, Ma, & Beauchamp, 2013). In our task, immediately after explor-
ing the cue, the patient could be in an expectation condition, awaiting the presenta-
tion of the same object, that is thus more easily detected. However, the effect of 
trial expectation does not explain the partial effect of improvement in the recogni-
tion of the second uncued stimulus in the overlapping images. In addition, it is im-
portant to consider that the patient was aware that the cue might or might not antic-
ipate one of the objects shown in the overlapping images (50% of the probability). 
This probably reduced the expectation effect.  
In conclusion, we consider that the identification of a previous stimulus influenced 
MR's capacity to perceive overlapping objects, probably thanks to a combination 
of bottom-up and top-down processing  when the cue was visual, and to top-down 
facilitation in cross-modal cues. Unfortunately, the effects were only temporary 
and were not generalised to other stimuli, as demonstrated by the fact that there 
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were no differences in MR’s scores for the additional list administered before and 
after the experimental procedure. Thus, in terms of recovery, cross-modal facilita-
tion does not seem to represent a useful strategy for rehabilitation. Nevertheless, 
the number of trials for each modality used in our experiment are probably too few 
to induce any long-term changes. Only more specific, prolonged programs will in-
dicate the potential effects of cross-modal facilitation in simultanagnosia.  
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Abstract  
 
Objective: The study aims to investigate the effects of transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation (tDCS) in a rehabilitation programme for Tactile Agnosia and to un-
derstand the role of the stimulation site in the modulation of the symptoms. 
Design: A single case study. Single blind pseudo-random trial in an ABABAB 
paradigm. 
Subject: A patient suffering from Associative Tactile Agnosia following an 
ischemic stroke in the right front-parietal cortex. 
Methods: Three blocks of occupational/neuropsychological and motor rehabilita-
tion sessions with off-line a-tDCS were alternated with three blocks of rehabilita-
tion sessions without tDCS (6 blocks in total). In order to assess the recovery, pa-
tient's performance was recorded in a tactile object recognition task before and af-
ter each of the 6 blocks and in two follow-up sessions (at 20 days and at 6 months). 
Furthermore during the blocks with a-tDCS, the stimulation was administered in 
counterbalanced order to two sites: i) the perilesional parietal area (specific stimu-
lation) and ii) a far from lesion occipital area (non-specific stimulation). 
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Results: The rehabilitation programme was significantly more efficacious when 
associated with a-tDCS than when it was administered without stimulation. In ad-
dition, the patient performed better after stimulation to the specific perilesional 
area as compared to the non-specific site. This improvement lasted over time. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Tactile Agnosia (TA) is a modality-specific deficit affecting the tactile recognition 
of objects, in the presence of adequate sensory, linguistic and cognitive functions.
1
 
Patients with TA are unable to identify simple objects when these are manipulated 
using their affected hand. In contrast, they easily recognise the same objects with 
the other hand and when they see them or hear their typical sound (e.g. the noise of 
keys).
2
 Furthermore, TA is not due to linguistic or memory deficits, as patients can 
normally denominate the objects presented in non-tactile modalities. 
Various different hypotheses have been advanced to understand the causes of TA. 
The first anecdotal descriptions of the syndrome did not clearly distinguish it from 
elementary somatosensory impairment,
3,4
 but recent studies have focused on more 
detailed descriptions of the symptoms and associated cerebral damage.
5
 In fact, the 
very first hypothesis that TA is the consequence of sensory disorders
3,6
 has been 
replaced by more recent theories suggesting that the neural correlates of TA may 
be found in a disconnection between tactile modality specific encoding and proc-
esses of multimodal integration
7
 or semantic memory systems.
8,9
 In some cases,
4,10
 
the presence of non-efficacious exploratory motor procedures has suggested that 
perceptual-motor integration may contribute to the syndrome.
4
 Finally, a theory 
concerning the role of general supra-modal disorders in spatial perception has also 
been advanced.
11-15
 
After the encoding of an elementary sensory perception, the process of object rec-
ognition by touch may be compromised at two steps: i) when sensory elements are 
integrated (Apperceptive TA) or ii) when the semantic representation of an object 
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is activated (Associative TA).
7
 Apperceptive TA is reported following damage to 
the inferior parietal and insula cortex.
3,11,15,16
 Associative TA is instead associated 
with lesions in the inferior parietal, supra-marginal
4,17
 and angular gyri,
9
 posterior 
insula and temporal cortex.
11
 A patient suffering from TA after a lesion in the cor-
pus callosum (trunk and splenium) has also been reported.
18
 
In effect TA is a rare syndrome, often discussed in single-case reports (but see
11
). 
This is mainly due to its very low incidence and the difficulties involved in isolat-
ing TA symptoms from frequently co-present sensory and motor disorders.
3
 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies to date which specifically 
investigate the effects of rehabilitation programmes for TA. Transcranial Direct 
Current Stimulation (tDCS), however, offers a new method of rehabilitation train-
ing. It is considered to be a useful tool as it modulates brain plasticity by means of 
the polarization of neuronal populations.
19 
Anodic tDCS increases cortical excit-
ability with positive effects on learning processes
20
 and facilitation in the acquisi-
tion of new skills.
21
 On the contrary, cathodic tDCS has inhibitory effects, result-
ing in a decrease in neural activity. tDCS may be particularly useful in order to 
contrast post-lesional symptoms due to hyperactivity in some networks or to 
modulate inter-hemispheric activations.
22,23
 
Here we report a single case study regarding a man with left hand TA following a 
vascular lesion in the right parietal cortex. Neurological and neuropsychological 
assessments were associated with an accurate analysis of his lesion. A rehabilita-
tion programme using tDCS was then carried out in order to understand: i) whether 
brain stimulation can enhance the effects of a traditional rehabilitation programme 
and ii) if different stimulation sites impact on the efficacy of the programme. For 
this reason, we used an ABABAB paradigm alternating a tDCS plus behavioural 
training programme (blocks A) with a behavioural programme (blocks B). In addi-
tion, in the A blocks we compared the efficacy of tDCS stimulation to two differ-
ent cortical areas: i) a specific perilesional area (P4) and ii) a non-specific, far from 
lesion area (Oz-O2). In this way, we were able to evaluate not only the efficacy of 
tDCS in behavioural training for TA, but also whether its effects are driven by an 
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increase in neuronal excitability in specific perilesional areas or by a general corti-
cal activation. 
Methods 
 
Case report 
US is a right-handed, 56-year-old German man. He has a high standard of educa-
tion (PhD), speaks fluent Italian and works as an agronomist. 15 days after an 
ischemic stroke in the fronto-parietal area of the right hemisphere, he was admitted 
to the Department of Rehabilitation. He was oriented in time and space and aware 
of his deficits. Motricity was spared although he suffered from very mild weakness 
in his left leg. He complained that he was no longer able to recognize objects with 
his left hand, although he could identify their shape and size. This deficit did not 
affect his right hand.  
 
Neuropsychological assessment 
1 month after the lesion onset, US’s general cognitive functions appeared pre-
served (Mini Mental State Examination - MMSE=30/30
24
). An in depth neuropsy-
chological assessment confirmed that the patient did not show any signs of neglect 
or language disorders. There were some difficulties regarding attentional flexibil-
ity, inhibition of automatic responses (Visual Elevator test, Stroop and PASAT) 
and planning (Tower of London, BADS). His score in a verbal short-memory test 
was under cut-off, but he did not show any other memory deficits. Although dur-
ing the execution of intransitive gestures US made some minimal errors (persever-
ation, omission and conduit d'approche), he compensated well for these. He did not 
have any pathological scores in tests for apraxia. The details of the neuropsy-
chological assessment are reported in Table 1. 
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Score 
  
Cut-Off 
(ES 0-4) 
Attention   
   Trail Making Test
25
    
     Test A (sec.) 50 >93 
     Test B (sec.) 151 >282 
     Test B-A (sec.) 101 >187 
   Attentional Matrices
26
  46.5 30 
   Visual Elevator (TEA
27
) 8.3 9.2 
   Stroop Test
28 
  
          Word (sec.) 44 <50 
          Colour (sec.) 74 <80 
          Colour/Word (sec.) 143 <120 
  PASAT
29 
  
       ISI 4000
 
10* ≤6* 
       ISI 3000 9* ≤6* 
       ISI 1800 24* ≤9* 
Spatial Neglect   
   BIT
30
   
      Conventional Subtests  141 129 
      Behavioural Subtests  80 67 
Memory   
  Short-term spatial memory
26
  
 
3.75 3.75 
  Long-term spatial memory  (Corsi
26
) 13.9 5.75 
  Short-term verbal memory (Word Span
26
) 2.25 3 
  Story Recall
26
  14.4 4.75 
  Rey 15-words Test
31
    
      Immediate Recall    52.2 28.53 
      Delayed Recall  13 4.69 
   Rey Complex Figure Recall
32
  14.15 6.20 
  Imitation hand positions
33
 20 12 
Apraxia   
  Rey Complex Figure Copy
32
  28.33 28 
  Clock Drawing Test
34
  9 7.57 
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  Ideational Apraxia Test
35
  14 (4) 
  Ideomotor Apraxia Test
36
 66 53 
  Constructive Apraxia Test
26
 10.50 (2) 
Executive Functions   
  FAB
37
  16.8 12.03 
  Raven's progressive Matrices
38
  36.75 20.72 
  Tower of London
39
  23 26.54 
  WCST
40
 97.8 90.50 
  BADS
41
   
        Rule shift cards 
 
0* (4) 
        Temporal judgement  3 (3) 
        Key search  6 (1) 
        Zoo map  14 (3) 
        Modified six elements  5 (3) 
Language   
  AAT
42 
  
         Token test 49 (4) 
         Repetition 147 (4) 
         Writing  90 (4) 
         Naming  118  (4) 
        Comprehension 119  (4) 
Table 1. Neuropsychological Assessment. US's scores in tests assessing Atten-
tion,
25,26,27,28,29
 spatial neglect,
30
 Memory,
31,32,33
 Apraxia,
34,35,36
 Executive func-
tions
37,38,39,40,41
 and Language are reported.
42
 All scores (second column) are cor-
rected for age and education. ES= Equivalent Score. * = tests where the score is 
based on the number of errors. Pathological ES are 0 (severe) and 1 (moderate). 
ISI= Inter-stimuli Interval in msec. Pathological results are in bold; scores at cut-
off are in italics. 
 
 
Tactile Agnosia 
 
Somato-sensory perception 
In order to isolate the presence of Tactile Agnosia with respect to other potential 
deficits, a detailed screening of somato-sensory perception was preliminarily ad-
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ministered by means of clinical tasks and the Evaluation of Somatic Sensation 
Test
43
 (Table 2). US did not show any left hand deficits in the detection of tactile 
stimuli. In contrast, he failed to localise tactile stimuli with both hands and to imi-
tate the position of his right hand with his left hand. However, this latter symptom 
seemed to be the result of a certain degree of awkwardness in the movements of 
his left hand rather than proprioceptive deficits. In fact, US carried out all the tests 
for somatic sensations and proprioception without errors (Table 2).  
 
  
 
At 1 month 
 
At 6 
month  
 
 
RH LH LH 
Tactile Perception 
  
 
  Lightly touch (12) 100 91.66 100 
  Touch with Pressure (12) 100 100 100 
  Vibration (8) 100 100 100 
  Temperature (12) 100 75 100 
  Tactile extinction (19) 94.7 84.5 - 
  Localization of the touch by other hand (12) 75 66.66 75 
  Imitation of other hand position (12) 91.66 50 75 
  Discrimination of movement (12) - 91.66 - 
Somatic Sensation Test
43 
  
 
  Joint Position Sense (0-51*) - 11* 8* 
  Pressure Sensation (0-16*) - 4* 0* 
  Motor Sequences (0-16*) - 0* 0* 
  Thumb-index grip force control (0-316*) - 16* 28* 
  Functional tests (0-40*) - 0* 1* 
Object recognition (15) 100 26.66 - 
Tactile Recognitions
17 
  
 
Geometrical shapes 
  
 
  Discrimination (12) 100 83.33 - 
  Denomination (12) 100 83.33 - 
Drawing objects after haptic exploration (5) 80 40 - 
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Praxic Abilities
17
 
  
 
Letters during active manipulation 
  
 
  Discrimination (12) 91.66 83.33 100 
  Denomination (12) 75 25 50 
Letters during passive manipulation 
  
 
  Discrimination (12) 91.66 91.66 91.66 
  Denomination (12) 66.66 41.66 50 
Supra-modal Spatial Representation
17
 
  
 
  Tactile Spatial Representation (9) 77.77 66.66 - 
Visual Spatial Imagery 
  
 
  Imagery of letter shape
44 
(40) 100  
Table 2. Clinical assessment of Tactile Agnosia and correlated functions. The results 
in the examinations at one and six months after lesion are reported in percentages of cor-
rect responses. Sensory perception was assessed by means of clinical tasks and the 
Evaluation of Somatic Sensation Test.
43
 Clinical tests of Tactile Perception, Praxic 
Apraxia and Supra-modal Spatial Representation for diagnosis of Tactile Agnosia were 
administered following the procedure suggested by Veronelli and colleagues and Sartori 
& Job.
17,44
 RH = right hand; LF = left hand. * = number of errors. In parentheses the 
number of items per task. For the task of imagery of letter shape the scores are not hand 
specific. Pathological scores are in bold. 
 
 
The Assessment of Tactile Agnosia 
In order to determine the nature of the subject’s tactile agnosia (whether associa-
tive or apperceptive), we capitalised on the method of assessment proposed by 
Veronelli and colleagues.
17
 This distinguishes three main functions: i) tactile rec-
ognition, which concerns the processing and integration of the basic sensory fea-
tures of objects in order to determine its shape; ii) praxic abilities, which are nec-
essary to explore objects and iii) supra-modal spatial representation, in order to 
exclude more general spatial deficits. 
US was blindfolded during all of these tasks. The tests were first executed with the 
left hand and then with the right hand as control (Table 2).  
 
Object recognition. A task involving the tactile recognition of a variety of objects 
was used to evaluate the presence of Tactile Agnosia. 15 different objects used in 
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daily life activities (e.g. clothes peg, screwdriver) were presented at three different 
time intervals from the lesion onset.  
While US could immediately name all the objects using his right hand (100%), he 
was totally unable to recognise them with his left hand. This task was repeated 
three times in the first 40 days after lesion onset in order to verify the stability of 
the symptoms (score at 15 days: 1/5; 25 days: 1/5; 40 days: 2/5). In addition, the 
patient was unable to give any information about object functions or to execute the 
pantomime of their use. Nevertheless, after manipulation with his left hand, he was 
able to describe the shape of the objects in detail in terms of their outline, texture 
and temperature (see Supplementary video materials - SM). 
 
Tactile recognition. Two tasks were administered. In a task involving the Dis-
crimination of geometrical shapes, US was asked to manipulate 12 pairs of three-
dimensional geometrical shapes (i.e. triangles, squares, circles and rectangles; 
small= 1.5x1.5 cm; big= 3x3 cm) and to judge if they were the same size and 
shape (same/different response). In a Denomination task, the same geometrical 
shapes were presented individually and the patient was asked to name them. 
In addition, in order to distinguish between US’s abilities to perceive and represent 
the shape of the various objects from potential linguistic disorders, he was re-
quested to do a drawing task after haptic exploration of the objects.
17
 US manually 
explored 5 different objects (a birthday candle, a wooden spoon, a bottle of nail 
varnish, a pair of glasses and pincers) and was asked to draw them immediately af-
terwards (using is right hand). He was then asked to identify all the 5 objects pre-
viously drawn. The score was calculated on the number of objects which he had 
drawn and denominated correctly.  
 
US did not show any particular difficulties in the discrimination and naming of the 
geometrical shapes after left hand exploration (Table 2) and this confirms his abil-
ity to recognise elementary features of shapes and objects. In contrast, he found it 
difficult to recognise his own drawings after left hand manipulation (but not after 
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right hand manipulation (Left Hand: 2/5; Right hand: 4/5). This suggests that he 
was unable to integrate features pertaining to the shape in order to identify objects.  
The fact that he was able to name objects after right hand tactile exploration ex-
cluded any potential role of language and drawing abilities.  
 
Praxic ability. A comparison between active and passive manipulation allowed us 
to distinguish between symptoms due to agnosic and apraxic deficits. In the active 
condition, US was asked to identify 12 3D-letters that he was permitted to manipu-
late freely. In the passive condition, the same 12 letters were written by the ex-
perimenter on the palm of US’s hand (graphesthetic function). In both tasks US 
was requested to: i) identify two letters as being the same or different from each 
other (Discrimination task) and ii) name one of the letters (Denomiantion task).  
An isolated deficit in identification abilities after active manipulation may be an 
index of praxic disorders,
10
 while in the presence of tactile agnosia, patients are 
expected to fail in both the active and passive conditions. Nevertheless, in the case 
of associative tactile agnosia, only passive naming would be impaired with spared 
passive discrimination.
17 
Although US’s movements appeared slightly clumsy, he was easily able to recog-
nise whether the pairs of letters were the same or different (based on the elemen-
tary features of the shapes). Nevertheless he failed at the Denomination task. 
  
Supra-modal Spatial representation. A specific assessment excluded the presence 
of spatial neglect (Table 1). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the cerebral lesion 
was on the right hemisphere, we assessed Supra-modal spatial representation after 
tactile exploration.
17
 A 30x30cm base with 36 nails in it was placed in front of the 
patient. He was asked to move his hand touching the tops of the nails according to 
9 different sets of directions given by the examiner (e.g. "Please move your hand 3 
nails to the left").  
No considerable difference was found between the two hands in this task (right 
hand:77.78%; left hand: 66.66%) ruling out a main role of disorders in spatial rep-
165   
 
resentations in US’s tactile agnosia. Finally, we excluded disorders in mental im-
agery by means of a letter imagery task.
44
 
 
Analysis of lesion  
A structural MRI was carried out 3 days after the lesion onset and the patient’s le-
sion was mapped by mean of the MRIcron software
45
 on the standard T1-weighted 
MRI template (ICBM152) of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordi-
nate system, approximately matched to the Talairach space.
46
 We first oriented the 
template on the midsagittal and midcoronal axis to match the original scan of the 
patient. Then, a blind expert clinician manually traced the lesion using the 
MRIcron Software.
45
 
The final image of the lesion was superimposed onto the Automatic Anatomical 
Label (AAL) template
47
 in order to ascertain the number of voxels involved in the 
lesion in each area and the centre of mass of the lesion.  
The main areas damaged in the right hemisphere lesion are the supramarginal 
gyrus (-x= 53, y=-22, z=18), the inferior parietal cortex (x= 37, y=-50, z=38), the 
angular cortex (x= 38, y=-53, z=22), the rolandic operculum (x= 53, y=-10, z= 11), 
the postcentral gyrus (x= 63, y= -15, z= 15), the Heschl gyrus (x= 40, y= -24, y= 
12), the superior temporal gyrus (x= 60, y= -12, z= 11) and the insula (x= 41, y= -
6, z= 11) (see Figure 1 for details). The same test repeated at 10 days from the 
stroke gave analogous results. 
The same procedure was used by overlapping the lesion to the JHU (Johns Hop-
kins University) DTI-based white matter atlas
48
 in order to analyse the white mat-
ter tracts. This indicates that the lesion involves the superior longitudinal fascicu-
lus and the posterior and superior corona radiata (Figure 1f). 
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Figure 1. US's lesion. The lesion traced on MRI Template is reported (the right hemi-
sphere is on the right). The lesion (in red) mostly involves the right supramerginal gyrus, 
inferior parietal, angular cortex rolandic operculum, post-central gyrus, Heschl area, tem-
poral superior gyrus and insula. The lesion is shown in a) Axial, b) Coronal, c) Sagittal 
views and d) on a 3D brain representation. e) The tables show the percentage and number 
of voxels of damaged tissue in each area in the grey (left table) and white matter (right ta-
ble). f) The lesion (in red) affecting the white matter.
 
 
 
Experimental design 
 
A series of anodic-tDCS (a-tDCS) stimulation sessions was administered to US 
with the aim of investigating its potentially beneficial effects. 
Three 5-day-blocks of off-line a-tDCS stimulation sessions blocks (A) were alter-
nated with three 5-day-blocks of occupational/neuropsychological rehabilitation 
sessions without tDCS blocks (B). During the a-tDCS sessions (A), electrical 
stimulation was administered to both the perilesional parietal area (specific perile-
sional stimulation condition) and the right occipital area (non-specific stimulation 
condition). This was carried out in a counterbalanced order over the five sessions 
of each block, with an interval of at least 2.5 hours. 
A task involving the recognition of real objects (executed by the subject before and 
after stimulation) served as a measure of the modulatory immediate effects of 
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tDCS. A similar task but with different objects was employed as general measure 
of improvement between the blocks (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental Design a) Timeline of the entire experiment, b) An example of 
the objects (5 objects repeated once) used in a single session involving specific or non-
specific stimulation and presented to the patient before and after tDCS (block A).  
 
 
The paradigm thus allowed us to investigate whether: i) a-tDCS stimulation in-
duces a greater improvement in tactile recognition than occupa-
tional/neuropsychological therapy and ii) the specificity of the area stimulated im-
pacts on the effects of this training. 
 
tDCS 
In accordance with safety guidelines,
49
 off-line tDCS stimulation was administered 
by means of a constant current stimulator (BrainStim, EMS), using two saline-
soaked sponge electrodes (5x7 cm; 35cm
2
) at an intensity of 2mA for 20 minutes 
(with a fade-in and fade-out of 120s).
50,51
 The sites of the electrodes were identi-
fied following the international 10-20 system coordinates.
52,53
 In each session, the 
location of the anodic electrode was counterbalanced in two stimulation sites cor-
responding to the two experimental conditions: the perilesional parietal area on P4 
(the specific stimulation condition) and the occipital area on Oz-O2 (the non-
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specific stimulation condition). The cathodic electrode was always located in an 
extra-encephalic position on the contralateral side of the forehead.  
 
Object recognition pre and post a-TDCS. Before and after a-TDC stimulation, US 
was asked to recognize a series of simple, everyday objects, which he manipulated 
with his left hand. We built some lists of objects. In order to balance the difficulty 
of the lists and to avoid the learning effects due to the repetition of the same ob-
jects, various different lists were administered before and after the session follow-
ing the order showed in Table 3. 
 
Block and Day  Specific Parietal Stimulation Non-specific Occipital Stimulation 
A1 (5 objects repeated) List List 
     Day 1  A F 
     Day 2 B G 
     Day 3 C H 
     Day 4 D I 
     Day 5  E L 
A2 (5 objects repeated)
 
  
     Day 1  F A 
     Day 2 G B 
     Day 3 H C 
     Day 4
 
I D 
     Day 5 
 
L E 
A3 (6 objects repeated)   
     Day 1  M N 
     Day 2 O P 
     Day 3 N M 
     Day 4 P O 
     Day 5  Q R 
Table 3.The lists of objects used to assess the effects of a-tDCS and the order of 
administration is schematized. Capital letters indicate the different lists. 
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General measure of tactile recognition. An additional list of another 12 objects 
which were different from those previously used (the External Assessment List) 
was used as a general measure of tactile recognition before stimulation, between 
each block and in two follow-up assessments.  
 
 
Procedure 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the training programme lasted a total of 6 weeks. 3 weeks of 
tDCS stimulation associated with traditional occupational/neuropsychological and 
motor rehabilitation (Blocks A in Figure 2) were alternated with 3 weeks when the 
patient participated exclusively in occupational/neuropsychological and motor re-
habilitation (Blocks B in Figure 2). 
Each tDCS daily session was planned in six steps: 
Step one: US sat in front of a table, blindfolded. An object was put into his left 
hand which was lying palm up on the table and he was asked to identify it. The ob-
ject remained in his hand until he recognised it or in any case for a maximum of 2 
minutes. When he found it impossible to name the object, an accurate description 
of it was accepted.  
Step two: the first tDCS stimulation condition (i.e. specific – in P4 or non-specific 
– in Oz-O2 ) was administered. During stimulation, the patient did not perform any 
activities. 
Step three: the subject did a recognition task involving the same objects as those 
used in Step 1. 
Interval: between the two stimulation conditions there was an interval of around 
2.5 hours during which US participated in physiotherapy and rested. Note that dur-
ing the A blocks, the neuropsychological/occupational activities carried out (i.e. 
those focusing on attention, executive functions, proprioception and limb position 
recognition) were never executed during stimulation but always at different times 
in the day.  
170   
 
Step four: using an identical procedure as that used in Step 1, the patient was asked 
to execute a tactile recognition task with a new list of objects (table 3).  
Step five: a-tDCS was applied to the second site (non-specific – in Oz-O2 or spe-
cific – in P4) 
Step six: a further recognition task using the same objects as those used in Step 4 
was carried out.  
As the patient was blindfolded during these experimental sessions, he could not 
see the objects and did not receive any feedback regarding his performance. This 
was done in order to avoid any interference.  
Only at the end of the whole training programme (i.e. after Block B3) did US use 
his right hand (i.e. the control hand) to explore all the objects previously used in 
the recognition tasks.  
Furthermore, in order to measure any potential improvement in US’s general abil-
ity in terms of tactile recognition, the External Assessment list (with 12 objects 
which were different from those used in training programme) was administered be-
fore training (baseline), between the A and B blocks and in two follow-ups, re-
spectively 20 days and 6 months after the end of training programme (Figure 2).  
 
 
Results 
 
The fact that all of the objects used in the training programme were familiar to US 
was confirmed by the patient’s post-training performance with his right hand (ac-
curacy= 93%). US’s performance was analysed on three levels, namely as general 
improvement, effects of stimulation and specificity of stimulation site.  
 
General Improvement. The scores applying to the External Assessment list in the 
various different phases of the programme were compared to each other (Baseline, 
A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3, two follow-ups) by means of repeated Wilcoxon Tests. 
The raw scores obtained in task using the External Assessment List were used for 
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analysis. All of the responses were sorted into three categories for each object: 1= 
Correct recognition of the object; 0.5= Recognition of the correct semantic cate-
gory, but not of the specific object; 0= Failure to recognise the object.  
Results indicated a significant difference between the baseline and A3 (Z=-2.385, 
p=0.017) and B3 (Z=-2.181, p=0.029). This improvement lasted until the first fol-
low up (Z=-2.322, p=0.020) and the second follow up (Z=-2.060, p=0.039) (Figure 
3a). In addition, significant differences emerged in a comparison between A1 (Z=-
2.271, p=0.023) and B1 (Z=-2.251, p=0.024) versus the first Follow up (Figure 
3a). 
 
Effects of stimulation. The effects of rehabilitation in blocks A (tDCS) and B 
(without tDCS) were compared by computing the differences between the scores 
obtained using the post-block External Assessment list with those of the pre-block 
assessment (and corresponding to the previous post-block measure, i.e. the differ-
ences between post-A1v. Baseline, post-B1 v. post-A1, post-A2 v. post-B1, post-
B2 v. post-A2, post-A3 v. post-B2, post-B3v. post-A3). For each object of the Ex-
ternal Assessment list, we computed the differences between the patient’s re-
sponses in the two assessments in order to obtain a performance index. We 
awarded a score of +1 or + 0.5 when the patient identified correctly or partially 
correctly an object which had not been identified in the list for a previous task (i.e. 
an improvement in performance), 0 when his performance did not change and -1 or 
-0.5 when he failed to recognise an object which had been previously correctly or 
partially correctly identified (i.e. a worsening performance).  
The comparison by means of Wilcoxon tests showed that the blocks after tDCS 
(As) gave better results than those without tDCS (Bs) (Z=-1.943, p=0.052). How-
ever, direct contrasts for consecutive Blocks (A1 v.B1; A2 v. B2, A3 v. B3) did 
not show significant results (see Figure 3b). 
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Figure 3. Measures of General Improvement and Effects of stimulation. a) External 
Assessment analysis on performance at Baseline after each training session and in the two 
Follow-ups. b) The comparison of General Improvement between Blocks A with tDCS 
and Blocks B without tDCS is shown; *:<0.05.  
 
 
Specificity of the stimulation site. Taking into consideration only the A Blocks, a 
comparison was made between the number of objects recognised after specific and 
non–specific stimulation by means of a Mann-Whitney Test (Site: Parietal vs. Oc-
cipital). For each session, this analysis was computed on the differences between 
US’s score in the recognition of objects task before tDCS stimulation and his score 
in the recognition task with the same objects after stimulation (the performance in-
dex was calculated with the same criteria described in section Effects of stimula-
tion).  
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Results indicated that tDCS applied to the specific, perilesional Parietal area was 
more efficacious than non-specific stimulation applied to the Occipital cortex (Z=-
2.072, p=0.038). 
In addition, for each stimulation site (specific and non-specific), the 3 blocks were 
compared by means of a Friedman Test (Time: 1st; 2nd; 3rd), with direct Wil-
coxon post-hoc analyses. Only in the specific Parietal Stimulation Condition was 
the improvement significantly different between the 3 blocks (Friedman 
χ2(2)=5.801, p=0.055). In fact, the improvement was more impressive in the A1 
(Z=-1.988, p=0.046) and A2 blocks (Z=-2.516, p=0.012) than in A3. In contrast, 
there were no differences between the three A blocks in the non-specific Occipital 
Stimulation condition (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Measure of Specificity of the stimulation site. A comparison between the 
scores relating to Parietal (specific) and Occipital (non-specific) stimulation in the three 
blocks of stimulation to each site. Significant direct contrasts are reported. *:<0.05 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this single case study, the effects of a tDCS programme on the recovery of a pa-
tient suffering from TA were investigated. Furthermore, specific perilesional 
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stimulation was compared to stimulation applied to a site far from the patient’s le-
sion, i.e. a site which was not involved during the tasks performed. In a 6-week-
ABABAB paradigm, the patient alternated a week of occupa-
tional/neuropsychological rehabilitation with a week where these activities were 
associated with anodal tDCS stimulation. This was repeated three times. Results 
indicate that tDCS enhanced US’s performance in tasks involving the tactile rec-
ognition of objects. Crucially, the patient's performance improved after specific 
tDCS stimulation in the perilesional Parietal area as compared to stimulation in a 
non-specific Occipital area. This recovery lasted until the follow up assessments at 
20 days and 6 months after the end of the intervention. These results suggest that 
a-tDCS stimulation on perilesional areas can support the recovery of impaired 
abilities and supports traditional rehabilitation, facilitating processes of learning 
with long-term effects.  
 
Phenomenology and neural correlates of Tactile Agnosia. To better understand 
the nature of US’s deficits, an in depth assessment of TA was carried out and the 
patient’s symptoms were compared with the information emerging from an analy-
sis of his lesion. Disorders in the perception of touch, pressure, vibration and tem-
perature were excluded. In addition, following assessment by means of Delay's 
categorization
54
, it was established that US was not impaired in the recognition of 
the size and shape of objects (amorphognosia) or in the discrimination of specific 
features relating to objects, such as weight, texture or temperature (ahylognosia). 
The patient was also able to describe objects in detail after manipulation with his 
left hand, but he could not identify them in semantic terms or describe their func-
tion (tactile asymboly), that is, he was unable to name objects or mime their use. 
We excluded the possibility of language deficits as US was able to name the ob-
jects that he had manipulated or drawn after manipulation with his right hand. 
Even though he was able to draw (and also describe) all of the object's individual 
features, he was unable to identify the object manipulated with his left hand and 
thus also to represent it correctly in a drawing.  
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It is somewhat difficult to understand the role of motor ability in object recognition 
and to ascertain whether poor manipulation might lead to a failure to recognise an 
object or vice versa.
4 
Nevertheless, US did not present with any specific motor dis-
orders during manipulation. At times the subject reduced the speed of manipula-
tion but this was exclusively in order to focus his attention on the task.  
Another aspect to consider is that lesions in the right parietal cortex are often asso-
ciated with spatial disorders. We excluded this possibility in US. Although in the 
first days after the stroke he found it difficult to explore the area of space to his left 
hand side, this deficit had totally resolved itself at the moment of this study. 
Our hypothesis is that US presented with left hand unilateral Associative TA,
7
 
namely a specific problem regarding the recognition and semantic representation 
of the objects that he explored with his left hand. These symptoms are due to a dis-
connection between the primary somatosensory cortex and the networks involved 
in the superior processes associated with object identification
4 
or between these lat-
ter and the semantic memory system.
8
 
According to previously reported cases of Associative TA,
4,9,11,17 
US's brain dam-
age mainly involved the right hemisphere in the supra-marginal gyrus, the inferior 
parietal cortex, the angular cortex, the insula and the temporal cortex. In addition, 
the rolandic operculum and the post-central gyrus were damaged.  
There was also a small amount of damage to the tapetum of the corpus callosum. A 
similar lesion (specifically in the splenium) was reported in a case of tactile ano-
mia.
55
 This is a deficit due to the disconnection between intact tactile and impaired 
verbal processes and it is characterised by difficulties in naming and verbally de-
scribing objects after manipulation. Nevertheless, this typically spares the ability to 
pantomime the use of an object. In contrast, as reported, US was able to describe in 
detail the features of an object, but he was unable to mime its use. Furthermore, he 
did not manifest any other deficits associated with tactile anomia, such as finger 
anomia
18
 or dysgraphia.
6
 US’s lesions also included subcortical white matter, in 
particular the superior longitudinal fasciculus and the posterior and superior corona 
radiate. The superior longitudinal fasciculus is one of the intra-hemispheric white 
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matter tracts that connect the posterior and anterior networks involved in atten-
tional processes.
57,58
 This might explain the dysfunctional signs relating to atten-
tion and executive functions that US showed in some attentional tests (TEA, 
Stroop, PASAT, Tower of London, BADS) and in everyday life activities where 
he showed hesitation (e.g. when approaching new tasks) and uncertainty (e.g. 
when planning and organising multiple tasks). 
In addition, these subcortical lesions may have damaged the connections between 
parietal (SII, inferior parietal and posterior associative areas) and frontal (prefron-
tal, SMA, premotor, FEF) cortices, which are active in normal people during tac-
tile recognition tasks.
4,10,59,60
 
Finally, a ventral pathway (connecting SI, SII, insula and medio-temporal areas) is 
involved in the non-specific modality of object recognition, as shown in memory 
tasks regarding the shape of objects,
61 
object discrimination 
2 
and the integration of 
different modalities in object recognition.
3
 It is thus possible that US’s lesion af-
fects these connections between ventral, parietal and frontal areas.
60 
Taken as a whole these data suggest that US suffered from Associative TA. 
 
The effects of a tDCS programme in the rehabilitation of TA. The application of 
tDCS in rehabilitation programmes is relatively recent and to date only a few stud-
ies have investigated the efficacy of this stimulation when associated with a spe-
cific rehabilitation programme for brain damaged patients (e.g. 
22,64-66
). In line with 
these previous studies, we proposed a programme involving repeated tDCS ses-
sions (over several days) in order to monitor the additive effects of stimulation.
22,66
 
In addition, we analysed the potentially different impact of tDCS on US's perform-
ance comparing two different stimulation sites.  
In the comparison between the B blocks (in which US only participated in occupa-
tional/neuropsychological therapy) and the A Blocks (in which standard rehabilita-
tion was associated with brain stimulation) the latter produced better results.  
We can thus conclude that for this patient, tDCS enhances the effects of rehabilita-
tion, with prolonged long term effects as confirmed in the two follow-up checks. 
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We exclude the possibility of a spontaneous recovery as, although US was in the 
acute phase after the lesion onset, his deficits in object recognition were stable at 
the three measurements carried out before the experimental baseline. Moreover, 
his results were not influenced by other sensory-motor factors since the rehabilita-
tion activities he carried out were identical in blocks A and B and the stimulation 
was administered off-line (i.e. not contemporary with occupa-
tional/neuropsychological rehabilitation).  
The tDCS programme we devised was relatively long and this probably facilitated 
the resulting long term potentiation (LTP).
67
 Specifically, off-line anodal tDCS 
stimulation affects the neuronal membrane depolarisation by means of the in-
volvement of glutamatergic N-methyl-Daspartic (NMDA) receptors that, subse-
quently, activate LTP mechanisms.
68,69
 In fact, off-line stimulation is usually ap-
plied for its neuroplasticity effects in experimental and clinical populations suffer-
ing from neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. depression, chronic pain and stroke reha-
bilitation).
70
 
Finally, we exclude any potential effects of adaptation to stimulation. Post stimula-
tion effects have been reported elsewhere,
71
 but the improvement gained by the 
subject in our study was maintained even though our paradigm included long in-
tervals without tDCS (one-week blocks B1, B2 and B3).
72,73
  
The results of the comparison we made between the two stimulation sites indicate 
that tDCS is more efficacious when applied to the perilesional Parietal area than 
the Occipital area. By analysing the subject’s performance in each condition, his 
improvement after P4 stimulation was more evident in the first two blocks (A1 and 
A2) than in the last week of training (A3). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 
week A3 US’s performance was quite good even before training and this might 
have reduced the possibility of recording further improvement in this specific 
block.  
A smaller improvement, especially in the first two blocks, was also recorded with 
Occipital stimulation, indicating that non-specific stimulation may also affect 
neuro-modulation, although less than with specific perilesional stimulation. 
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We chose not to use a sham stimulation condition in this study since the patient 
was very sensitive to any changes in the intensity of the stimulation and quickly 
understood when the stimulation was not real. In any case we consider that it is 
useful to compare different areas of stimulation in order to understand the impor-
tance of a focused stimulation, as has recently been discussed in other studies.
74
 
Our analysis of US’s lesion indicated that the area corresponding to P4 is in a per-
ilesional position in the right posterior parietal cortex (PPC). This was the site 
which was used in previous studies regarding tDCS stimulation with brain-
damaged patients, in particular in rehabilitative training for neglect
65 
and apraxia.
5
 
In fact, PPC corresponds to the area between the superior and inferior parietal cor-
tices, in the parietal-frontal network - an area which is often disconnected in 
TA.
11,15,76,7715
 For this reason, we suggest that stimulation to PPC might have 
modulated the increased activity in the spared tissue around the lesion.  
It has been suggested that PPC has a role in supporting the recognition of objects 
in general since it is involved in the integration of the various different features 
which make up an object.
78
 In addition, anodal tDCS on the right perilesional PPC 
enhances sensory-motor networks.
65
 Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
in our study tDCS stimulation affected the perception of the objects thereby in-
creasing the efficacy of manipulation.
4 
PPC also plays a role in top-down attentional mechanisms,
79,80
 in particular in the 
visuo-spatial network.
58
 Nevertheless, US presented with very good attentional 
abilities and we therefore exclude the possibility that the progress he made de-
pended on attentional factors.  
 
The main limitation of this study is that it involves only one individual patient 
whose performance is not comparable with those of control subjects due to the 
ease of the task for healthy people. Thus, we do not know if stimulation applied to 
other patients with similar symptoms would have the same effect and it is in fact 
very difficult to find similar subjects due to the fact that the deficit is highly spe-
cific. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the rehabilitative programme carried out in 
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a sub-acute phase, US’s TA was stable thus excluding the hypothesis of a sponta-
neous recovery.  
Another potential limitation is that this paradigm did not include a proper sham 
condition but compared two stimulation sites with each other and two conditions 
involving the presence or absence of tDCS stimulation and traditional rehabilita-
tion. Even if this is not a typical administration, this procedure allowed us to iden-
tify the effects of specific perilesional stimulation.  
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, at least in the case of this pa-
tient, specific perilesional stimulation can support rehabilitation by enhancing per-
ceptual, representational object related processes. Further studies are needed in or-
der to understand the potentially greater efficacy of paradigms involving online 
specific-stimulation administered during the execution of ad-hoc tasks. 
 
Clinical messages 
 anodic tDCS increases the efficacy of rehabilitation in a patient with Tactile 
Agnosia after ischemic stroke. 
 Specific anodic tDCS on perilesional areas is more efficacious than non-
specific stimulation for patients recovering from Tactile Agnosia and it 
represents a useful tool to be used in rehabilitation after strokes. 
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